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A bstract
Voting systems aim to provide trustworthiness in elections; however, they have 
always been a target of malicious behaviours due to difficulties in designing such 
complex systems and the enormous value of controlling the election results, caus­
ing unfair election outcome, loss of personal privacy and trust in democracy. This 
thesis aims to shed light on how voting systems, in particular, paper-based ones 
can be evaluated so as to provide a better level of confidence in their trustwor­
thiness.
This thesis advances the evaluation of the paper-based voting systems using for­
mal methods with automated analysis. In analysis of security protocols, the for­
mal definitions of protocol requirements need to be constructed precisely. To this 
end, a formal framework regarding the anonymity requirement has been given 
and demonstrated to be appropriate for the analysis of voting systems. Simi­
larly, it has been demonstrated th a t the assumptions under which voting systems 
are secure should be well-defined for a rigorous security analysis with the auto­
mated analysis of the ThreeBallot voting system. Moreover, a novel approach has 
been proposed to analyse cryptographic voting systems under a passive attacker 
model using the Prêt à Voter voting system as case study. Finally, an active 
powerful attacker has been adapted into the analysis of voting systems, and an 
automated formal analysis of vVote voting system has been conducted, which is 
under development for use in Victorian Electoral Commission (VEC) elections, 
Australia in 2014. W ith the analyses of voting systems performed in this thesis, 
the formal approach developed here has been demonstrated to  be successful in the 
automated analysis of such complex systems using the process algebra. Commu­
nicating Sequential Processes (CSP), and the model checker, Failures-Divergence 
Refinement (FDR).
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Chapter 1
Introduction
One of the main aims of voting systems is to provide trustworthiness in elections; 
however, they have always been a target of malicious behaviours due to diffi­
culties in designing such complex systems and the enormous value of controlling 
the election results. This thesis aims to shed light on how voting systems, in 
particular paper-based ones, can be evaluated so as to provide a better level of 
confidence in their trustworthiness.
In the early stages of democracy, the voting procedure took the form of a show-of- 
hands, i.e., voters simply put forward their preference in public. However, as this 
method allowed voters to be influenced by others, a new system based on ballot 
papers was introduced in Australia for presidential elections in 1858 in which 
voters voted in the private environment of a booth. This was the election to 
introduce the concept of privacy and it caught on across the world’s democracies. 
However, although voters obtained a better level of secrecy, this meant a shift 
in verifiability of an election to establishing whether the contents of the ballot 
box had been interfered with in any way. Subsequently, through mechanization 
and most recently, computerization of elections voting systems have evolved with 
(e.g., lever machines, punch cards, optical scans and Direct Recording by Elec­
tronics (DRE) machines). Nonetheless, from the literature, despite these new 
technologies, it is apparent tha t there are problems with voting systems tha t 
have yet to be resolved [DSS03, Sch04, Gum05, G0 0O8 , Bla09].
In 2000, in the United States presidential elections, A1 Gore, the Democrat candi­
date was given a negative vote count of —16,022 votes in Florida, Volusia Gounty 
due to equipment failure and subsequently this controversial election was won 
by the Republican, George W. Bush, with a narrow margin of just 537 votes. 
Similarly, in the Florida 2004 presidential election, 58,000 postal ballots went 
missing [BBC04]. These are only two examples among many others of election 
frauds or failures in the history of democracies. As a result of such problems.
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a number of countries have either abandoned or suspended their e-voting sys­
tems (e.g., California and Florida states in USA in 2006, Netherlands in 2008, 
Germany in 2009 and Ireland in 2009).
Many voting systems have been proposed over the last two decades, which aim 
to ensure strict requirements so as to guarantee their trustworthiness [Gha81, 
F 0 0 9 2 , NefOl, BG02, GRS05, Riv06, GEG+08, GGM08, Adi08). The convention 
in all except [Riv06] is to use cryptography to  provide voter privacy, anonymity, 
integrity and so forth. However, encryption does not always mean guaranteed 
privacy in security protocols. For example, Lowe [Low95] demonstrates tha t the 
Needham-Schroeder public-key protocol [NS78] is indeed insecure 17 years since 
it was first proposed. In addition to concerns regarding security protocols, there 
has been increasing concern tha t all employed voting systems need to  be verified. 
Recently, research has focused on the formal analysis of trustworthy voting sys­
tems [NAN05, DKR06, BHM08, DKR09, DKRIO, SRKKIO, Sm yll). However, 
there is still a lack of m ature methodology th a t can be used to provide a foun­
dation for automated verification of voting systems due to difficulties entailed 
in modelling and analysis. These obstacles are inherited from the security pro­
tocols, whereby [RSG“^ 00]: the security properties can be too highly subtle to 
define precisely; describing the model in a hostile environment can be too com­
plex; defining any intruder’s ability is extremely challenging and the concurrency 
involved in security protocols further complicates analytical endeavours. This 
increased complexity has meant tha t hand proof verification of voting systems is 
losing its effectiveness and hence, the need for automated protocol verification.
The substantive aim in this thesis is to investigate in current definitions of privacy- 
related properties, in general, and to redefine them so as to facilitate formal 
analysis of any voting system. Formally defining such properties is not straight­
forward as there can be various requirements for different scenarios. Regarding 
this, [SS96] presents a formal definition in relation to the anonymity for security 
protocols, which this researcher contends does not apply in the case of such voting 
systems. In order to ensure a rigorous security protocol analysis, the first task is 
to develop a framework and this is to be achieved by drawing upon the definitions 
of privacy-related properties and the passive and active intruder models. This 
framework will then be tested to find out how effective it is for identifying the 
vulnerabilities of certain voting systems. T hat is, the goal is to establish the best 
way to model and analyse validation of voting systems in terms of their trustwor­
thiness. Moreover, because voting systems differ in terms of their designs aimed 
at providing privacy, the belief here is tha t the framework adapted is capable of 
evaluating the effectiveness of these diverse systems in protecting such as privacy 
and secrecy.
1.1. Formal Methods 3
1.1 Formal M ethods
Voting systems can be construed similarly to  security protocols, which involve 
cryptographic primitives designs and protocols. In the literature, provable secu­
rity and formal methods are the two main techniques used for security protocol 
analysis. The former takes the form of mathematical proof regarding a secu­
rity protocol, where the aim is to reduce the security of the modelled system to a 
mathematically hard problem in the presence of an adversarial activity. However, 
systems involving cryptographic protocols have become increasingly complex and 
consequently such attacks do not only depend on flaws and weaknesses in the un­
derlying cryptographic algorithms. T hat is, provable security is not sufficient 
to cover all possible nonintuitive intruder attacks [Mea03]. As a result, formal 
methods, defined by Meadows [Mea03] as
“A combination of a mathematical or logical model of a system 
and its requirements, together with an effective procedure for de­
termining whether a proof th a t a system satisfies these requirements 
have been introduced by way of improvement on simple mathematical 
approaches.”
Meadows also highlights these treatm ents’ usefulness in cryptographic protocol 
analysis as they provide both a thorough analysis of the different paths th a t an 
intruder can take as well as specifying precisely the environmental assumptions 
tha t have been made. In this thesis, formal methods are deemed suitable for rig­
orous specification descriptions and modelling and analysis of the various voting 
systems, in particular, because they have been used effectively for much security 
protocol analysis since being proposed by Dolev and Yao [DY83].
These authors were the first to formalise a hostile environment in which a pro­
tocol can run concurrently, and the intruder can, for instance: overhear, modify, 
block, replay or fake the messages on the communication channels. Since then 
research has focused on model checking tools, such as Failures-Divergence Re­
finement (FDR) [GGH+]. Regarding this, Lowe implemented a formal analysis 
of the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key (NSPK) protocol for the first time using 
FDR and process algebra in the form of Communicating Sequential Processes 
(GSP) [Low95]. The goal of this protocol was to set up mutual authentication 
for two agents by a trusted server using public-key cryptography. However, Lowe 
demonstrated tha t it is not secure when an honest agent commences a session 
with an intruder. That is, he found tha t the subsequent attack is not related to 
the cryptographic algorithm tha t the NSPK is based on, but to the protocol as 
a whole and tha t consequently, if it were to be used with any other public-key 
protocol would still be insecure. In other words, even when this cryptographic
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algorithm is secure, the protocol relying on these primitives may not be so. Sim­
ilarly, voting systems based on either cryptographic or non-cryptographic prim­
itives may be vulnerable to any sorts of security attacks. As a result, the main 
challenge is to maintain the security properties of voting systems intact in the 
presence of malicious agents.
1.2 Defining Desired Properties and Proto­
col Analysis
Trustworthy voting systems can be required to provide a number of crucial prop­
erties such as: secrecy, anonymity, and verifiability. Hence, instead of saying 
tha t a voting system protocol is secure, it is checked whether each of any de­
sired properties are satisfied or not. However, before this can be achieved it is 
to assign precise formal definitions to these properties, which is this researcher’s 
opinion need to  be focused. Security properties are generally defined in terms of 
reachability or indistinguishability. Regarding the former, the secrecy property 
can be defined as being whether malicious agents or an intruder can reach cer­
tain data  in a protocol run. This kind of analysis requires checking all possible 
states of unauthorised access to see whether any lead to intruders or malicious 
agents knowing data th a t should remain secret. Indistinguishability is the term 
often used to investigate the anonymity property. Under this lens, the goal is to 
check whether an intruder can ever distinguish events performed by the proto­
col agents and hence, such analysis is made through a comparison between two 
protocol states.
A review of the existing literature reveals th a t research has focused on giving 
precise formal definitions of the security properties of trustworthy voting sys­
tems [KR05, COPD06, DKR06, BHM08, DKR09, DKRIO, Sm yll] in several 
paradigms, such as the applied pi calculus [FA02], a modular approach [HS04], 
epistemic logic [GHPv05, BRS07, LJPIO], and probabilistic and non-deterministic 
approaches [CPP06, DPP07, BP05]. As the main challenge here is not only to 
give precise definition requirements, but also to automate the analysis, CSP is 
adopted owing to its m aturity and suitability for automation with FDR. Ad­
ditionally, although some of the earlier works on security analysis of voting 
systems have involved automating the analysis, formal language has not sup­
ported a mature full-automation in privacy analysis. Instead, a hand proof was 
given [KR05, BHM08, DRS08] or a compiler was written and their soundness 
needed to be proven [GSll, Sm yll]—this author’s understanding of the sound­
ness is th a t when there is no error, there must be none (no false negatives)—or 
an inefficient tool was adopted [GGK12].
1.3. Contributions that address limitations of existing literature
In process algebras, such as CSP, a protocol is modelled by a process, which may 
also be a composition of other processes. Ideally, the overall process reflects the 
same behaviour as protocol. Moreover, the agents in the protocol are also present 
in the individual processes, for instance, the intruder process. When the model 
is composed and the requirements are translated into CSP, then the protocol 
can be analysed under the assumptions made about the intruder. If the model 
checking against the specification fails, the model-checking tool produces counter­
examples, which means th a t the system does not satisfy the specification. In the 
case tha t model checking is performed successfully, one can question about the 
correctness of the system model. Such possible errors in designing the desired 
behaviour of systems can be detected by further reasoning via various sanity 
checks written as specifications. If the system model behaves correctly for all 
possible cases, then one can be sure th a t the model is correct. However, it is not 
an easy task to try  all the possible cases, but a number of necessary sanity checks 
can help in gaining confidence in the model.
1.3 Contributions that address lim itations 
of existing literature
A key objective in this thesis is to focus on automated formal analysis of crypto­
graphic and non-cryptographic voting systems. In particular, the contributions 
made in the forthcoming chapters match the objectives of: providing concise def­
initions of requirements for voting systems so as to eliminate the vagueness in the 
anonymity definitions in the existing literature, and hence to facilitate future au­
tom ated analysis of such complex systems (Chapter 4); modelling and analysing a 
non cryptographic voting system (Chapter 5) to show the validity of the adopted 
approach, with particular emphasis on the importance of the assumptions when 
designing voting systems; modelling and analysing a paper-based cryptographic 
voting system (Chapter 6 ) to illustrate tha t the mechanised analysis of such sys­
tems can be conducted by the tool introduced in this work; and adapting a formal 
framework of a more powerful intruder model into voting systems protocol anal­
ysis (Chapter 7) so as to avoid attacks on new systems before they are deployed. 
In the remainder of the section the contributions of each of the empirical chapters 
of this thesis (Chapter 4 to 7) are presented.
C h a p te r  4. Anonymity of voters lies at the heart of the democratic process, 
for if the link between them and their vote is uncovered, then not only is the 
secrecy breached but also the integrity of the election is threatened, because 
votes could be bought, or voters coerced into supporting particular candidates. 
Moreover, as rigorous protocol analysis requires a concise formal definition of the
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properties, the anonymity property also needs to be clearly defined. However, 
as pointed out above, formally defining such properties is not straightforward as 
these can vary for different scenarios. Regarding this, there have been number of 
research efforts towards formally defining the anonymity property in the context 
of voting systems. However, little work has been undertaken aimed at providing 
a foundation for the automated verification of such properties.
In the extant literature, Juels et al [JCJ05] describe anonymity for elections in 
terms of provable security. Other definitions of the desired properties of voting 
systems have made use of formal methods, for instance, Delaune et al [DKR06] 
defined privacy properties in terms of adaptive simulation in the pi calculus. 
These authors then discovered in [DKR09] tha t their previous work had unde­
sirable properties, and proposed redefinition based on observational equivalence, 
but did not provide any means of automatic verification. Backes et al [BHM08] 
proposed a new formalization of coercion resistance for remote voting protocols in 
terms of observational equivalence, which implies vote privacy; their verification 
is automated, but some human effort is still required when transforming equiva­
lences in their definition into a pair of processes, which have the same structure 
but differ only by terms. Chothia et al [COPD06] presented a framework for 
automatically checking anonymity using bisimilarity in the process algebraic lan­
guage pCRL  [BFG+01], by analysing the voting scheme first given in [F0092]. 
Their model, like th a t put forward for this research, uses a passive intruder; 
however, their use of bisimilarity can produce false positives (that is, false at­
tacks), because it effectively allows the intruder to see not just what actions are 
taken but where internal choices are resolved. Bisimilarity is more efficient for 
checking [HHK95], but seems too strong a notion of process equivalence for this 
application. More recently regarding the pi calculus, Delaune et a l  [DRS08] 
and Smyth [Smyll] attem pted to verify the FOO voting system with the tool 
ProVerif [BlaOl]; however, the soundness of the transformation they used has yet 
to be proven. However, Chadha et a l  [CCK12] managed to verify the anonymity 
of the FOO voting system using a prototype. Active Knowledge in Security Pro­
tocols (AKISS), which was written in the OCaml programming language and 
implemented to check equivalences. Nevertheless, it turns out tha t this tool 
needs to be improved in terms of efficiency, as accepted in these authors’ pa­
per. Perhaps even more importantly, they were unable to determine precisely 
the termination of the saturation procedure, which is required for deciding trace 
equivalences, only being able to  conjecture what it was.
In Chapter 4, formal definitions of anonymity properties for voting protocols are 
elicited using the process algebra CSP. To this end, first, a number of anonymity 
definitions in the literature are investigated and those claiming to  represent strong 
and weak anonymity are tested in terms of their suitability for various voting
1.3. Contributions that address limitations of existing literature
systems. It emerges th a t the weak anonymity definition can be used to verify the 
anonymity property of voting systems mechanically, but the strong form is not 
appropriate. It is generally accepted tha t the conventional ballot voting system* 
in the vast majority of cases provides anonymity, if this system when tested 
supports this perspective then it will provide validation for formal definitions of 
this aspect derived for this research.
C h a p te r  5. Rivest’s ThreeBallot voting system is im portant because it aims to 
provide security (voter anonymity and voter verifiability) without requiring cryp­
tography. Nevertheless, a valid vote consists of three individual ballots, making 
the system very difficult to verify by hand proof methods and hence, an efficient 
way of automatic analysis is highly desirable. Moreover, carefully and concisely 
defined underlying assumptions are also necessary for a rigorous formal analy­
sis. Analysis of the ThreeBallot system is provided to demonstrate tha t concise 
meaning of these assumptions is crucial when developing a voting system.
In the literature, the ThreeBallot voting system has been subject of analysis of 
one sort or another many times since its publication [Str06b, Str06a, CEA07, 
App07, dMPQ07, TPR07, CKW08, HSS09, K T V ll]. Perhaps the earliest of this 
was conducted by Strauss [Str06b, Str06a], who established the success proba­
bilities of attacks for various numbers of candidates and voters in multiple races. 
That is, the various attacks against the system, in particular, reconstruction and 
pattern request attacks were considered. The experiments were coded in Python, 
using modelled elections with a number of races on a single multi-ballot form. 
Clark et al. [CEA07] also investigated ThreeBallot, and elicited th a t its multi­
ballot form can reveal information tha t can compromise voter privacy. More­
over, a simulation-based analysis of this system was made by de Marneffe et al. 
[dMPQ07] using the universally composable security framework [CanOl]. They 
found tha t ThreeBallot lacks an election fairness guarantee (by looking at some 
receipts a real world adversary is able to obtain an estimation of the election out­
come). Additionally, a modified system protocol in which a voter chooses his/her 
receipt before expressing her preference was proposed in [dMPQ07]. This proto­
col was shown to guarantee election fairness, at the cost of some noise in the final 
tally, with the short ballot assumption (SBA)'*’, and an additional assumption 
tha t most of the receipts are not known to the adversary. One drawback, how­
ever, is tha t the voter cannot express his/her preference on the mini-ballot th a t 
she has chosen as her receipt, which makes voting more complicated. Statistical
*The conventional (also called classical or traditional) voting system is the system where 
the voter indicates her preferred candidate by marking a ballot form in a private environment 
(booth) located in polling stations, and casts her vote by dropping the ballot paper into a ballot 
box. After the election is closed, the cast votes are collected at a central place and tallied.
U h e SB A states that the information content of a ballot should be low and this assumption 
is further investigated in Chapter 5.
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results about the relation between the number of candidates in an election and 
the privacy level of this system were provided by Cichoh et al  [CKW08] as well 
as a critique on the effectiveness of Strauss’ attacks. Cichoh et al  claimed that 
it is impossible to reconstruct voters’ preferences in a single election run with 
two candidates with a ‘reasonable number of voters’. However, the definition of 
weak anonymity used in [CKW08] is much different from this researcher’s, given 
in [MHS 12]. T hat is, considering tha t an individual mini-ballot can be used to 
construct two different multi-ballots cast for the same candidate, their definition 
seems necessary, but not sufficient. T hat is, the observer would notice th a t one 
of the voters is not able to vote for tha t candidate. A more theoretical work was 
carried out by Henry et al [HSS09], who focused on a two-candidate race, and 
determined the secure ballot sizes under reconstruction and pattern requesting 
attack conditions. Finally, Kfisters et al [KTVll] computationally analysed 
the level of privacy offered by the ThreeBallot voting system and the proposed 
system by de Marneffe et a l [dMPQ07], and concluded tha t the latter provides 
better privacy than the original.
In Chapter 5, a CSP model of ThreeBallot is constructed and used to  produce the 
first automated formal analysis of its anonymity property using FDR. During this 
process, it emerges tha t one of the crucial assumptions under which ThreeBal­
lot operates, the Short Ballot Assumption, is highly ambiguous in the literature. 
Consequently, various plausible precise interpretations are put forward, but it is 
discovered that in each case, the interpretation is either unrealistically strong or 
else fails to  ensure anonymity. Therefore, a version of the Short Ballot Assump­
tion in relation to ThreeBallot tha t is realistic but still provides a guarantee of 
anonymity is adopted.
C h a p te r  6 . The definition of anonymity for voting systems and the tool 
used for model checking should be compatible with the automated analysis of 
cryptography-based voting systems, which use such features as: symmetric, asym­
metric and homomorphic encryptions as well as digital signatures and mixnets.
In the literature, although automated formal analysis of Prêt à Voter does not 
exist, this researcher is aware of a few full system threat analyses of it. For ex­
ample, Karlof et a l  [KSW05] presented an analysis of Chaum’s scheme [Cha04], 
on which the Prêt à Voter system is based. Their threat analysis mainly covered 
those from DREs, t ailiers, and outside coercive parties as well as collusions be­
tween these. They identified a number of vulnerabilities, for instance, subliminal 
channel attacks, denial of service and message reordering attacks and social en­
gineering attacks caused by unreliable, but honest participants, such as voters. 
Another interesting work more specific to Prêt à Voter is tha t of Ryan and Pea­
cock [RP05, RPIO]. They performed a system perspective analysis of Prêt à Voter
1.3. Contributions that address limitations of existing literature
by first investigating Karlof et aUs observations and describing further vulnerabil­
ities and threats, for instance, the doll matching, side-channel and kleptographic 
attacks as well as the undermining of public confidence. Finally, Jonker et al. 
[JMP09] proposed a formal framework for quantifying voter-controlled privacy 
and an analysis of P rêt à Voter was conducted in [Jon09] using this framework. 
Although, this analysis did not cover a complete modelling of Prêt à Voter and 
was not automated, they illustrated tha t their framework could be used to  deter­
mine the privacy level of Prêt à Voter. Following tha t Jonker and Pang [JP ll] 
extended the framework in [JMP09] with the model of a bulletin board and by 
capturing the coercion-resistance property, and they applied the extended frame­
work to the Prêt à Voter voting system to measure loss of privacy.
In Chapter 6 , the ability of the chosen methodology of automated analysis of 
cryptographic voting systems with a paper-based trustworthy voting system Prêt 
à Voter [RS06] tha t aims to provide anonymity based on mixnets and cryptog­
raphy is investigated. Subsequently, the first-fully automated verification of this 
voting system from an observer point of view is presented. Moreover, a number of 
conspiracy theories, such as the election authority’s colluding with the intruder, 
are examined to see if anonymity is preserved under such conditions.
C h a p te r  7. The more powerful the intruder, the better the security analysis 
required, as they can act in an increasing number of different ways. Hence, a 
natural next step is to model a more powerful intruder along the lines of a Dolev- 
Yao one [DY83], who is in control of the network, and can mount active attacks. 
This type of intruder not only observes a protocol run, but also interacts with the 
protocol participants, overhears communication channels, intercepts and spoofs 
any messages tha t he/she has learned or generated from any prior knowledge.
In the literature, there have been a number of attem pts for autom ated anonymity 
verification of voting systems, which have deployed the Dolev-Yao intruder model. 
For example, Backes et al. [BHM08] analysed voting systems mechanically in 
terms of verifiability properties. However, no automated analysis of anonymity 
property was provided as the ProVerif employed was ineffectual for coping with 
equivalences, and hence, a hand-proof was required. Similarly, Delaune et al. 
[DRS08, DKRIO] and also Smyth [Smyll] verified vote privacy of the FOO voting 
system with an additional compiler (ProSwapper), but these lacked proof of its 
soundness. Moreover, Chadha et al. [CCK12] managed to verify the anonymity 
of the FOO voting system using a prototype, AKISS, which was w ritten in the 
OCaml programming language and implemented to check equivalences. However, 
the tool adopted was inefficient, and an im portant part of the analysis, the ter­
mination of the saturation procedure as required for deciding trace equivalences, 
was conjectured.
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In Chapter 7, intruder capabilities are expanded with the adaptation of a full 
Dolev-Yao [DY83] intruder model, which is then modified with additional as­
sumptions. For this purpose, the lazy spy (perfect spy) intruder model [RG97] in 
relation to voting systems is drawn upon, as it is very efficient in terms of cutting 
down unnecessary states as well as being flexible for usage with any other privacy 
related properties. In order to demonstrate, the suitability of this intruder model 
for evaluating voting systems, the vVote voting system, a promising real-world 
e-voting system is, subsequently analysed. In this part of the investigation, the 
secrecy and anonymity properties are covered as well as it being shown th a t a 
generic voting system can be analysed effectively using lazy spy in CSP with the 
FDR model checker.
1.4 Publications
Our contributions listed above were published in the following journal and con­
ference proceedings, upon which the thesis is partly based.
[M H S 1 2 ]: M urat Moran, James Heather, and Steve Schneider. Verifying 
anonymity in voting systems using CSP. Formal Aspects of Computing, pages 
1-36, 2012
[M HS 13]: M urat Moran, James Heather, and Steve A Schneider. Automated 
anonymity verification of the ThreeBallot voting system. In IFM, pages 94-108, 
June 2013
[M H13]: M urat Moran and James Heather. Automated analysis of voting sys­
tems with Dolev-Yao intruder model. In Automated Verification of Critical Sys­
tems AVOCS, September 2013
1.5 Outline
The rest of this thesis is organised as below.
Chapter 1 has introduced the thesis by identifying the gap in the literature, 
thereby eliciting research problems on voting systems th a t need to be addressed.
Chapter 2 describes the necessary concepts for helping the reader to understand 
basic concepts covered throughout the thesis. Firstly in this regard, cryptographic 
primitives are introduced, on which some of the case study voting systems are 
based, (e.g., public-key encryption, digital signatures and mixnets). Secondly, 
election methods and the privacy properties of voting systems are investigated. 
Next, four paper-based, supposedly, trustworthy non-cryptographic (the conven­
tional and the ThreeBallot voting systems), and cryptographic voting systems
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(Prêt à Voter and vVote) are introduced. Finally, the syntax and semantics of 
the process algebra, CSP, are explained.
In Chapter 3, an analysis for a problem called Dining Cryptographers is provided 
in order to explain modelling in CSP and the anonymity concept in general. In 
addition, the NSPK security protocol is drawn upon to  provide a stronger intruder 
model and analysed in terms of the secrecy property. The intruder model will be 
used for analysis of the vVote voting system using CSP and FDR in Chapter 7.
A formal framework for the anonymity definition using CSP is described in Chap­
ter 4. Subsequently, using this definition, the conventional voting system is mod­
elled and analysed, followed by presentation of the initial results of the automated 
privacy investigation into voting systems.
The suitability of the adopted framework is probed by modelling and auto­
matically analysing a paper-based non-cryptographic trustworthy voting system, 
ThreeBallot, in a more efficient way than previously in Chapter 4. Additionally, 
strong evidence is provided regarding the aforementioned ambiguity of the short- 
ballot assumption and consequently, alternative definitions for this are provided 
tha t are more efficient and realistic given its underpinning meaning.
In Chapter 6 the research framework is extended by formalising some of the 
cryptographic primitives as well as presenting the first automated anonymity 
analysis of Prêt à Voter. This analysis highlights the ability of this framework 
in modelling and analysing cryptography-based voting systems. Moreover, there 
is analysis of this particular system under alternative assumptions, including 
misbehaving election authorities.
In Chapter 7 the Dolev-Yao [DY83] intruder model is adapted to voting systems 
tha t can be automated using FDR and use this framework to model and analyse 
the vVote voting system. Further, it is demonstrated th a t secrecy analysis of 
voting systems is effective when using this adapted framework.
Finally, in Chapter 8 the contributions of this thesis are reviewed, the limitations 
considered and suggestions for future research directions are put forward.
Note on experimental configuration. The experimental results regarding the ver­
ification times for the automated analysis of voting systems given in Chapter 5 6 
and 7 were produced on a machine with Intel(R) Core(TM) 15 CPU 2.40GHz, and 
1GB RAM. Additionally, FDR 2.94 academic version was used in all mechanical 
analysis.
Note on CSP models of the voting systems analysed in this thesis. The GSP 
models of the voting systems, from which the experimental results given in this 
thesis were produced can be downloaded from the author’s personal webpage 
h ttp ://n iu ra tm o ra ii.w o rd p ress .co in /p u b lic a tio n s / under the CSP codes ti-
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tie. Additionally, they will be available on the departmental webpages 
h t t p : //www2. s u r re y . a c .uk/com puting /people /m urat_m oran /index .htm and 
h t tp  : / / epubs. s u r r e y . a c .u k /id /e p rin t/8 0 4 9 2 8 .
Chapter 2
Background
The aim of this chapter is to give enough detail for the reader to understand the 
basic concepts used in the remainder of the thesis rather than presenting an ex­
haustive survey on voting systems. Firstly, a brief background on cryptography 
used in the construction of voting systems provided and subsequently the deduc­
tions rules capturing the properties of cryptographic primitives based on [Sch96] 
in Section 2.1 are spelt out. These rules will help in the understanding of the 
basic ideas behind the modelling and analysis of security protocols using CSP 
and FDR model checker as given in Chapter 3. Moreover, an overview of voting 
systems, and their desired properties is presented in Section 2.2 as well as the 
electoral methods. Finally, a CSP notation along with the abstraction methods 
and semantics used in this thesis is provided in Section 2.3.
2.1 Cryptography
Cryptography is generally used as a medium to provide a secure communication 
between principals over a hostile network. If the intruder is not bounded, he can 
perform infinitely many attacks in order to break the cryptographic protocols’ 
goal (e.g., key distribution or authentication). As in [Low95], the attacks are not 
necessarily based on the fiaws in the cryptographic algorithm used, for they could 
be down to the protocol itself.
Generally, in formal methods, a strong assumption is made regarding cryptogra­
phy tha t abstracts away the underlying cryptographic algorithm and its proper­
ties, i.e., its strengths and weaknesses. T hat is, the encryption and decryption 
are treated as symbolic operators. For instance, an encrypted message with the 
key (pk) can only be decrypted by the corresponding secret key {sk) holder. 
Moreover, although the cryptographic algorithms are not unbreakable under the 
assumption of an intruder with enough computing time and power, it is typically
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assumed tha t the intruder is bounded by the computational power, and th a t the 
probability of him breaking the cryptographic algorithm is negligible. Therefore, 
the main focus here will be on the analysis of security protocols under secure 
cryptographic algorithms, in the sense th a t no one except the corresponding key 
holder is able to decrypt an encrypted message.
In Chapter 7, a structure is required tha t enables the intruder to deduce informa­
tion from what he sees and what he already knows. Such derivations regarding 
cryptographic primitives are captured in terms of deduction rules by the entail- 
ment relation h as described in [Sch96]. The relation is defined as the relation 
between the set of messages tha t are known by, say the intruder, and those that 
can be generated, h: F (M E S S A G E )  x M E S S A G E ,  In other words, M. m  
means tha t the message m  can be deduced from the set M. and the relation is 
closed under the following axioms (Table 2.1) for an information system.
A l.  if m G A4 then A4 h m
A2. if A4 h m and A4 Ç A4' then A4' h m
AZ. if A4 h rrii for each m* G A4' and A4' h m  then A4 h m
Table 2.1: Axioms
The cryptographic messages can also be structured so tha t they can be generated. 
In Table 2.2 and throughout this thesis: symmetric encryption of a message m  
with the symmetric key k is denoted as Ek{m); public key encryption with the 
public key pk  is shown as Epfc(m); similarly, signing the message with the secret 
key Sk is Ssfc(m).
M l. A4 h m A A4 h /c Efc(m)
M2. A4 h m A A4 h p/c ^pk{m)
M3. A4 h m A A4 h s/c SgA:(ni)
Table 2.2: Deduction rules capturing cryptographic message construction
The properties of the encryption methods, symmetric-key and public-key cryptog­
raphy, and the signatures can be captured as in Table 2.3, where Dfc(Efc(m)) mod­
els symmetric decryption, Dsfc(Epfc(m)) public key decryption, and Vpfc(Ssfc(m)) 
message extraction from a signature with the signing public key.
Table 2.4 illustrates some of the deduction rules regarding composable messages 
by any agents (in the models in this thesis, it will be an intruder). In other words, 
an agent can generate a fact or a message, if he knows a specific set of messages.
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K l. DkiEkim)) h m
K2. ^ski^pk (^ )) h m
K3. Vpfc(Ssfc(m)) h m
Table 2.3: Deduction rules covering cryptographic primitives (m is not necessarily 
a message, it could be any fact. For instance, in K3., m  can be a hash of a 
message)
For instance, one possessing the encryption key k and message m  can deduce, 
Ek{m).
SYM-ENC. {k ,m } h Efc(m) A l .M l .
SYM-DEC. {k, Efc(m)} h m A l .M l . K l .
ASYM-ENC. {pk, m } h ^pk{m) A1.M2.
ASYM-DEC. {sk, Epk{m)} h m A l.M 2 .K 2 .
SIGN-SIG. {sk ,m } h Sskim) A l .M Z
SIGN-EXT. {pk,Sskim)} h m Al.M Z.K Z.
Table 2.4: Derived deduction rules involving cryptographic primitives
2.1.1 Symmetric key Encryption
Symmetric key encryption is the class of cryptographic algorithms th a t use the 
same key for message encryption and ciphertext decryption (i.e., encryption and 
decryption key is the same key). Hence, in order for two parties to  communicate 
securely, they need to share the same key. Such encryption is denoted here as 
Ek{m), where k is the shared secret and m is a message. Thus, it is expected 
tha t anyone possessing the shared key k can encrypt the message m, and decrypt 
the ciphertext Efc(m), as defined by the derivations SYS-ENC and SYS-DEC in 
Table 2.4.
In order to establish a secure communication with shared keys, it is assumed th a t 
the shared key is only shared between legitimate agents, and no one else. Hence, 
this requires their having a prior arrangement to agree on a shared key and this 
issue is partially resolved by public-key cryptography.
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2.1.2 Public-key Encryption
Public-key cryptography (also known as asymmetric key cryptography) was first 
put forward by James H. Ellis, Clifford Cocks, and Malcolm Williamson at the 
Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) in the UK in 1973, which 
was kept secret. Later on, an asymmetric-key cryptosystem was designed by Diffie 
and Heilman [DH76] in 1976. This cryptographic system, unlike symmetric key 
cryptography, requires two different keys for encryption and decryption, a public 
key pk  and secret (private) key sk, respectively. Hence, each agent has a pair of 
keys, {pk, sk), which are mathematically linked such tha t Dg^(Ep^(m)) =  m for a 
message m. The previous issue in symmetric key cryptography, where the agents 
need to  share a key, is resolved in this system, as the public key of an agent, 
say pka for agent a, is public and hence, anyone can encrypt a message m  using 
a ’s public key, subsequently sending it to a, also in public. Moreover, although, 
any potential intruder can see the encrypted message, he cannot decrypt it in a 
reasonable amount of time, unless he possesses the secret key ska and therefore, 
only the secret key holder can decrypt the message.
R SA
RSA [RSA78] is a ground breaking algorithm designed for public-key cryptogra­
phy by Rivest, Shamir and Adleman. It is based on the difficulty of factoring 
large integers, which is computationally hard. In more detail, two distinct primes, 
p  and q, and an integer e are chosen such th a t 1 <  e <  4>{n) and gcd{e, 4>{n)) = 1 , 
where (f) is Euler’s totient function and (j){n) = {p—l){q — l).  The values n  and e 
will be publicly accessible. For each value tha t forms a corresponding secret key, 
an integer d is chosen, such th a t e • d =  1 mod 4>{n). Then, a message m  can be 
encrypted with the equality c = m^{ mod n) by anyone knowing the public values 
n  and e and consequently, the decryption of the ciphertext c can be performed 
as =  {m^)^ =  rrf'^ =  m(m od n).
E lG am al
ElGamal [E1G84] is a non-deterministic public key algorithm and unlike the RSA, 
the encryptions of the same plaintext always result in different ciphertexts due 
to its probabilistic feature. The public and secret generation for each agent is 
performed by firstly choosing large random prime numbers p  and q, such tha t 
p = 2q-{-l holds. Secondly, a generator g is chosen from the Gq subgroup of 
Zp—ElGamal can be generalised to work in any finite cyclic group, such as, the 
group of points on an elliptic curve over a finite field [MV096]. Finally, a random 
secret value x g Z* is chosen. Thus, the triple {p,g,g^) will form the public-key, 
and {p, g, x) the secret key of an agent. The subsequent encryption of a message, 
m, can be calculated as {g'^,mK), where h = g^ and r  G Z* is a random value.
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Moreover, in order to decrypt the ciphertext and to obtain m, one should compute 
using the secret value x  as =  m.
Table 2.4, contains the two rules ASYM-ENC and ASYM-DEC, thereby captur­
ing the desired properties of public-key encryption systems in a symbolic way. 
In addition, public-key cryptography also allows the message m  encrypted under 
the secret key to be extracted if it is re-encrypted under the corresponding secret 
key, i.e., Epk{Dsk{'m)) = 'm, which is useful for constructing digital signatures, as 
discussed next.
2.1.3 D igital Signatures
The digital signature of a message provides a guarantee for its authenticity and 
origin. A public key implementation of the digital signatures can also provide non­
repudiation, should a dispute arises about the signer of the message (the signer 
of a message is not be able to  successfully challenge the validity of the signature). 
Although, a signature can be created differently depending on the algorithm 
used, here it is considered th a t a signed message is created by encrypting the 
hash of a message with the signer’s secret key sk  and reversely, the signed fact 
is extracted with the signer’s public-key pk. Hence, as Ep^(Dg^(m)) =  m, the 
output of the verification will demonstrate whether the message was indeed signed 
with the corresponding secret key sk, and whether it has been tam pered with 
or not. Signing a message and extraction of the message from a signed one are 
captured in Table 2.4 with the derived deduction rules, SIGN-SIGN and SIGN- 
EXT. According to these, an agent a can sign a message m with his secret key 
ska, and anyone knowing a ’s public key can verify m ’s authenticity and origin 
by checking whether Vpfc (^S5fc^(H(m))) =  H(m) where H() is an agreed publicly 
known hash function. In the modelling approach to digital signatures in this 
thesis, the origin and the authenticity of a message, say Ssfc„(m), is ensured via 
the authenticated channels. T hat is, an agent is ready to accept any message in 
the expected form, e.g., if the agent b is waiting for a signed message from the 
agent a, as long as; the message is signed with ska, b believes th a t Ssfc„(m) is 
generated by a, and m  is not tampered with.
2.1.4 Homomorphic Encryption
Homomorphic encryption is a property of cryptographic systems, which allows 
for computations to be made on ciphertexts without revealing the secret. T hat 
is, the encryption algorithm E() is homomorphic if given E(mi) and E(m2) one 
can obtain E(mi O m 2 ) for some operation O and messages, m \  and m 2. For 
instance, ElGamal shows a multiplicative homomorphic property as: for given two 
ciphertexts E(p g^a,)(mi) =  (p^'bmih^^) and (m2) =  {g'^^,m2 K^), where h =
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and r \ , r 2 G Z* and p  and q are two large random prime numbers, one can show 
th a t E(p^g,^)(mi)-E(p,g,^)(m2) =  (m i-m 2)h^i+''2)modp =  E(p,g,a.)(mi.m2).
Here, the interest is in the homomorphic property because of its applicability 
to voting systems in terms of providing vote privacy. T hat is, as every vote 
is encrypted under the election public-key, authorities add all encrypted votes 
together, and decrypt and tally the final results without knowing individual ones. 
P rêt à Voter [RS06] and Civitas [CCM08] are among such voting systems.
2.1.5 Threshold C ryptosystem
A threshold technique allows for an initial secret key to  be shared securely among 
a specified number of agents. More specifically, a cryptosystem is (t, n) threshold, 
if t  or more agents recover the initial secret key sk by combining their individual 
secret shares, whereas fewer than t  are unable to do so. In electronic voting, 
however, each threshold party produces a partial decryption of a secret using 
their key share, and the combination of these partial decryptions form a full 
decryption of the secret. For further reading on threshold cryptosystems, the 
reader is referred to [Ped92].
2.1.6 Re-encryption
Re-encryption allows for a ciphertext of a message to be encrypted again without 
needing the secret key x. T hat is, although the two ciphertexts encode the 
same plaintext, they differ in terms of randomness, which results in separate 
ciphertexts. In the case of the ElGamal public-key algorithm, if it is assumed 
th a t {g'^,mK) is the ciphertext tha t encodes the message m  with the random 
value r, in order to  re-encrypt the ciphertext, another value r' G Z* is chosen 
at random. Hence, the re-encryption of the message m  can be produced with 
(g"^ g' '^, m K K ' ). To decrypt this value, the secret value x  is applied as before to 
produce which will be equal to m. In voting, re-encryption
is used to break the link between the voter and the ciphertext sent by her as they 
look different after re-encryption. An advanced version of this technique is used 
in the mixnets in order to anonymise the cast votes in an election.
2.1.7 M ixnets
Chaum [Gha81] designed mixnets for anonymous communications. The goal of 
a mixnet is to  shuffle its input list in such a way th a t no one can trace the 
output list back, thus breaking the link between its inputs and outputs. This 
is done either by decrypting each element of the input list, which requires the 
mix possessing the corresponding secret key, or by re-encrypting them so that 
the input and output lists all look different, but still encode the same messages.
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Figure 2 .1 : An example mix network (mixnet) with three mixes and four inputs
The only entity knowing the link is the mix itself. However, because a dishonest 
mix can reveal the anonymous links, a better approach involving multiple mixes 
was suggested by Chaum. According to this, only a collusion of all mixes could 
break the order of the elements in the input list. In Chaums’s decryption mixnet, 
the inputs are the ciphertexts constructed as a layer for each mix server in the 
network that needs to be decrypted with the mix server’s private key. Having 
decrypted the layer corresponding to its own public key, the mix permutes the 
list and forwards it to the next mix in the network. In the re-encryption type 
of mixnets [PIK94], the inputs are the messages encrypted under an algorithm, 
such as ElGamal [E1G84], which allows mix servers to re-encrypt them and after a 
re-encryption, the mix server permutes the inputs, subsequently outputting them 
to the next mix.
Figure 2.1 depicts a generic mixnet consisting of three mixes. The first takes a 
list of messages in the order {A, J5, C, D) as its input—the list in its application 
to voting systems can be a list of encrypted candidate names, or onion values in 
order to provide an anonymous channel on which the voters cast their votes, thus 
hiding the link between the voters and their cast ballot forms. Subsequently, the 
output of the first mix becomes the input for the second, and following tha t the 
output of the second mix will be the input for the third. At the end of shuffling, 
the last mix server outputs the mixed order of the list, (C, A, B, D) in Figure 2.1.
In order to ensure whether a mix in the network is honest, a method called 
randomised partial checking (RPG) [JJR02] as illustrated in Figure 2.2 can be 
performed, which requires tha t each mix reveals half of its links between the 
elements in the input and output lists. Note tha t if a link to an element of the 
input list has already been revealed for a mix, the link for tha t element in the 
next mix should not be revealed. For instance, in Figure 2.2, the links for the 
inputs B  and D  are revealed for RPG in the first mix server, however, in the 
second mix, only the input and output links for A  and C  are revealed. Hence, 
an audit on these published links can be performed to verify tha t the mix is, 
indeed, honest, if the element has not been tampered with, without revealing the
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Figure 2.2: Randomised partial checking of a mixnet with two mixes and four 
inputs
input-output links of the mixnet. Moreover, if a mix acts dishonestly, the chance 
of its being caught is 2“ .^
2.1.8 Security Implications
Although re-encryption enables a ciphertext to be modified without the need of 
a secret key and plaintext would appear to be a useful mechanism for anonymis- 
ing mixnets, this can also lead to undesired severe consequences as it can also 
be modified by the intruder in a meaningful way. This means tha t such cryp­
tographic systems tha t use re-encryption (indeed inherent in any homomorphic 
cryptosystem), such as mixnets, are not secure under ciphertext indistinguisha- 
bility under adaptive chosen ciphertext attack (IND-CCA2). However, they can 
achieve a weaker notion of security, such as, indistinguishability under chosen 
plaintext attack (IND-CPA).
2.2 Voting Systems
Under the traditional voting system, a trade-off is introduced between voter pri­
vacy and verifiability of the election. That is, as the ballot box keeps the link 
between the voter and her* ballot secret, it provides voter anonymity. However, 
the voter has no way of tracing his ballot or verifying whether it has been cast as 
intended and tallied correctly at the end of the election. Hence, the integrity of 
the election depends on the assumption of honest election officials (also called the 
chain-of-custody). Moreover, the honesty and correctness of the election officials 
are generally audited by the independent observers or the representatives from 
each political party in the election race. The deployment of electronic devices.
* Throughout the thesis, a voter will be referred to as female and an intruder as male. For 
instance: the voter takes “her” receipt, and the intruder will try to figure out how a voter has 
voted using “his” abilities.
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such as lever and DRE machines, aimed to assist the voters’ casting their votes, 
introduced a new trust in hardware and/or software used in the machines as well 
as in the election officials, as these are generally provided by private companies. 
In order to provide verification of such hardware and software components in 
voting systems, the voter-verified paper audit trail (W PA T ) was proposed by 
Rebecca Mercuri in 1992 [Mer92], which is a way of verifying a ballot being cast 
as intended by the voter th a t involves having a printer on the voting machine 
tha t prints out a receipt of the vote. However, although W P A T  provides a cer­
tain level of verification, it is insufficient for verifying all of the chain-of-custody 
points.
End-to-end (E2E) voting systems ensure tha t a voter is not only able to verify tha t 
her ballot is recorded as intended, but also counted as cast (included in the final 
tally). Moreover, anyone can verify tha t only eligible voters are allowed to cast 
ballots and the final tally is correct. This is generally done by producing a receipt 
for the voters, who can then check against the published receipts in a public 
domain like the web bulletin board (WBB). However, a receipt should not leak 
any information about how the voter has voted, as this could cause vote buying 
and coercion attacks as described in Section 2.2.2. The following are examples 
of paper-based E2E voting systems: non-cryptographic the ThreeBallot [Riv06], 
and cryptographic Prêt à Voter [Rya05] and vVote [BCH+12a, BCH+12b] voting 
systems. In this thesis, the focus is particularly on paper-based E2E in-person 
voting systems.
In the rest of this section, first, the terminology of voting system participants is 
introduced and then the desired properties of these systems provide the focus. 
Finally, the different types of electoral methods are outlined.
2.2.1 Terminology
In this subsection, some of the concepts of the voting systems and elections 
covered throughout this thesis are clearly explained so as to avoid ambiguity in 
their interpretation.
V oter: an eligible and registered individual attending to an election in order to 
express her preference.
C a n d id a te : an individual running in an election process.
V ote: a representation of a voter’s preference.
B allo t: a medium for voters to cast their votes.
E lec tio n  A u th o rity : the individuals responsible for the conduct of elections, 
e.g., preparing ballot forms and voter registration.
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E lectoral Officials: the individuals working during an election, who are respon­
sible for voter authentication, vote collection and tallying, such as polling station 
workers.
Trusted Third P arty (T T P): an independent and trusted organisation, which 
can help with the verification of some parts of an election as and when needed, 
for instance, auditing the correctness of the final tally and voting systems’ com­
ponents.
Intruder: a hostile individual deliberately trying to violate protocol objectives, 
and in this thesis two types are considered according to their destructive capa­
bilities: passive and active intruders. More specifically, a passive intruder cannot 
only observe all public information but also the private channels th a t can be 
shared by dishonest agents. By contrast, an active one acts as described in 
Dolev-Yao [DY83] and the details on the capabilities of such intruders are given 
in Chapters 4 and 7.
V oting System  A ttacks
The followings are the attacks related to voting systems.
V ote-selling Attack: the voter being able to  sell her vote, as she can prove to 
the intruder how she has voted.
Italian  Attack: the intruder being able to ask the voter to  fill a ballot in an 
uncommon way, so he can later check whether the unusual ballot appears on the 
bulletin board.
R econstruction  Attack: the intruder being able to reconstruct a cast ballot 
form with the information available. He may then find out how the voter has 
voted.
Forced-abstention Attack: the voter being forced to abstain from voting.
R andom isation  Attack: the voter being forced to cast a ballot form in a 
random way.
Im personating or Sim ulation Attack: the voter being forced to give her 
credentials to a coercer, who can then vote instead of her.
2.2.2 Desired Properties of Voting System s
The design of trustworthy voting systems is not a trivial challenge since they 
depend heavily on a range of trust assumptions regarding such aspects as: the 
electoral officials, the voters and the hardware and software used. T hat is, obvi­
ously, these elements can be exploited with the intention of modifying the elec­
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tion results or undermining their credibility by decreasing the voter’s trust in 
the system. Consequently, in order to reduce the probability of elections being 
compromised, increased transparency and better monitoring are desirable during 
the electoral process. Thus, a trustworthy voting system can be considered as a 
challenge to get the level of transparency needed to gain confidence in the system, 
the degree of privacy th a t allows for the necessary freedom of choice to the voter 
and election integrity, all at the same time. Next, some of the desirable properties 
of voting systems are discussed in turn, i.e., privacy-related (anonymity, receipt- 
freeness, and coercion-resistance), verifiability aspects (eligibility, individual and 
universal) and integrity and fairness.
A nonym ity
Anonymity of a voter means tha t the voting system should not reveal or give 
any information about how a particular vote was cast, often referred to as vote- 
privacy. For this to be the case, the identity of the voter associated with a ballot 
paper must be hidden. In order to clarify the distinction between secrecy and 
anonymity in voting systems, we can think of a situation where the intruder 
happens to link the voter to her ballot form, violating the anonymity property, 
but cannot interpret what her real vote is, preserving the secrecy of the vote. 
Therefore, the intruder can reveal the secrecy of a vote (knowing for whom the 
vote is), such as, by decrypting the encrypted vote, but still cannot link the vote to 
the voter casting it, preserving the anonymity property. There exist a numerous 
number of anonymity definitions, referring to it as either secrecy of a vote or 
the link between the voter and her vote. This is a subject covered in detail in 
Chapter 4 where the various definitions of anonymity in the literature are drawn 
upon in order to derive a concise formal definition regarding this requirement.
R eceipt-Freeness
Receipt-freeness [BT94] ensures tha t a voter does not possess any information 
(e.g., receipt) tha t can be used by any third party to show how she has voted. A 
violation of this requirement may end up the voter being encouraged to sell her 
vote to a coercer (vote-selling attack). For instance, although the P rêt à Voter 
voting system provides a receipt for the voters for verifiability purposes, it does 
not illustrate how she has voted.
C oercion-R esistance
Essentially, coercion can be described as a voter being threatened or forced to 
act according to the instructions she has been given by a coercer. The coercion 
can be tha t the voter is forced to vote for a particular candidate, but it can 
take various forms, such as, forced-abstention, randomisation, and impersonating
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or simulation. The corollary of this, coercion-resistance [JCJ05], refers to the 
coercer failing to have any evidence as to how a voter has voted, even if she has 
interacted with him.
Individual, U niversal and E ligib ility  V erifiability
Individual verifiability allows a voter to verify whether her vote has been cast- 
as-intended and counted-as-cast a t the end of the election.
By contrast, universal verifiability implies th a t any independent organisations, 
party or charity are able to verify tha t the election result is correct at the final 
tally, which is indeed the sum of all valid votes tha t are cast-as-intended.
Eligibility verifiability ensures th a t only eligible/legitimate voters can vote, and 
th a t they should be allowed to vote only once. The concept is introduced 
in [DKRIO] as “anyone can check tha t each vote in the election outcome was 
cast by a legitimate voter and there is at most one vote per voter” .
In tegrity
Integrity (also called correctness or accuracy) ensures tha t the valid cast ballots 
are counted correctly in the final tally.
Fairness
The term  fairness, refers to the situation th a t no partial results are revealed 
before the tallying phase, which otherwise would affect the voters’ preferences 
during the election.
The attacks on voting systems listed in the previous subsection aim to break the 
privacy related properties; anonymity, receipt-freeness and coercion-resistance, 
which are mainly focused on this thesis. An attack may have impact on several 
privacy requirements depending on the reason to  the attack. For instance, vote- 
selling may occur due to  the voting system itself (violation of anonymity) or voter 
receipts (violation of receipt-freeness) or a interaction with a powerful coercer 
during vote casting (violation of coercion-resistance). Moreover, reconstruction 
and Italian attacks violate receipt-freeness property of voting systems because 
of the information leakage in voter receipts. Finally, the forced-abstention, ran­
domisation, and impersonating or simulation attacks require the coercer com­
municate with the intruder at any time during the election period violating 
coercion-resistance property. However, because of the relation between privacy 
properties—coercion-resistance implies receipt-freeness and receipt-freeness im­
plies anonymity (vote privacy) [DKR09]—if a voting system is protected against 
the attacks targeting coercion-resistance, it should also be immune to the receipt- 
freeness and anonymity attacks.
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In this thesis, the focus will be mainly on privacy properties, anonymity, receipt- 
freeness and coercion-resistance, and on the attacks against these voting system 
requirements.
2.2.3 Electoral M ethods
There are numerous electoral methods tha t are used in different countries and 
on various occasions. They mostly vary according to the number of winners, 
e.g., single and multiple-winner electoral methods. First-past-the-post (FFTP) 
or plurality voting is probably the most common single-winner electoral method 
and under this method, a candidate should receive more votes than  any other in 
order to win. Additionally, each voter is allowed to vote for only one candidate. 
Generally, an F FT P  ballot paper consists of a list of candidates and a marking 
box for each, with the voter just marking one of the boxes tha t corresponds to 
her preferred candidate. Although, this type of electoral method provides the 
main focus in the rest of the thesis owing to its simplicity and also the fact th a t 
it is overwhelmingly the most commonly used, the preferential voting procedure 
is also given some attention.
Preferential or ranked voting allows voters to rank the candidates in term s of 
their preferences. This method also varies according to tallying methods and the 
number of runs in an election. For instance, the single transferable vote (STV) is 
a preferential method, which permits “wasted” votes to contribute to the overall 
result. That is, when a candidate reaches the quota declared by the election 
authorities, he wins a seat, then the other votes for the winner are transferred to 
other candidates depending on the preferences on those ballots as it is a multiple 
winner electoral method. If no candidate exceeds the quota, the candidate with 
the least votes is eliminated, and the ballots he has received are transferred to 
other candidates. This process is repeated until a candidate wins a seat or the 
number of seats left is equal to the number of the remaining candidates. In 
the case of a single winner election, the STV becomes the alternative vote (AV) 
or instant-runoff voting (IRV). The reader is referred to [RRE+05] for further 
details about electoral methods.
2.3 Communicating Sequential Processes
CSP is a formal language designed to describe concurrent systems in term s of 
components tha t interact by means of message passing. It belongs to the pro­
cess calculus family and was introduced by Hoare in 1978 [Hoa78]. Since then it 
has been improved in terms of its ability to model concurrent systems as well as 
analysing security protocols, in particular, regarding its effectiveness when the 
model checking tool FDR [Low96, Ros97, RSG+OO, RoslO] is employed. More­
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over, CSP allows for systems to be modelled in terms of processes, which can 
synchronise and interact with the environment. In addition, it provides several 
semantic models to analyse the behaviour of processes and systems.
2.3.1 Syntax
Processes are defined in terms of a collection of events tha t they may perform and 
for CSP the occurrence of an event should be regarded as an atomic action without 
time. More specifically, a synchronised event can happen when all processes agree 
on executing it, i.e., it happens when it is inevitable. The set of events that 
are visible is called U, and the internal events are written as r .  Processes are 
associated with an interface or alphabet, denoted aP .  If no alphabet is explicitly 
defined then it will be the set of events tha t the process can perform and the 
simplest process is STOP, which fundamentally means doing nothing. SKIP  
is another named process, which terminates immediately. However, it is not a 
deadlock as in STOP, but a successful termination. In addition, RU N {A) is the 
process th a t can always perform any member from the given set of events AC. U 
and the process, RU N  is defined as RU N  {A) =  -4- RU N  {A).
The CSP grammar is used for the processes, P, and Q, the set of events. A, 
variable, x, channel, c, events, a and b, and data, v with data-type, T. The 
elements of language used in this work are set out in Table 2.5 (See [RoslO, Sch99] 
for a fuller account of the language).
Civen a process P  and an event a in S ,  the prefix process a P  is initially 
willing to  perform an event a. T hat is, it waits until the event, a, is performed 
then behaves like the process P. For instance, the process, P\ = a - ^ b  STOP  
will perform the events a and b, then it will terminate.
Events can also be structured into any number of parts. For example, an event 
of the form c.v can represent a channel c passing value v. The set of values T  
th a t can pass along c is the type of c, so the set of events associated with channel 
c of type T  is {c.v \ v E T}.  This can also be written as {|c|}. If C is a set of 
channels, then {|C|} =  U cecikl}-
The input process c?x —)■ P{x) is initially prepared to accept a value th a t will be 
bound to the locally introduced variable x  along channel c, and then behave as 
P  having received input x. The output process c\v -4- P  outputs value v along 
channel c. Throughout the thesis, structured events are used to describe events 
in voting systems. For example vote.v.c can represent voter v casting a vote for 
candidate c.
Recursive processes in CSP, are described by means of recursive definitions of the 
form N  = P, where iV is a process name tha t can appear in process P. N  can also
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i
P ,Q  ::=  processes
STOP  stop (deadlock)
SKIP  successful termination
a P  prefixing
c?v -4- P{v) data input
c\v -4 P  data output
P  U Q  external choice
□ ^^^P (x ) indexed external choice
P  V\Q nondeterministic choice
n^g^P(a:) indexed nondeterministic choice
if b then P  else Q conditional choice
bSzP if 5 then P  else STOP
P  a p \\a Q  Q alphabetised parallel composition
||^^^(P(z), aP{x))  indexed alphabetised parallel composition
P  II Q generalised or interface parallel
A
P  III Q interleaving
^^^P(æ) indexed interleaving
P  \  A  hiding
P[[P]] relational renaming
Table 2.5: CSP notation
take parameters, giving definitions of the form N{p) = P{p). Thus, the process, 
P2 = a -A b P2 , are recursively defined, alternating between the events, a and 
b. Moreover, instead of defining a recursive process with one equation, mutual 
recursion can be used for this purpose. For instance, the process definitions 
Ps = c7x -A P4 {x) and PaÇx) = dix -4 P3 describe a process tha t repeatedly 
inputs and then outputs a value.
2.3.2 Choice Operators
CSP offers choice operations for processes, which are called external and non­
deterministic choice operators denoted as □ and □, respectively. The process 
P  D Q can act like P  or Q depending on the choice of the initial event chosen by 
the environment. For instance, for the process (a -4- P ) □ (5 -4 Q), if the first 
event chosen is <2 then the process will behave as the process P , after perform­
ing the event a. Similarly, if the first event chosen is the event h, subsequently
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the process will act as the process Q. While the external choice operator leaves 
the choice to its environment, in a nondeterministic process, the choice is made 
internally. Thus, the process (a —)• P ) □ (6 —> Q) can act as either a -4 P  or 
b Q and the environment has no control over which this is. Indexed versions 
of external and nondeterministic choices allow for choices to be made among a 
number of processes. In addition to these, there is also the traditional conditional 
choice if-then-else.
2.3.3 Parallel Operators
Systems can be made up of a collection of processes th a t run in parallel and
tha t are synchronised in relation to the events tha t they agree to perform. For
instance, the alphabetised parallel P  ap\\aQ Q executes P  and Q in parallel,
where they have to synchronise regarding those events th a t are in both of their
alphabets, but they can perform other events independently. Thus, they must
only agree on the events in the intersection a P  D aQ. P  \\ Q will be used as
shorthand for P  ap\\aQ Q in the remainder of this thesis. Additionally, the
events tha t need to be synchronised can be identified with the generalised or
interface parallel operator P  || Q, where all events in A  must be synchronised,
A
but not the events outside A, which can be performed independently. These 
parallel operators are associative and commutative, so any number of processes 
in parallel can be combined, in any order, without ambiguity. Thus, P  || Q || P  
can be written as representing the parallel combination of three processes P , Q 
and R.
Alternatively, the desire may be to run any two processes independently of each 
other, i.e., they do not synchronise with any events, not even those tha t they 
share and this behaviour can be implemented using the interleaving operator 
written as “|||” , which also has an indexed form to describe the interleaving of 
a family of processes. Finally, all parallel operators, including interleaving ones 
are symmetric, associative and distributive over external and nondeterministic 
choice.
2.3.4 Abstraction M ethods
The abstraction methods tha t are frequently used in the analysis are: the hiding 
abstraction method used as P  \  A to make occurrences of events in A  internal, 
and hence invisible to an observer and the renaming method shown as P[[P]] for 
a relation P , so th a t the occurrences of an event a are replaced by events b such 
th a t aRb. An example for the hiding operator is tha t for a given set of events
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A  E U  with the following step law:
\ a - > ( P \ A )  if a ^ A ,
The latter method is used under the circumstance tha t an observer can see tha t an 
event is happening, but is unable to detect which event it is. More specifically, in 
renaming if P  is a relation on the alphabet of process P , then P |P ]] behaves like 
P  except tha t it performs different events. Moreover, whenever P  can perform 
the event a, P JP J  can perform each event from its relational image, P[{a}]. For 
instance, given the process P  =  a  -4  a -4  STOP, and the relations aRh and aRc, 
P[[P]] should be considered as:
P[[P]] =  (6 -4 (6 -4 STO P  □ c -4  STOP)) □ (c ^  (6 - 4  STO P  □ c -4  STOP))
Some earlier accounts of CSP [Sch99] used a function or its inverse in place of the 
relation P , to  provide alphabet renaming and inverse renaming, but in this thesis 
the more general approach using the relation as described in [RoslO] is employed.
A substitution-like notation is often used for describing relations. Regarding 
this, P p / 6]j means tha t the event or channel b is replaced by a in P , e.g., {b —4 
STOP)l^/b}  =  a - 4  STOP, and {b?x -4  5TO P)p/6j] =  a?x STOP. More 
generally, multiple substitutions, including P p ’^ /6,a]j (a maps to b and b maps 
to a), many-to-one renaming, P p ’®/6,cjj {b and c both map to a) and one-to- 
many renaming P j^ ’^/a,a]j (a maps to  both b and c) are allowed. In addition, 
overload notation is used, with [[■ /^Fj] referring to the relation corresponding to 
the renaming.
A useful result when composing renamings is th a t renaming via relation P  fol­
lowed by renaming through P ' is equivalent to renaming through the relational 
composition P  ; P '.
Lem m a 1. P[[P]][[P']] =  P [ P  ; P'j]
2.3.5 Traces and Other Semantic M odels
CSP provides a wide range of semantic models, which help in the description 
of a process behaviour. W ith respect to these, the traces model, T  is employed 
in this thesis, which refers to the finite sequences of events th a t a process can 
perform as denoted by (ai, ^2, • • •, o„). The empty trace is denoted (), and the 
concatenation of two traces as t r \ t r 2 - t r  A is the projection of tr  onto the set 
A (i.e., the sequence of events in tr  th a t are in A), and tr  \  A is the projection of 
tr  onto E\A, i.e., the trace tr with events from A removed. Two traces tr i  and 
tr 2 are related by P , if they are also pointwise related, i.e., they are the same 
length and the events at each position are related by P .
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The set of all traces of the process P  is written traces (P), which is a non-empty 
set as every process has the empty trace, (), in its trace set. For instance, the 
set of traces of the process, a —4 5 —4 STOP,  is {(), (a), (a, 6)}. Some of the 
definitions in terms of the traces model are as follows;
traces{STOP) = {()}
traces{SKIP) = { ( ) , ( / ) }
traces{a -4- P ) =  {()} U {(a)"s | s E traces{P)}
traces {P □ Q) =  traces{P) U traces(Q)
traces{P  n  Q) =  traces{P) U traces{Q)
traces{P \  X )  = {s \  X  ] s € traces(P )}
traces{P  || Q) =  {s G [ olP  U cx.Q )*  \ s [ a P  E traces{P) A
s [ aQ E traces{Q)}
traces{P^R{[) = R[traces{P)]
Additionally, CSP offers the failures model, P ,  which provides more information 
about what a process may refuse to perform. A failure is a pair (tr, X ), where 
tr  E traces{P) and X  is the refusal set of the process P  after the trace tr . A 
refusal is a set of events th a t a process refuses to perform in a particular state. 
Thus, the trace/refusal pair helps to  distinguish two processes th a t have the same 
traces, but differ in terms of what events they refuse to perform. For instance, 
although the traces model cannot distinguish P  D Q from P  □ Q, it is possible 
with the failures model. To see this, suppose tha t P  =  a -4 S T O P  0  6 -4  S T O P  
and Q =  a -4  S T O P  n  b ^  ST O P ,  under these process definitions, both 
process traces refine each other as their set of traces are the same and equal 
to  {(), (a), (6)}. However, in terms of the failures model, the refusal sets of 
these processes differ as the refusal set for P  is {((), 0), ((a), {a, 6}), ((6), {a, 6})} 
and for Q is {{(),{a}),({),{b}),{{a),{a,b}),{(b),{a,b})}.  In more detail, the 
difference between the refusal sets of these processes is the initial choice between 
performing the event a or b. T hat is, with the external choice, P  does not 
refuse to perform any of a and b as the decision is made by the environment, 
while Q can refuse to perform a or b. Further, the Failures/divergence model, 
M ,  gives more information than  the traces model regarding whether a process 
ever reaches a state where it can diverge, in other words, the process continues 
performing t ’s  forever and refuses all visible events. Generally, the failures model 
is used to check liveness properties, in terms of whether the process or system 
performs any good behaviour, whereas in the traces model the checking is for 
the bad behaviour being performed by the process. In our analysis, a number of 
compression functions have been used. More details about these operators can 
be found in Section 5.4 and in Section 7.7.
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2.3.6 Traces Refinem ent and M odel Checking
Traces refinement is offered in CSP to compare behaviour of processes. Regarding 
this, if every trace of Q is also a trace of P , then Q trace-refines P  or P  is refined 
by Q, denoted P  Cy Q and this is used in this thesis. If P  and Q refine each other 
then they are trace equivalent as denoted P  = t  Q- It is deemed th a t the traces 
model is sufficient for the purposes of this research aimed at verifying whether 
the model of a system satisfies a certain specification, such as anonymity.
Failures-Divergence Refinement (FDR) [GGH+] is the model checking tool en­
gaged with for the analysis, which was designed by Formal Systems (Europe) 
Ltd to check formal models created with the CSP formal language. This allows 
for the automated checking of assertions of specifications SPEC  and implemen­
tation {MODEL). T hat is, MODEL meets the specification SPEC  if MODEL  
is a refinement of SPEC. FDR checks the assertions automatically, and if the 
refinement does not hold, then it produces the first 100 counter-examples of the 
refinement, which are sequences of events tha t demonstrate the violation of the 
specification. Although FDR is easily used to check refinements, it suffers from a 
generic problem tha t all model checking tools suffer from: state space explosion. 
W ith regards to this problem and for further details in CSP and FDR, the reader 
is referred to [Ros97, Sch99, GGH+, RoslO].
Apart from FDR, there exist other model checking tools for CSP, such as; 
ProB [LB03] and Process Analysis Toolset (PAT) [SLD09]. ProB is a tool set 
tha t can be used as a model checker for CSP specifications besides other formal 
languages. It supports analysis of CSP processes using both refinement checking 
and linear temporal logic (LTL) model checking. The other model checking tool 
for CSP is PAT. It can perform refinement checking, LTL model checking and 
simulation of CSP processes. Because FDR is a mature model checking tool for 
CSP specifications with a number of semantics available, and our departmental 
experience with CSP and FDR model checker, they have been employed in all 
our analysis throughout this thesis.
In summary, in this thesis CSP is used as the formal language to define the 
anonymity requirement of voting system, and to model a number of voting sys­
tems as parallel compositions of individual processes. Additionally, FDR is em­
ployed to assist in verifying whether the models of the voting systems meet their 
requirements (specifications).
2.4 Summary
In this chapter, the essential background to the cryptographic primitives, which 
are drawn upon to carry out the investigation into voting systems in Chapter 6
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and 7 have been described. Subsequently, an overview of the key voting systems, 
their requirements and electoral methods was given. Additionally, the formal 
language CSP was introduced with its notation and semantics, as well as the 
model checking procedure and the tool FDR. In the next chapter abstractions 
(deduction rules) of the cryptographic primitives are employed when modelling 
and analysing security protocols using CSP and FDR. In particular, the use of the 
CSP approach, as the key methodology employed in this research, is explained 
and justified by drawing upon case studies provided in the existing literature.
Chapter 3
M odelling  and A nalysis o f  
Security P rotoco ls  using C SP
Prom the previous chapters, the necessity for automated formal analysis of 
privacy-related requirements in voting systems has emerged with justification. 
This chapter forms the foundation of this researcher’s approach to  the modelling 
and analysis of voting systems using CSP and FDR by presenting two protocol 
methods found in the literature. Firstly in Section 3.2, by presenting a formal 
analysis of the dining cryptographers protocol [Cha88], the aim is to demonstrate 
how security protocols and their specifications may be modelled using CSP. The 
modelling and analysis of this protocol given in [RSG'^OO] is considered in a hos­
tile environment from an observer’s point of view and this approach will be used 
in the analysis of voting systems in Chapters 4 - 6 .  Additionally, the anonymity 
definition (strong anonymity) as the security protocol specification given in this 
chapter will be used in Chapter 4 in order to compare two different anonymity 
definitions for voting systems. Following this, Lowe’s notorious attack [Low96] on 
the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key (NSPK) protocol [NS78] shall be presented 
in Section 3.3. This critical analysis of the NSPK will lead to the provision of an 
active Dolev-Yao-like intruder model, namely lazy spy, which will then be tested 
for its efficiency with regards to voting systems using CSP. Moreover, the analysis 
of the secrecy property of the NSPK will help in defining tha t for voting systems 
in Chapter 7.
3.1 Overview
A security protocol is designed to provide a certain goal comprising vari­
ous security-related properties, such as: secrecy, integrity, anonymity and so 
forth [RSG“^ 00]. In order to  claim th a t a protocol is secure, it should be able
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to meet all of its security-related objectives in a hostile environment where an 
intruder is trying to break them. Ryan et al. [RSG'^OO] point out some of the 
difficulties encountered when designing and analysing security protocols because: 
the security properties can be too subtle to define precisely; describing the model 
in a hostile environment can be too complex; defining any intruder’s ability is 
extremely challenging and the concurrency involved further complicates any an­
alytical endeavours. Although the protocols themselves are easy to express, for 
instance, the NSPK can be defined in three lines, they are too complex to eval­
uate using hand-proofs. Nevertheless, such protocols can be easily analysed by 
model checking tools, such as FDR, as long as the security objective is defined 
precisely, and the communication network between agents and the hostile en­
vironment are modelled efficiently. However, because model checking tools are 
bounded by the number of participants due to the state space explosion prob­
lem, as explained in Chapter 2 , they cannot achieve the security objectives of 
the protocols for infinitely many agents, but they can effectively find the attacks 
breaking the security objectives involving a small number of agents.
The following two protocol analyses in the rest of this chapter based on [RSG“'”00] 
and [Ros97] illustrate how to overcome the aforementioned difficulties. First of 
all, the focus is on a well-known security protocol, the dining cryptographers, and 
involves explanation on how a number of anonymity notions can be captured by 
modelling and analysis of this toy example under a passive intruder model. Such 
an intruder model is easy to define as the intruder can only observe the public 
channels. Following this, analysis of the NSPK protocol under an active intruder 
model and the precise formalisations of its security objective, secrecy, are given. 
This is of relevance because in this researcher’s opinion the characteristics of these 
security protocols and using the CSP approach in their analysis are appropriate 
for the analysis of voting systems. Finally, throughout the thesis the analysis is 
conducted with the FDR model checker.
3.2 Dining Cryptographers
The dining cryptographers protocol was proposed by David Chaum [Cha88] and 
illustrated th a t it was possible to send and receive anonymous messages uncondi­
tionally or cryptographically. Fundamentally, it involves a scenario where three 
cryptographers are having dinner together in a restaurant, and each of them is 
informed by their organisation whether or not he or she is paying the bill. How­
ever, the organisation cannot only choose one of cryptographers to  pay the bill, 
but can also opt to pay it itself and the aim is to allow them to find out whether 
one of them  is paying or not. Moreover, if one of the cryptographers is paying, 
for some reason, they would like to keep his/her identity anonymous. How can 
the participants ensure this is achieved?
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The protocol works as follows. Each cryptographer tosses a coin, which is also 
made visible to their right-hand neighbour and thus, each is able to see two coin 
tosses. Once they examine the results of these tosses, they can either say agree 
if they are the same or disagree if they are different. If a cryptographer is not 
paying then he/she will always tell the tru th  about the comparison of tossing 
results. However, the paying cryptographer will say the opposite. If the number 
of disagrees are even then the organisation is paying, whereas if odd, then one of 
the cryptographers is, but is able to remain anonymous.
out.O
CRYPTO
look.0 .0 look.0 .2
pays.O notpays.O
CoinO Coin2
look.1.0 look.2.2MASTER
p a y s .l p a y s.2
n o tp a y s .l n o tp a y s .2
CRYPTl CRYPT2
o u t.l o u t .2
look.1.1 look.2.1
C o in l
Figure 3.1: Dining cryptographers protocol (adopted from [RSG+OO])
As illustrated in Figure 3.1, the protocol can be modelled as a parallel compo­
sition of the cryptographers, coins, and master processes, with the latterm ost 
determining who is paying the bill (note th a t in the following CSP descriptions 
of these processes are based on [SS96]). The events pays.i and notpays.i between 
the cryptographers and the master are the instructions regarding the payment, 
and the events look.i.j.x model the cryptographer i reading the value x  from the 
coin j .  Lastly, the events of the form out.i model the declarations made by the 
cryptographers.
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In more detail, the process M ASTER  chooses either to pay himself, or one of the 
cryptographers to pay non-deterministically and hence, the process definition for 
the master is defined as follows, where C is the set of cryptographer identities:
M ASTER =notpays.O —)• notpays.l —> notpays.2 -4- STOP  
n
( pays.i —> \
notpays.{{i +  1) mod 3) —)■
 ^ notpays.{{i +  2) mod 3) -4- STOP J
n
iec
Consequently, the process CRYPTQ  models the cryptographers. The cryptog­
rapher i is first given instructions regarding payment with the events pays.i and 
notpays.i by the MASTER, then they compare two coins tha t they can see by 
the channels look.i. If the coins are the same then the cryptographer performs an 
out.i.agree event, or otherwise an out.i.disagree event. If the cryptographer pays 
and the coins are the same then the cryptographer performs an out.i.disagree 
event, else an out.i.agree event and hence, the process tha t models this behaviour 
can be defined as:
C RYPT(i)  =
(  notpays.i -4- look.i.ilxi —4
look.i.{{i +  1) m od  3)7x2 -4  STOP  
I if  (x i  =  X2 ) th en  out.i.agree —4 STOP  
y I else  out.i.disagree —4 STOP
\
D
(  pays.i —4 look.i.ilxi -4-
look.i.{{i +  1) m od  3)7x2 -4  STOP  
I  if  (x i  =  X2) th en  out.i.disagree -4- STOP  
y  I e lse  out.i.agree —4 STOP /
Finally, the process th a t models each coin is defined in terms of a choice between 
reading heads and reading tails.
COIN{i) = Heads{i) n Tails{i)
Heads{i) = look.i.i.heads —4 Heads{i)
□ look.{{i — 1) mod 3).i.heads —4 Heads{i)
Tails{i) = lo o k . i . i . t a i l s T a i l s { i )
□ look.{{i — 1) mod 3).i.tails —4 Tails{i)
In order to construct the model, the cryptographers are interleaved as they act 
independently each other CRYPTS = \\\^CRYPT{c). For the same reason, the 
coins are interleaved among themselves as COINS = \\\^COIN(i). However, the 
cryptographers and coins should synchronise on common events look, and this
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composition should be run in parallel with the master process synchronising on 
pays and notpays events when modelling the overall protocol, say MEAL.
M EAL ^ { { C R Y P T S  || COINS) || M ASTER)
{|ioo fc |}  {I pays |}U {| nofpaj/s 1}
The dining cryptographers model in CSP has now been modelled, however; the 
anonymity property, which is to be checked against this protocol, needs to  be 
specified before the analysis can proceed and therefore in the next subsection 
this issue is addressed.
3.2.1 Formal Specification of Anonym ity
Schneider and Sidiropoulos [SS96] state tha t anonymity is a property of agents 
rather than the messages carried on the channels, for the la tter is concerned with 
confidentiality. Moreover, these authors give an anonymity definition for security 
protocols, which is termed here strong anonymity (this notion of anonymity will 
be further discussed in Chapter 4). The definition is expressed by these authors 
informally as “a message tha t could have been originated from one agent could 
equally have been originated from any other” [SS96, p.5]. T hat is, if the message 
X originated by the user i is considered in the form i.x, then it could equally have 
been in the form j .x ,  where j  is a user from the set of all users.
In the CSP approach to anonymity, agents’ actions in relation to events are of the 
form channel.i.x, where the channel represents the type of event, i is the identity 
of the agent and x  is the content of the event. As anonymity is concerned with 
the origin of such events, it refers to cases where an event channel.i.x cannot, 
in some sense, be distinguished from channel.j.x, where i and j  are two agents 
within the group of USERS, and x  is in the set Data. Hence, the set of all the 
messages communicated on the channels covering all identities of the agents tha t 
need to be hidden can be written as:
A  = { \ channel.i.x | i € USERS, x  G Data |}
The intuition is tha t if an observer has access to only the content x  of the message, 
and the identity of the agent i is hidden from them, then the content could equally 
have been generated by any of the agents.
D efin ition  1 (Strong Anonymity [SS96]). A process P  is strongly anonymous 
on the alphabet A  C D if:
P P / y \ x , y e A l  =t P
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The original definition in [SS96] expressed this definition using functional and 
inverse functional renaming, as follows (now cast in relational notation):
P[I^/Al][[^//5]] =T P  where /? ^  a P
is used as shorthand for | x € Aj, and as shorthand for
P //?  I X € Aj. Moreover, [^ /A j is used as shorthand for p / y  | x,y € Aj. The 
definition given here is equivalent, since the composition of the relations p /A ]  
and P //5 J  is indeed P /A j .  P p / A j  = t  P  means tha t the two processes, P , and 
the renamed process, P p / A ] ,  are trace equivalent and so are indistinguishable 
from the point of view of an observer who can see the traces of each of these 
processes. The two corollaries are:
1. If the abstracted system P  is anonymous on the sets A and A', then P  is 
anonymous on A U A', if A fl A' 7  ^ 0.
2. If P  is anonymous on the set A and A' Ç A, then P  is anonymous on the 
set A'.
3.2.2 Analysis
Anonymity is often considered in presence of an observer. In the dining cryptog­
raphers example, the observer could be an outsider sitting at another table or 
other cryptographers sitting at the same one and in the anonymity analysis for 
this protocol only these two cases are considered (for more case analysis of this 
protocol, the reader is referred to [SS96]).
A nonym ity from  an O utsider’s P oint o f V iew
The anonymity of the system MEAL  from an observer’s point of view is provided 
where he/she can only see the out events. Thus, the internal events like look will 
be abstracted away, but not pays events, because they are needed for checking 
anonymity between the cryptographers on the set A% =  {{pays |}. Regarding this, 
according to the strong  anonymity definition, it is necessary to check whether 
the trace equivalence
M PALpi/AiI =T m e a l
holds. However, prior to this the look events need to be hidden as the observer 
is not allowed to see a cryptographer looking at a coin yet and the best way to 
model this is by using the hiding operator. Therefore, the assertion required for 
the anonymity check is:
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M E A Ll-^i/A il \  {| look 1} =T MEAL \  {| look |}
However, if the observer is allowed to see when a cryptographer is looking at 
coins, but not the content or outcome of the tosses then renaming is the most 
suitable abstraction method and under these circumstances the trace equivalence 
required to check for anonymity of the system is:
MEALÿ°°'^-i-i/look.i.j.x} =T M E A L ÿ°°’‘-‘-i/look.i.j.x}
FDR confirms tha t anonymity is provided by the dining cryptographers protocol 
model in both cases.
A nonym ity A gainst O ther Cryptographers
Anonymity against the other cryptographers is also provided by the protocol, be­
cause each is not able to distinguish the payer from other two. In more detail, the 
observer, say cryptographer i, now possesses more information than the outsider 
in the previous subsection, because he/she can see the look.i events. As a result, 
the anonymity of the protocol needs to be checked for the set Ag below.
A 2 = {\pays.{{i -f 1) mod S),pays.{{i -t- 2) mod 3) |}.
Following that, the set of sensitive information (the look events of the other 
cryptographers):
(S' =  {| look.{{i -f 1) mod 3),look.({i -f 2) mod 3) |}
needs to be hidden from the cryptographer i and therefore, the assertion required 
for anonymity in this case is the following.
M EALl-^^/Ail \ S = T  MEAL \  S
However, in the case where cryptographer i is able to see other cryptographers 
looking at coins but not the contents, the renaming operator is more appropriate, 
as used previously. As a consequence, the following equivalence needs to  be 
checked for the anonymity of the protocol.
M E A L i [[^2/ ^ 2]] =T M E A Li 
where M EALi =  MEAL^'^^^'^'^/look.a.b.x | a e C\iJ.
FDR verifies tha t the dining cryptographers protocol satisfies the anonymity 
requirements against the other cryptographers.
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3.2.3 Summary
In this subsection it has been demonstrated how FDR and CSP can be used to 
model a simple security protocol and to verify mechanically whether the protocol 
satisfies the anonymity requirement. Moreover, the formal specification of strong 
anonymity was presented as such a requirement and this on first consideration 
might relevant to the analysis of voting systems (the differences are explored in 
Chapter 4). The analysis has illustrated tha t the operators under CSP, such as 
hiding  and renaming, are useful for abstracting away sensitive information in 
the presence of an observer or passive intruder. This kind of intruder model is 
used in Chapters 4 - 6 ,  when analysing the ThreeBallot and Prêt à Voter voting 
systems with a different specification for anonymity.
In the next section, an active and stronger intruder model is described, which 
is then used for analysing the effectiveness of the NSPK protocol in terms of its 
secrecy property. Subsequently, this intruder model is used in Chapter 7 during 
the evaluation of the vVote voting system.
3.3 Needham  Schroeder Public-Key Proto­
col Analysis
The Needham Schroeder Public-Key (NSPK) protocol aims to provide mutual au­
thentication after a sequence of message exchanges between a number of agents. 
More specifically, mutual authentication between the agents Alice and Bob en­
sures th a t if Alice thinks she has been communicating with Bob, then she should 
indeed be communicating with him and the same applies for Bob as well, i.e., 
he should be sure tha t who he thinks he is talking to  should indeed be Alice. 
Additionally, the protocol aims to provide a secrecy property, which means the 
contents of the communication between Alice and Bob should be kept solely to 
them. T hat is, under the NSPK protocol, the secret is the nonce (an abbreviation 
for “number used once”), which takes the form of a shared symmetric key, such 
th a t no party other than the key holders are able to decipher messages encrypted 
by using it.
In order to achieve its goals, the protocol uses public-key cryptography, whereby 
each agent a and 6, and the server s possess their own public and secret keys, 
namely, (pka, ska), (ph^skb)  and (pks,sks), respectively. Additionally, the pro­
tocol uses nonces, i.e., used only once in a protocol run, denoted as ria and nt  
generated by the agents a and b, respectively. Moreover, the protocol agents can 
be either an initiator to  start a session or a responder for a request to establish 
one. The following describes how the NSPK protocol works in steps.
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m .l a s : a, b
m .2 s a • ^sks {P^b
m.3 a -)■ b:' ^pkbif^at a)
m.4 b -> s : b,a
m.5 s -)■ b: ^sks {P^a\,a)
m .6 b —)■a :
m.7 a -)■ b:’ ^pkb{l^b)
In the protocol, it is assumed tha t agents do not necessarily know each other’s 
public keys and hence, the steps where the agents communicate with the server 
(m .l, m.2, m.4, m.5) in order to obtain each others’ public key can be omitted. 
This is because the messages in m .l and m.4 are in the clear, meaning the intruder 
can see what is being sent and thus it is not im portant tha t the intruder knows 
when the agent a is willing to communicate with b. Consequently, it can be 
assumed tha t the agents already know each other’s public-keys, thus shrinking 
the protocol steps down to three (m.3, m .6 , m.7). In this three-message version 
of the protocol, agent a sends his randomly chosen nonce Ua and his identity by 
encrypting with agent 6’s public key pk^. Therefore, as the only agent knowing 
the secret key ski, is b, if a receives Ua back from b, then a should be sure th a t she 
is talking to  b, because only b can decrypt and evaluate the ciphertext encrypted 
under pki,. Subsequently, in step m .6 , b sends not only the nonce Ua derived from 
the ciphertext, but also a freshly generated random nonce, ni, to a and so he can 
authenticate the agent a by challenging her with the encryption Epfc^(na,n{,). In 
the final message, a encrypts nt with 6’s public key and sends it to b. Hence, as 
only agent a can decrypt the ciphertext, b is now sure tha t he is indeed talking to 
a. Now tha t a and b share a secret, which should be only known by them, they 
can use this key for further communication.
In order to analyse such a protocol as the NSPK in CSP, the behaviour of honest 
agents, Alice Bob and the server Tom  as well as the misbehaving agent, the 
intruder, have to be modelled. Moreover, the intruder will have the ability to act 
with other good agents with a fake identity, in the name of say Cameron, thus 
functioning as a Dolev-Yao intruder [DY83]. The well-behaved agents will follow 
the rules of the protocol properly, whereas the intruder will not. The modelling 
and analysis of the NSPK in the following subsections will be based on [Ros97] 
and [RSG+00].
3.3.1 Defining Reliable Agents
An agent can either initiate the protocol to establish a secure communication 
with another agent or respond to  a session request. The following process 
Agents{a,na) describes the behaviour of the agent a with the nonce n^. T hat
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is, if the agent possesses a nonce then he chooses to be either an initiator or a 
responder, but if no fresh nonce exists, then the process terminates.
Agent{a, (ua)) =
if (ua) =  0 then STOP  else Initiator{a,no)  □ Responder {a, Ua)
An initiator aims to be in a secure authenticated session with a target agent. 
Thus, initiator, a, chooses a target from the set of agents. A,  except herself and 
the server, T, with which to  establish a session. Afterwards, she sends her identity 
a and the target’s identity b to the server and following this, the initiator should 
accept the public-key certificate of b sent from the trusted server. Having received 
the public-key of the target 6, the initiator challenges him with an encryption of 
her freshly generated nonce Ua- The initiator now should be ready to accept 
the correct message sent by the responder b along with a new nonce challenge 
ni chosen from the set of nonces, W. Finally, having answered the challenge 
with the message including n^, the initiator enters a session with the responder. 
Note tha t the channel comm, on which honest agents communicate, has the form 
a g e n t s .agents.messages, which specifies the origin of the message as well as its 
destination.
Initiator {a, no) =
 ^ comm.a.T.{a,b) ^  
comm.T.a.SskriP^b^b) 
comm.a.b.Epk,^{na, a) —>■
 ^ comm.5.a.Epfc^(no, nt) —^  ^
□  comm.a.b.Epki,{nb) -A 
y ribeM y Session{a,b,ni,) j
n
beA \{a ,T }
J
A responder has to accept any message initiating the protocol by other agents 
except the server, but it must be in an agreed form. For instance, if he is waiting 
a nonce, then the message should be a nonce, or if he is willing to accept a signed 
message by the server, then the message should indeed need to be signed by 
the server (any other messages th a t are not in an acceptable form are rejected). 
The responder’s behaviour when he communicates with the initiator is the same, 
except obviously they have opposite perspectives. Moreover, the responder com­
municates with the server to obtain the other agent’s public-key just like the 
initiator and finally enters a state in which he is in a session with the initiator.
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Responder{b, n^) =
/  comm.a.b.Epk,^{na,a) -A \  
comm.b.T.{b,a) —> 
com m .T.b.SskT{pka,C L)  - A  
comm.b.a.Epk^ {ua, rib) 
comm.a.b.Epk^irib) —)•
\  Session(b,a,rib) /
□
oGA\{6,T}
UaeN
Once the NSPK protocol is completed, the initiator and responder are in an 
authenticated session, and they can send secret messages to each other using 
the second nonce as the symmetric encryption key, with these messages being 
symbolically defined as {AtoB  and BtoA).
Session{a, b, n) =
comm.a.b.Epk^{AtoB) —)• Session{a,b,n)
□ comm.b.a.Epk^{BtoA) -4- Session{a,b,n)
□ close -4 Agent{a, (n))
Similarly, the behaviour of the server, Tom, can be modelled in the protocol 
(note tha t the server is not needed in the three-message version of the NSPK), 
under the assumption tha t he is an honest party who both the initiator and the 
responder trust. He is responsible for issuing public-key certificates, and when 
asked for a particular agent’s public key, he obligingly sends the signed public-key 
to  the requesting agent.
Server{a, b, n) =
^  I comm.a.T.(a,b) -4 \
a eA \{T }  \  comm.T.a.SskT{ph,b) ^  J
beA \{a ,T }
Finally, in order to model the hostile environment, the intruder process is mod­
elled in the next subsection.
3.3.2 Building the Intruder
The intruder can overhear the messages between the honest agents, being able to 
intercept, block and/or send fake messages as well as interacting with the latter. 
Moreover, he can also act as a legitimate agent and interact with the other honest 
agents using his trustworthy credentials, such as identity, public-key pair, a fresh
nonce and a secret which he can send to the honest agents. However, he cannot
decrypt a ciphertext unless he possesses the appropriate secret key. Additionally, 
he can extend his initial knowledge with the information learned by observing
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communication channels either via overhearing or intercepting and subsequently 
generate any message by using the facts in his knowledge base. He is also given 
the power to  deduce further knowledge from what he knows already under the 
deduction rules.
The knowledge tha t such an intruder can build is huge, as he can always learn  
new messages, and say those tha t he knows. However, this kind of modelling 
requires him be ready to act for any single fact he possesses, but it is not an 
efficient way to model such complex protocols, as the required state space is too 
large to be handled by the model checker tools. In order to address this, the 
lazy spy intruder model is a standard technique for security protocol analysis, in 
which the intruder is called lazy  as it avoids the eagerness of pre-computation of 
unnecessary inferences [RoslO]. It is modelled in a way th a t the intruder should 
know only the facts tha t he does not initially know, or tha t cannot be deduced 
from his initial knowledge. Therefore, to this end, the intruder is modelled as 
parallel composition of those facts tha t can be learned {leamable facts).
To allow the intruder to build messages a number of deduction rules need to 
be defined. A deduction is a pair { X ,f ) ,  where X  is a finite set of facts and 
/  is the fact th a t can be generated providing th a t the intruder possesses all 
the facts in X .  Four of the deductions regarding the rules in Table 2.4 are as 
follows: deductionsi captures the symmetric key encryption, deductions2 refers 
to public-key encryption, deductionsz covers digital signatures, and deductions/^ 
encapsulates sequences.
deductionsi{X) = { { { f,k } ,  Efc(/)), {{E k{f),k}, f )  | Ek{f) G X }  
deductions2 {X) = { ( { / ,# } ,  Epk{f)), {{Epk{f),dual{pk)}, f )  \ Epk{f) G X }  
deductionss(X) = { { { f,s k } ,S sk { f)) ,{ {S sk if) ,d u a l{ sk )] ,f)  | Ssk{f) G X }  
deductions4 {X) =  {{{{m )},n th{j, (m))),
{{nth(i, (m)) | z G {0 . . .  # (m ) — 1}}, (m))
I (m) G X, J G { 0 ...  # (m ) — 1}}
Moreover, the finite set deductions{X) = [jj^  deductionsi{X) is the set of all 
possible deductions covering all the deduction rules.
As mentioned above, the intruder only needs to fake messages th a t are valid, i.e., 
the messages th a t really travel on the protocol channels between agents, which 
makes it more efficient. Hence, in order for the intruder to understand the nature 
of a message, its type also needs to be defined. For instance, the message that 
is an encryption of a nonce can be described as being in the set m essagei, and 
the justification of the message being heard can be defined with the set commi 
as shown below.
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m es sagei =  
com mi =
m essage2 = 
comm2 =
messages =  
comms =
message^ = 
comm/i =
messages =  
comms =
messages =  
comme =
E p f c a  ( ^ a )  I  a e  A,Ua e A f}
a.b.m  I m  G m essagei, a e  A ,b  e  A ,a  b}
Epfca (^a, rib) I  a G A, ria G W, G Af] 
a.b.m  I m  G m essagc2 , a € A ,b  e  A ,a  ^  b}
EpkaW, b) I a G A, 5 G {a}, n^ , G jM} 
a.b.m I m G messages, a G A, 5 G A, a 7  ^ 5}
E f c ( / )  I  /  G  Secret}
a.b.m  I m  G message^,, a G A, 6 G A, <2 7^  6}
SskTiipka,a)) I a G A}
a.b.m  I m  G messages, a E A ,b  E A ,a  b}
[a,b) I a G A , 6 G A \{a}}
a.b.m  I m  G messages, a G A ,b  G A ,a  b}
The union of all such messages form the set of messages, M. = \Ji messagei, and
the set comms = commi is used in the intruder process in order for him to
learn only the messages sent between the protocol participants. That is, these 
messages are the ones tha t he can learn or wants to construct for faking, but 
he can also construct messages in parts. In order to do so, the intruder needs a 
way to identify the facts tha t are relevant to the messages, A4 and this is made 
possible using the function called explode. This function can be applied to all 
the previously defined message types as follows:
explode{Epk{m)) = {Epk(m),pk, dual{pk)} U explode(jn) 
explode{Ek{m)) = {Epk{m),k} U explode{m) 
explode{Ssk{m)) = {Sskirn),sk, dual{sk)} U explode{m) 
explode{{xs)) = {{xs)} U \J{{explode{x) | a: G set((2:s))}) 
explode{x) = x
where dual{pk) = sk  and dual{sk) =  pk. Thus, the function explode extracts the 
set of all facts tha t are of relevance to the given message. Similarly, all facts can 
be learned as:
AllFacts = \J{{explode{m) | m  G A4})
and then by using the deductionsQ  function all possible deductions being built.
AllDeductions = deductions {Allfacts)
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In addition, the set of deductions and facts can be further cut down by omit­
ting facts tha t cannot be reachable given the initial knowledge by the following 
procedure. Known, being the full initial knowledge closed with a function called 
CloseiXlC), extracts all possible deductions by applying the deduction rules for 
the set, %/C, where the initial knowledge %/C given to the intruder for the analysis 
of the NSPK is the set of all public-keys, the secret key of Cameron, a fresh nonce 
and a secret.
PossibleBasicKnowledge =  K now n  U messages 
KnowableFacts = Close{PossibleBasicKnowledge)
Leamablefacts = KnowableFacts \ Known
After discarding all the deductions th a t are already known to the intruder and 
the ones tha t cannot be reached by him, the deductions, T), can be defined as 
follows:
V  = {(X, / )  I (X, / )  G AllDeductions, 
f  G Leamablefacts,
f i x ,
X  \ Knowlablefacts = 0}
The following process, Ignorantof, ensures th a t all facts in Leamablefacts have 
state: the process can always learn  a fact, but it can only say once the fact is 
known. Moreover, the channel infer models the occurrence of inferences and an 
inference on the deduction (X ,/)  can happen when all its assumptions X  are 
known, but /  not.
Ignorantof (f)  = f  G A4 Szlearn .f -4- K n o w s(f)
O G { ( X , / 0  | (X ,  / )  G %>, f  =  / }  - ^
K n o w s(f)  = f  G A 4 h  s a y .f  -4 K now s{f)
□ /  G A i h le a r n . f  -4 K now s{f)
O G { ( X , f  ) | (X, f  ) G /  G X } - 4
□ /  G Secret Sz in truderknow s.f -4 K n o w s(f)
The set Secret in the last line consists of the secret messages tha t the in­
truder should not be able to know and in this case, they are defined as the 
set {A toB , B toA }. Hence, when he gets to know an element of this set, the chan­
nel intmderknows fiags this up signalling th a t the secret has been compromised. 
The following AlphaL{f) defines the alphabet of each fact.
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AlphaL{f) = { sa y .f , learn, f  \ f  G M }
U{intruderknows.f | /  G Secret}
U {m /er.(X ,/')  | ( X J ' ) € V J ' = f }
U {in fe r .{X J ')  | { X J ' J e V J e X }
Consequently, the intruder process can be defined as a parallel composition of 
facts, where the internal events infer are hidden.
In truder =
chase(( || {Ignorant{f), A lphaL{f)))\{\infer\})
fE Leamablefacts
III Say Known
The process SayKnown defined below ensures th a t the proper messages th a t are 
already known are learned and said, since the facts tha t are of relevance to  the 
initial knowledge X /C  are not included in the Leamablefacts and Deductions.
SayKnown =  sa y .f  G Known D A4 4- SayKnown
□ learn, f  G Known n A4 -4 SayKnown
chase is a special function tha t makes the analysis more efficient by avoiding 
checking all possible states [RoslO], because it always follows rs  (unstable states) 
until no more r  is possible. Hence, some other possible ways are left to be explored 
and the operator has the right to choose any path to follow. In addition, although 
chase(P) changes the value of the process P  sometimes, the behaviour of chase(P) 
is equivalent to P  whenever P  is deterministic and in this analysis of the intruder 
process this is always the case [Ros97j. In the following subsection, a description 
is provided on how to connect together the reliable agents and the intruder.
3.3.3 Com position of the System
Having modelled the reliable agents, including the server, as well as the intruder, 
the model th a t connects all these agents needs to be composed. T hat is, the 
reliable agents and the intruder need to  be modified in a way tha t the messages 
are ready to be tampered with by the latter. To this end, the comm  events, and 
learn  and say ones need to be connected to  each other (see Figure 3.2). Hence, 
for an agent a, the outgoing messages along the channel comm.a.b.m  and learn.m  
events of intruder are renamed to either a comm.a.b.m  or take.a.b.m  events, and 
similarly inbound messages on the comm.b.a.m  and say.m  events are renamed 
to either a comm.b.a.m  or fake.b.a.m  events. The reliable agents will not notice 
the difference whether they communicate over the comm  channels or the take  
and fa k e  channels and consequently, they have no way of knowing whether the
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com m .a.b .f/ \
comm.b.a.f
take.a.b.f
comm.a.b.f
fake.b.a.f
comm.b.a.f
/  \  leam.f
In tru d e r
■^ay.f
Figure 3.2: Connecting agents with renaming
intruder is communicating with them. The number of agents in such analysis 
needs to  be kept to a minimum, because of the earlier discussed state explosion 
problem. Hence, in this model there exist two reliable honest agents Alice and 
Bob trying to establish an authenticated communication via the server, Tom, 
and an intruder who can act as Cameron  trying to break the protocol objectives. 
The roles for each agent can be predefined, such as, Alice being the initiator with 
a nonce, and Bob being the responder with the nonce ns-  The following 
processes model the renamed honest agents.
Alice =
In itia tor{A , nA)
A .p ,  / a A ; e .p .A ,  c o m m y c o m m . A . p ,  c o m m . p . A ,  c o m m  | p 6  A \ { A } ] ]
Bob =
Responder {B ,n s )
^ake.B.p, fake.p.B, commycomm.B.p, comm.p.B, comm | p € A \ {H}|
Tom  =
Server
^ake.T.p, fake.p.T, c o m m y comm.p.T, comm | p G A\ {T}]]
As a result, the N etw ork  process below models the connected reliable agents 
in such a way as to allow the intruder to perform manipulations on the comm  
channels.
N etw ork = 
{Alice Bob) Tom
ri œmm.A.B, n 
œmm.B.A
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Similarly, the intruder is renamed so tha t what he says can be said or learned 
again. Moreover, he learns only the valid messages due to the second renaming 
whereby all of them take the form p ,p '.f ,  which indicates tha t they are from real 
communications between the agents. Finally, what the intruder says  becomes 
fa ke .
r In truder  =
In truder
pay, learn I
^comm.p.p .f,take.p.p . / f  learn.f, learn.f | p.p'.f € comms ]]
]^fake.p.p . / !  say.f \ p.p'.f € comms, p ^  p'\
The NSPK protocol, the process System , is then defined in terms of the parallel 
composition of N etw ork  and r in tru d er  tha t synchronise on comm, take  and the 
fa k e  events.
System  =  N etw ork  || r in truder
{I œmm,take Jake  |}
Having modelled the protocol, the secrecy specification for the analysis is defined 
in the next subsection.
3.3.4 Formal Specification of Secrecy
Secrecy can be defined in a number of ways. For example, non-interference can 
be used in situations where the intruder is interested in agents’ activity with­
out any observation on the communications among legitimate agents. In other 
words, the view at the low level (not highly classified inputs and outputs) is 
unable to tell whether or not high level activity with highly sensitive data  has 
occurred [RSG'^OO]. This sort of formalism of secrecy is too strict for the pur­
pose of our analysis in this thesis where the intruder needs to derive content 
of any message transm itted over the network. Moreover, non-interference style 
secrecy definition is known to have issues with the secrecy of an encrypted chan­
nel as the high-level plaintext infiuences the ciphertext visible to the low-level 
user [RSG*^00]. On the other hand, secrecy can be defined in a simpler and 
more appropriate way as a safety property. Such characterization (also called as 
reachability) considers the situation where the intruder reaches a certain state of 
knowing a secret as a secrecy breach. The intruder with such formalization can 
perform traffic analysis and deduce the facts about the protocol messages. In this 
thesis, the formal definition of secrecy as a reachability property will be focused.
As stated previously, the secrecy property can be defined as safety property, i.e., 
nothing bad should happen and hence, the protocol should not leak any secret
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information during a protocol run. In the NSPK protocol, the set Secret is 
defined as {A toB , B toA }. Therefore, in order for the protocol to provide secrecy 
for any messages, the intruder should not be appraised of these secrets by the 
end of the protocol run (the secret is kept secret) and to  achieve this there is an 
extra channel called in tm derknow s. Although, this channel is not a part of the 
actual protocol, it is useful for security analysis, since its occurrence means tha t 
the intruder process is in a state where it knows the secret data, thus breaking 
the secrecy of the sensitive information. For instance, if the secret AtoB  has 
been possessed by the intruder then Alice must be thinking tha t she is in an 
authenticated communication with Bob, when she is actually interacting with 
the intruder.
As explained in Section 2.3, safety properties are generally modelled using the 
traces model in CSP and so is the secrecy property. The following trace refinement 
checks whether the event in tm derknow s  ever happens in a protocol run:
STO P  Et System  \B \{ \ in tm d e r k n o w s  |} 
where E  is the alphabet of the process System :
X =  {| comm, take, fa ke , in tm derknow s  |}
Model checking of this protocol with FDR provides a trace in which the intruder 
performs an in tm derknow s  event, meaning the protocol fails to keep the secrecy 
of the messages A toB  or B toA . The following counter-example in Figure 3.3 is a 
confirmation of Lowe’s attack.
The attack is mounted with two parallel running protocol sessions, a  and /3. In 
the protocol run (x, the honest agent Alice wants to communicate with the corrupt 
agent Cameron, whereas during session the intruder initiates the protocol for 
a secure session with the other honest agent Bob, and makes him believe tha t 
he is interacting with Alice by learning all the secrets from the session a  and by 
impersonating her.
In more detail, in step /3.6, Bob responds the intruder’s nonce challenge by sending 
the encrypted and ng  under pkA- However, the intruder, at this stage, cannot 
decrypt the message and retrieve the nonce n s  and instead he sends it back to 
Alice using her session with Cameron in step a .6. At the end of the a  session 
in step a.7, Alice responds to Cameron’s challenge by decrypting the message 
Epk^{nA,riB) and sending n s  to  Cameron by encrypting it under his public key, 
Epkcins)- Because the intruder possesses Cameron’s secret key, he can then 
obtain the nonce n s  and answer Bob’s challenge by encrypting n s  under Bob s 
public-key. Having completed the session 13, Bob now thinks th a t he is in an
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CK.l A 4 T (A,C) comm.A.T
a.2 T 4 A SskT{pkc,C) comm.T.A
a .3 A 4 C ^pkc A) take.A .C
/3.1 I{A ) 4 T (A,B> fake.A .T
/3.2 T 4 7(A) Sskr{pkB,B) take .T .A
73.3 L(A) 4 B Epfcs {'^Ai A) fake.A .B
/5.4 B —y T (B,A> comm.B.T
/9.5 T 4 B Sg&T ip^A 5 A) comm.T.B
(3.6 B 4 7(A) ^pkA iPA-) LIb ) take.B .A
(X.6 C 4 A ^pkA {'^A 5 riB ) fake.C .A
a .r A 4 C ^pkc {^b ) take.A .C
/3-7 I{A) 4 B Epfcs {i^ b ) fake.A .B
Figure 3.3: Lowe’s attack on seven-message version of NSPK: The right hand side 
is the FDR output equivalent of the messages on the left hand side. Moreover, 
the steps in bold, like a . 3 , represent the attack for a three-message version of 
the NSPK protocol where there is no server, T, involved. Finally, I  (A) models 
impersonating Alice, hence, the intruder can intercept the messages coming to 
Alice and send fake messages as if Alice is sending them.
authenticated session with Alice, when he is actually talking to the intruder. 
Therefore, when Bob wants to send a secret B toA  to Alice, he will send it by 
encrypting it with the nonce n^ , {BtoA), which is the shared secret key. As 
the intruder possesses ub  and therefore can extract B toA, there is a violation of 
the secrecy property of the NSPK protocol.
Lowe [Low96] suggested a fix for this situation by adding the sender’s identity 
in step 6 of the seven-message version of the NSPK. In the previous attack, it 
was explained how the intruder is able to receive u b ) from Bob in step
/3.6 and replay it to Alice via Cameron in a .6. However, with Lowe’s fix he 
is not able to perform the same actions, as there is the sender’s identity in the 
message tha t he receives in step /3.6, £^^^(72^ 1, 715, B ). Therefore, when he replays 
this message to Alice, which includes Bob’s identity, she would notice th a t the 
original sender of this message was not Cameron, but Bob, thereby being able to 
avoid the attack.
3.3.5 Summary
This above section has introduced the Dolev-Yao intruder model for CSP, which 
is active and stronger than the observer defined in the Dining Cryptographers 
Problem covered in the previous section. Additionally, an efficient method for 
implementing the intruder model (lazy spy) in CSP, which can also be checked
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automatically using FDR, has been described. In terms of modelling crypto­
graphic protocols, the NSPK protocol was modelled and analysed with respect 
to the secrecy property as is a common desired in relation to voting systems. In 
Chapter 7 this intruder model is adapted for the analysis of cryptographic voting 
systems, specifically vVote and although it is modified a lot for this purpose, the 
main idea underpinning the analysis remains the same.
In the next chapter the anonymity requirement for voting systems is formally 
defined, and subsequently applied to conventional voting system analysis under 
the passive intruder model as categorised in Section 3.2, using the CSP language 
and the FDR model checker.
Chapter 4
Form al A nonym ity  D efin ition  
and A u tom ated  V erification
This chapter* presents a novel approach to defining a formal anonymity specifica­
tion as well as modelling and analysis of non-cryptographic voting systems using 
CSP and FDR. To this end, a number of anonymity definitions in the literature 
are investigated in Section 4.2 and subsequently the weak anonymity is formally 
defined in Section 4.3 in CSP for automated verification. Moreover, the strong 
and weak anonymity specifications are tested in terms of their suitability for vot­
ing systems with a referendum example using the abstraction methods introduced 
in Section 3.2. Additionally, the conventional voting system (CVS) is modelled 
and analysed with respect to these specifications in Section 4.4 and in Section 4.5 
there is further analysis which considers the possibility of corrupt agents as de­
scribed in the previous chapter regarding dining cryptographers problem, where 
sensitive data may be leaked to an intruder. Finally, in Section 4.6 a discussion 
on the formal definitions of anonymity for voting systems is presented.
4.1 Overview
Anonymity of one’s vote lies at the heart of the democratic process, for if the link 
between a voter and her vote is uncovered, then not only the secrecy but also 
the integrity of the election is threatened, because votes may be bought, or the 
voters may be coerced into supporting particular candidates. As rigorous proto­
col analysis requires a concise formal definition of the properties, the anonymity 
property also needs to be clearly defined. However, as mentioned previously, 
formally defining such properties is not straightforward as these can vary for dif­
*This chapter is mainly based on the published work in the Formal Aspects of Computing 
Journal [MHS 12].
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ferent scenarios. Regarding this, there have been a number of research efforts 
towards formally defining the anonymity property in the context of voting sys­
tems. However, little work has been undertaken aimed at providing a foundation 
for the automated verification of this property.
4.2 Related Work
First, drawing on the existing literature, several approaches to anonymity are 
considered.
Pfitzmann et a l [PKOO] define anonymity in a message sender-receiver setting, 
where it is specified as the state of someone not being identifiable within a given 
anonymity set of subjects (a set of all possible subjects who might cause an 
action). In a voting context, this would mean tha t no specific vote is linkable to 
any particular voter ID. In addition, an element from the anonymity set possesses 
indistinguishability if it is indistinguishable from all other elements in the set. In 
terms of voting, this would naturally mean the inability to  distinguish a particular 
vote from within a set of votes. Unobservability describes when an intruder cannot 
observe th a t a particular event has occurred, for example, tha t a particular voter 
has voted. Finally, the term pseudonymity describes the use of pseudonyms as 
identifiers of subjects. For instance, ballot serial numbers can be considered as 
pseudonyms tha t link voters to  ballot papers and the latter to votes.
Fournet and Abadi [FA02] give a general privacy definition in the pi calculus 
with respect to private authentication protocols. They define anonymity as the 
case where “two process behaviours have the same interpretation on the model 
as long as they are indistinguishable by observation in all contexts.” T hat is, 
two user processes U\ and U2 are identical in any context from the environment’s 
point of view; in what follows, this is defined as weak anonymity. Moreover, in 
their description, an observational equivalence notion^ is employed to formalise 
properties. Mauw et a l [MVd04] define anonymity based on the work in [PKOO] 
described above in th a t a coercer should not be able to distinguish a user u from 
another user u' in the anonymity group of u. That is, for every behaviour of 
the system tha t can be attributed to user u, there is another indistinguishable 
system behaviour th a t can be attributed to u'. Shmatikov and Hughes [HS04] 
give a specification framework for anonymity and privacy based upon a view 
in which system behaviour is described as a set of functions and the desired 
properties are defined with observational equivalence using a modular approach. 
In their paper, several forms of anonymity in terms of a sender-receiver relation
^The observational equivalence notion in this context is the analogue of the trace equivalence 
notion in CSP that are used in the definitions of anonymity in the next sections.
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are described and some of those definitions are adopted in this work as they are 
deemed applicable to the voting scenario, as described next.
• Absolute voter anonymity: an attacker cannot tell anything about the 
voter’s identity, as every voter is plausible for every observed vote. In 
addition, in this model an attacker should not be able to  link a pseudonym 
(for example, a ballot serial number) with a sender ID (voter). It should 
be noted tha t this strong form of anonymity corresponds to tha t discussed 
in Chapter 3.
• Type-anonymity: an attacker may learn the type of voter. T hat is, in the 
case of postal voting, if there are relatively few voters who have registered 
and cast their votes by post, an attacker may in some cases be able to reduce 
the number of possible voters for a particular vote to a proper subset of the 
set of voters (either the set of postal voters or its complement).
• Session-level: an attacker may know the entire set of voters and their votes, 
but is unable to link the latter to the former’s identities during an election (a 
session in their definition). For instance, if an attacker is observing a polling 
station where only one vote has been cast, and each polling station declares 
their results separately, he may be able to deduce the voter’s identity.
Unobservability: an attacker should not be able to identify tha t a particular 
voter has cast a vote; th a t is, a voting act should be unobservable.
Untraceahility: an attacker or an observer should not be able to determine 
whether two votes cast in different locations have been cast by the same 
voter.
Taking a different approach, Juels et al. [JCJ05] describes anonymity as the 
property of privacy, where the coercer or adversary cannot guess how a voter voted 
better than an adversarial algorithm whose only access is the final tally. Although 
Kremer and Ryan [KR05] and Delaune et al. [DKR06, DKR09] also consider the 
issue of privacy, they adopt Fournet and Abadi’s general privacy definition [FA02] 
in pi calculus for voting system protocols. Moreover, Delaune et al. use the term  
“vote privacy” as a synonym for anonymity, and look for cases where nobody has 
enough information to  identify whether two voters swapped their votes. T hat 
is, if an observer cannot tell whether two arbitrary honest voters swapped their 
votes, then he cannot deduce information about how they cast them and some 
of the applications of this notion of anonymity include [BHM08, DRS08, Sm yll, 
CCK12].
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In the next section, the appropriateness of two formal anonymity definitions: 
Schneider and Sidiropoulos’s [SS96] and Fournet and Abadi’s [FA02], are inves­
tigated, being denoted as stro n g  and w eak  anonymity, respectively.
4.3 Formal Definition of Anonymity
This section discusses the applicability of the strong anonymity definition with 
a referendum example using the abstraction methods introduced in Section 3.2. 
Subsequently, both strong and weak anonymity are assessed in the context of 
voting systems using CSP and FDR.
The strong anonymity definition has already been provided in Section 3.2.1 
whereby a process F  is said to be strongly anonymous on the alphabet A C X, if 
P p / y  I € A]] =T P , and it was shown tha t it is equal to P[[/^/A]][[^/y0]] = t  P , 
where /9 ^ aP . The first relation maps all the events on the alphabet A to a 
single event P, and the second maps /3 to any event in A. Thus, if every event 
of P  from the alphabet. A, is renamed to the event, /3 (many-to-one renaming), 
then whenever an event, a G A, is possible for P  to perform, P p / A j  can perform 
its image p. Conversely, Pi is one-to-many renaming, which maps the event 
p  back to the alphabet A. Thus, when P is possible for the renamed process 
P[[^/A]], any event in A is also possible for P p /A j[^ //9 ]].
W ith the following referendum example, the aim is to  examine the strong 
anonymity definition for voting systems as well as to demonstrate the appro­
priateness of abstraction methods in CSP and effectiveness of FDR in analysing 
such protocols.
4.3.1 Referendum Example
The following example of a referendum^ involves two possible voters v \  and %, 
with only one of them voting, either for or against it. However, the voter v\ 
always says yes (if he votes at all), and similarly the other voter V2 always says 
no. As a result, the process modelling this behaviour is defined as the process 
R ef by:
R ef=  vo te .v i  -4- yes  -4 STO P  □ vote.V2 -4 no  -4 STOP
If the aim is to verify whether the process satisfies strong anonymity, it is nec­
essary to  check the trace equivalence StrongSpecA{Ref) = t  Ref for the set 
A =  {| v o te .v i, vote.V2 |}, where
*A referendum is a form of democracy, whereby the voters are asked to accept or reject a 
particular proposal and hence, generally, the ballots consist of ye s  and no  options.
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Strong SpecA{Ref)=
=  vote.vi -4 {yes -4- STO P  O no -4 STOP)
□ vote.V2 -4 (no -4 STO P  □ yes -4 STOP)
However, the trace equivalence above does not hold, because {vote.vi, no) is a 
trace of StrongSpecA{Ref)-, but not of Ref. This has happened because the ‘no’ 
vote is sufficient to identify the voter. However, if the events in 77 =  {| yes, no |} 
are hidden from the observer, then the abstracted process Ref^^^ is defined as:
Ref^^^= R e f \  H
= vote.vi -4 STO P  □ vote.V2 -4 STO P
Now, when the strong anonymity definition is applied to  Ref^^^, the resulting 
process Strong Spec A{Ref^^^) has the same trace as Ref^^^, and the specification 
is met.
Additionally, the observer can be limited so tha t he can see the occurrence of 
events, but is unable to identify which the process is performing. For example, 
imagine th a t the votes are cast in envelopes, by using the renaming operator on 
the set H  above, the sensitive data can be abstracted away. The new abstracted 
process Ref^^"^ can be written as:
R e f  hs2 ^  ji^j^envelope,envelope/y^g^.^o-^
=  vote.vi -4 envelope -4 STO P  □ vote.V2 -4 envelope -4 STO P  
In order to verify whether Ref^^^ provides anonymity, the trace equivalence 
StrongSpecA{Ref^^^) = t  Ref^^^
needs to be checked. As the equality holds for the set A =  {| vo te .v i, vote.V2 |}, 
this demonstrates tha t the abstracted process Ref^^^ provides strong anonymity.
Another abstraction method tha t may be used is the masking, through which the 
sensitive information carried by the events can be masked during the protocol 
using all the same events as noise. For instance, the process R ef can be written 
as the parallel composition of P e/w ith  R U N (77), where 77 is the set of events to 
be abstracted, namely yes and no events. Hence, the abstracted process Ref^^^ 
as follows:
Ê  Rej\\\ RU N{H )
can perform any event from the set 77, and the observer cannot tell whether the 
occurrence of such events is from Ref^^^ or from RU N{H ). Hence, the equality
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StrongSpecA(Ref^^^) = t  Ref^^^
holds, meaning th a t the process Ref^^^ with the vulnerable events masked pro­
vides strong anonymity.
However, if it is assumed tha t both voters are participating in the referendum, 
and each can vote for any candidate they want, but only once, the new referendum 
process can be described as follows:
Refnew ^ v o te .v i  -4 yes -4 vote.V2 -4 no -4 STOP
□ vo te .v i  -4 no -4 vote.V2 -4 yes  -4 STO P
Subsequently, the new process with the sensitive information abstracted is: 
RefnÂv = R^fnew \  H
Hence, the trace equivalence th a t needs to be checked is:
Strong Spec A(Refniw) = t  Refn^m ew
However, the trace equivalence above does not hold when checked using FDR, 
because the counter-example produced by it, { v o te .v i ,v o te .v i) , shows tha t voter 
v\ can vote twice, whereas does not let this trace happen. To sum up, the
strong anonymity definition, as discussed in Chapter 3, requires th a t any voter 
is plausible for any vote and th a t she can vote multiple times. T hat is, once 
the attacker has discovered th a t v \  cast a particular vote, he then knows tha t v \ 
did not cast any of the others. This is something th a t is true of voting systems 
generally, but not true under strong anonymity. Therefore, this definition of 
anonymity is not appropriate for those voting systems where a voter is allowed 
to vote only once.
The anonymity definition given in [FA02], however, requires two voters swapping 
their votes. T hat is, the occurrences of vo te .v i  and vote.V2 events in the processes 
need to  be swapped, which solves the problem faced in the strong anonymity defi­
nition. However, the sensitive information ye s  and no  still needs to be abstracted 
away from the observer’s point of view by using one of the techniques described 
previously. To this end, the anonymity definition due to Fournet and Abadi 
(weak anonymity) can be described as the following.
D efin itio n  2 (Weak Anonymity). The process P  is weakly anonymous on a set 
of channels C of type T  if:
c.a: | a: € T]] = t  P
fo r any c,d  G C
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This states th a t the process has the same behaviours if any two channels from 
C  are swapped. That is, if c.x and d.x within P  are consistently swapped for 
all values of x, then the result is indistinguishable from the original protocol 
behaviour from an observer’s point of view. The ability to  swap them with­
out making any difference provides anonymity with respect to  the channel tha t 
has been used. Note tha t in the following cj is written as shorthand for
^.^•>d.^ j  d.x, c.x I rc € TJ.
In the context of voting, suppose two honest voters Va and Vb cast their votes 
for candidates Cx and Cy, modelled by the occurrence of events vote.Va.Cx and 
vote.Vb.Cy. The weak anonymity definition for a voting system model. System, is 
applied on the set of channels C = {\ vo te.vi I  G Voters]}, where any %, Vb 
values in the specification can be defined as:
WeakSpecc (System ) =  System ^^^^’''^ °''‘'^°^ '^'^  ^/  vote.Vb,vote.Vai
If the following refinement check holds, then the voting system provides 
anonymity under this definition.
WeakSpecc (System ) = t  System
It follows tha t strong anonymity on A  implies weak anonymity on channels con­
tained within A, as stated in the following lemma:
L em m a 2. I f  P  is strongly anonymous on A  and {|C|} Ç A, then P  is weakly 
anonymous on channels C.
Proof. Assume F  is strongly anonymous. Then consider some arbitrary c,d  G C:
P  p ’ d, cj =T P  Aj p ’ d, c] by strong anonymity on A
=T -PJ^/A] since [^ /A j ; p ’^ /d ,cj =  J^/A J
= T  P  by strong anonymity on A
□
4.4 M odelling and Analysis of a Conven­
tional Voting System
This section presents a formal modelling and analysis of the conventional voting 
system (CVS) with respect to the anonymity requirement, a system th a t is still 
under use in many countries, such as the UK. Under such a system, although the 
voter is not able to audit her vote once it is cast, the CVS, in the vast m ajority of
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cases, provides anonymity since the voters drop their anonymised ballots into a 
ballot box, which shuffles the anonymous ballots further. Therefore, by checking 
this voting system with the weak anonymity specification, further confidence can 
be gained regarding the suitability of the formal definition of anonymity for voting 
systems. Moreover, it will demonstrate the ability of CSP in modelling a simple 
voting system and of FDR for automatically checking whether the CVS model 
satisfies the anonymity requirements.
The model is described by means of the processes shown at the top of Figure 4.1. 
T hat is, it is a parallel composition of these individual processes. Each process 
has its own process definition and they are run in parallel, synchronising on the 
common events in order to model the message fiow between the agents of the 
protocol. In the rest of this section, the process definitions will be given for each 
agent, and the composition of the model presented. Following this, the ability 
of the intruder will be described and, finally the CVS model will be analysed in 
terms of the strong and weak anonymity definitions.
4.4.1 M odelling Assum ptions
Although the modelling assumptions are emphasised where necessary when pre­
senting CSP process definitions of the voting system model, the CVS model is 
based on the following assumptions.
• The model consists of a limited number of agents, which are assumed to 
work honestly: a voter, election official, booth, ballot box and a counter 
process. The message sequence chart of the communication between these 
individual processes are shown in Figure 4.1. As there are multiple voters 
in the model, each voter will follow this message sequence and each election 
phase.
• The voters are also assumed to choose a candidate to vote for before the 
registration phase because of the adaptation of the anonymity specification. 
In more detail, once the voter has started taking part in the election by 
registering to the election official, the voter cannot be replaced with another 
voter—this is required by the anonymity specification, which is focused in 
Section 4.3. Hence, if the voter is allowed to  choose the candidate she would 
like to vote for during the election process, this would cause false positives. 
Therefore, choosing the candidate before the registration is an assumption 
tha t should be made in order to eliminate false positives and also it is not 
so unrealistic.
Yet another assumption is made on the number of booths in a polling 
station. In the model there exist only one booth which synchronises with
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C,V,,S L r =  0
registration phase
voting phase
enter booth
leave booth
tallying
BoxOfficial Voter V CounterBooth
choose c 6  C
mark  
ballot s
authenticate
publish
Figure 4.1: Message sequence chart of CVS
the voters and does allow multiple voters to be in and casting a vote at 
the same time. There could have been more than two booths. However, 
having checked the system behaviours against the anonymity specification, 
this assumption has no harm in the formal analysis of voting systems. This 
is because the booth only allows the voters to mark their ballot forms in a 
private environment. Thus, in a polling station with multiple booths voters 
simply vote in separate booths, and queue to drop their envelopes into the 
ballot box as usual.
4.4.2 H onest Participants
In the CVS, the correctness of the election results, the secrecy and the verifiability 
of the votes depend on a chain-of-custody, whereby each step of the protocol is 
verified by a trusted third party or election officials. Hence, it is first assumed tha t
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each participant is honest and follows the protocol steps to ensure its objectives 
are met, in particular, the voter anonymity. The honest agent processes of the 
CVS model are modelled as follows.
V oter P rocess
A Voter from the set of voters chooses a candidate to vote for from the given 
candidate list before going to  the polling station and identifying herself to the 
electoral official. To this end, the choosing action for the voter v is modelled with 
the events choose.u.c, where c € C. As the choice of candidate is made by the 
voter, non-deterministic choice is the appropriate CSP operator, since the choice 
is not under the control of the system. Afterwards, she receives a ballot form 
with a serial number s on it on the channel collectform. In more detail, as the 
ballot form is given by the authority to  the voter, an external choice operator 
is used to  show tha t the voter accepts any ballot form given by the authority. 
Subsequently, she goes into a booth, votes according to her preference on the 
channel m ark.v.s.c, modelling v votes for c on the ballot paper with the serial 
number s. Finally, she leaves the booth, casts her vote by dropping the ballot 
form in the ballot box, modelled as cast.v.s.c, and leaves the polling station. 
Hence, the following process models the honest behaviour of a voter.
Voter{v)
n
cec
(  choose.v.c openElection —> auth.v  —)■ ^ 
/  collectform.v.s —)■ \
enter Booth.V 
m ark.v.s.c  —> 
leaveBooth.v —> 
cast.v.s.c
\  closeElection —)■ STO P J  j
□
In the model, all the voters can be described as the interleaving of voter processes 
for each as below.
Voters = lluev Voter (v)
The alphabets of the processes are not explicitly stated here, but are taken to 
be the set of all the events they can perform. For instance, the alphabet of the 
process Voters is shown below. Likewise, the alphabets of the other processes 
modelled include all the events tha t can be performed by these processes.
aVoters = {\ openElection, auth, collectform, enterBooth, leaveBooth, 
choose, mark, cast, closeElection]}
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E lection  Official P rocess
An Election Official working in a polling station authenticates eligible voters by 
their identification documents, and issues the ballot papers on which there are 
arbitrary and unique serial numbers. In the model, a set of pre-existing serial 
numbers are assigned to  the voters by the election official, which is performed non- 
deterministically as this official chooses them independently. Moreover, the same 
serial number is never given twice, so two different voters cannot receive the same 
one (the same ballot form) to  vote with. The election official process also opens 
and closes the election for a polling station and other processes synchronise with 
this official on the openElection  and closeElection channels, thereby maintaining 
the different phases of the election.
Elecofficial =  openElection Officially, S )
Official{ids, serials) = 
closeElection —> STOP  
□
/  auth.v  \
□  H i I
vE ids
B ooth  P rocess
A Booth is a private environment for the voters to cast their ballots without being 
observed. Thus, in the model, the booth process allows one voter to go in to  vote 
and to leave before the next is allowed to enter.
Booth = enterB oothlid  —> leaveBooth.id  —> Booth 
B allot B ox  P rocess
A Ballot Box is a box where all cast votes are collected under the control of the 
election official. It is assumed tha t there is a private untappable channel between 
a voter and a ballot box (or, in other words, the voter fills in the ballot paper and 
casts the ballot unobserved). In this model, the ballot box accepts the ballots 
from the voters and gathers them for collection. Hence, whenever a cast.v.s.c  
occurs the process will store the tuple (s, c) in a set. Once the election is closed, 
the box can be opened, and all the ballots can be withdrawn for the tallying, with 
this event from the set bag being performed non-deterministically, this complies 
with the anonymous behaviour of a ballot box. Finally, when there are no more 
ballots left in the box, the process terminates.
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B ox = openElection  —> Boxi{^)
Boxi(bag) = closeElection -4- B ox 2 {bag)
□
□  ^ cast.v.s.c -> Boxiipag  U {(s, c)}) ^
s^ Scec
B o x 2 (jh) = empty  —> STOP
B o x 2 {bag) =  □  w i t h d r a w .s .c B o x 2 {bag\{(s,c)})
{s,c)ebag
C ounter P rocess
A Counter is an election official who removes all cast ballots from the ballot 
box and tallies them. The following process models the counter’s behaviour for 
each candidate keeping a record of withdraw  events for each candidate. When a 
withdraw  event happens, the counter checks for which candidate the particular 
vote is, and subsequently increments the number of votes tha t he/she has received 
so far by one. Once the ballot box is empty, meaning there is no ballot to be 
counted, he announces the to tal number of votes tha t each candidate has received.
Counter{c, r) =
□  ^ withdraw.s.c -4- Counter{c, r  +  1)  ^
seS
□ em pty -4- total.c.r -4 done -4 STOP  
Counters = \\cecCounter{c,0)
The system for the conventional voting is defined as a parallel composition of all 
of the above described five processes, as seen below, and the correctness of the 
model is verified via a number of sanity checks, such as: “no voter is allowed to 
vote after the election is closed” and “the correctness of final tally” . These sanity 
checks increase the confidence in the behaviour of the model (see Appendix A .l).
S y s te m c v s  =  Voters || Elecofficial || Booth || Box || Counter
Having modelled the CVS, in the next subsection, the passive attacker or ob­
server’s behaviour is defined.
4.4.3 The Passive Attacker
In this analysis, it is assumed there exists a passive attacker or an observer who 
aims to break voter anonymity, and is capable of seeing all the public information
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over the election protocol. That is, the intruder’s ability is restricted to the public 
data, which needs to  be specified carefully.
Firstly, as in the real traditional elections, under the model anyone knows when 
the election is opening and closing, and what the final result is for each candidate 
in the end. Additionally, a list of all voters who are eligible to vote is hung on 
a public board in the polling station before the election and remains so during 
it. Hence, it is assumed tha t the intruder can observe who takes part in an 
election run as well as the voters going in and out of the voting booth. It is 
further accepted tha t the intruder can also see the ballot forms withdrawn from 
the ballot boxes and the tellers counting them.
However, the intruder cannot access any information tha t can link a voter to  her 
ballot form and/or to her chosen candidate. For instance, if the intruder sees the 
ballot form on which a voter has cast her vote, then he can violate her anonymity 
as he can also see the tallying of the votes at the end of the election. Hence, 
the channel between the voter and the election official, where the ballot form is 
given to the voter needs to be hidden, i.e., private channel. Obviously, the voter’s 
marking her ballot form also needs to be concealed from the observer.
An initial description of the system th a t the observer can see is put forward as: 
System'QYg = S ys tem cv s  \  {| m ark, collectform]}
This process models the conventional voting system tha t the intruder observes, 
in which the mark and collectform events are hidden. However, a number of 
other scenarios could be tried, like hiding the cast events completely, thus not 
allowing the observer to see the voter casting her vote. By contrast, he could be 
allowed to observe tha t the voter is casting a vote, but not for whom or what 
serial numbers are used. In order to do this, cast events have to be renamed 
to another event called envelope, which models the voter casting her vote in an 
envelope rather than in public, thereby hiding the private data. Consequently, 
the process System^^yg below models this behaviour of the CVS model.
System^QYQ =
4.4.4 Strong Anonym ity Analysis
As noted by Schneider and Sidiropoulos in [SS96], different definitions of 
anonymity are required for different situations. For instance, in a voting system 
where the anonymity of the voters’ identity is required, the strong anonymity 
definition tha t was given previously is too powerful, because multiple votes are 
allowed under this arrangement, which is not the case for all voting systems as
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they only permit the casting of one ballot, even though there might be several 
candidates voted for. To see this, the strong anonymity specification for the CVS 
model can be defined as the following;
StrongSpecA{System^QYg) =
System^QYS^^^^^^ /  choose.v.ci^ j^choose.v.ci j  dum m y\
The anonymity is checked for the set A  = { \ choose \ }, hence if the strong 
anonymity definition is applied to the CVS model, the choose events are re­
named to the event dum m y  ^  A, and renamed back to the set A. Hence, in order 
for the CVS model to provide strong anonymity, the following trace equivalence 
should be satisfied.
Strong Spec A{System^QYg) = t  System f^ys
FDR produces the counter-example trace of (c/ioose.ui.ci, c/ioose.ui.ci), mean­
ing th a t the system does not satisfy this specification as the abstracted model 
System^QYQ does not allow the voter v\ to  vote twice in an election run. As a 
result, the CVS model does not provide the strong anonymity given in [SS96] 
from the observer’s point of view.
The next subsection investigates the suitability of the weak anonymity definition 
for voting systems.
4.4.5 Weak Anonym ity Analysis
The weak anonymity definition formalised in Section 4.3 will be used in the 
second analysis. This analysis of the CVS model is conducted by comparing two 
situations: the first, in which the voters v i  and V2 vote any way they like; and the 
second, in which the voters swap their votes. From the intruder’s point of view, 
the processes System^^yg (the first situation) and WeakSpecAiSystem^^yg) (the 
second) should be indistinguishable. Hence, according to the weak anonymity 
definition, the specification is defined by swapping two votes, (i.e., choose.V2.c 
and choose.vi.c, where c E C) using the renaming abstraction method as in the 
following:
W eakSpecAiSystem^Qyg) =
c/ioose.'U2.cy choose.vi.c][
In order for the CVS model to provide anonymity under the weak anonymity 
definition, the following trace equivalence should hold:
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WeakSpecAiSystem^^yg) = t  System^^yg
FDR verifies tha t the equality holds meaning tha t the two systems are indistin­
guishable from the intruder’s point of view and therefore, the conventional voting 
system model provides anonymity under this definition.
In the next section, the case of corrupt agents in the protocol who can share 
their knowledge or observations with the intruder will be considered. Note tha t 
the weak anonymity definition is to  be used in the remainder of this thesis as the 
valid anonymity definition for voting systems, i.e., when anonymity is mentioned, 
the weak definition is being referred to.
4.5 Analysis under Alternative Assum ptions
For the dining cryptographers problem, the anonymity of the protocol was pre­
viously checked in relation to  two cases: from an outsider’s point of view and 
with respect to other cryptographers. Similarly, the analysis of voting systems in 
general and in the CVS model, specifically can be conducted under such assump­
tions. For instance, a corrupt election official may share their knowledge with 
the intruder, thereby enlarging his power over sensitive data, which can subse­
quently be used to break the anonymity of voters. Under these circumstances, 
the anonymity can be checked by focusing on election official and this can be 
modelled in CSP using the abstraction methods: renaming and hiding.
A trusted election official possesses crucial information regarding which ballot 
form was given to a particular voter and hence he has the power to break the 
anonymous link between the voter, her ballot form and the chosen candidate. 
Misbehaviour in this regard can be modelled by revealing the private channel be­
tween the voter and the election official and in order to do so, the event collectform 
should not be hidden when defining the abstracted system model SysterrP^yg. 
Therefore, only the m ark  events will be abstracted away and this whole process 
is as follows:
System f^yg = {System cvs^^^^^^^^/ c-ast.id.s.cÿ) \  {| m ark  |}
Following this, when the equivalence WeakSpecA{System^Qyg) = t  System^^yg is 
checked mechanically using FDR, it produces the following counter-example.
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( c h o o s e . V 3 . C 3 ,
c h o o s e . V 2 . C 1 ,
c h o o s e . v 1 . c 3 ,
openElection,
auth.vi,
collectform.v1.s2,
auth.V3,
c o l l e c t f o r m . v 3 . s 3 ,
auth.V2,
c o l l e c t f o r m . v 2 . s 1 ,
envelop,
e n v e l o p ,
envelop,
closeElection,
w ithdraw .si.ci)
The trace above identifies an attack against the anonymity of the voter In 
more detail, although the observer (electoral official in this case) cannot see the 
votes, because they are cast in an envelope, he knows which serial number the 
voter V2 was given by observing the event c o l l e c t f o r m . v 2 . s 1 .  When the votes 
begin to be counted, the corrupt official can also observe the occurrence of the 
w i t h d r a w . s i . c i  event, which links the serial number si to the candidate c \ .  As 
the serial number si was cast by the voter V2 , the observer is now certain about 
how V2 has cast her vote, thus violating V2 ’s anonymity.
4.6 Results and Discussion
The analysis has shown th a t the strong anonymity definition is too strong for 
analysing this concept in voting systems, if voters are not allowed to cast multiple 
ballots. T hat is, this specification requires an actor to perform different tasks 
tha t cannot be linked together in any way, which is not the case in general 
voting systems as only one such action, namely a ballot, can be cast and counted 
per voter—although, some schemes allow voters to cast multiple ballots, such as, 
JC J [JCJ05] and Civitas [CCM08], only one of the votes is counted at the tallying 
phase. Hence, the definition is not appropriate for these voting systems either. As 
a consequence, the weak anonymity was investigated for its suitability to provide 
a formal specification for voting systems, and it was verified tha t the CVS model 
provides such anonymity. Moreover, the appropriateness of the formal language 
CSP to model voting systems, and the capability of the FDR model checking tool 
for automated analysis were demonstrated.
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Additionally, some of the corner cases have been investigated. For instance, in 
case of unanimity in an election run, whereby all the voters vote for the same 
candidate, although it is clear how each voter voted, an observer still cannot 
identify whether two voters have swapped their votes (because this is a null oper­
ation), and so the anonymity definition is still satisfied. Similarly, the definition 
is still met in elections with an electorate consisting of a single voter, because 
swapping votes is still applicable even though there is only one vote. Addition­
ally, in the case in which the electoral official can assign the same serial number 
to two different voters, the weak anonymity is still satisfied by the CVS model. 
Indeed, assigning one serial number to two different voters may introduce a bet­
ter anonymity. Similarly, it was also demonstrated tha t the CVS model satisfies 
the weak anonymity definition even if there are no serial numbers on the ballot 
forms.
Moreover, the weak anonymity definition covers voting systems in which the final 
tally is published. However, although the strong anonymity definition is too strict 
for most voting systems, it can still be used in systems tha t allow a voter to  vote 
multiple times in an election, or where only the winner is announced and not the 
full tally. For instance, strong anonymity may be an appropriate definition for 
television polls where votes are cast by sending an SMS to a particular number.
4.7 Summary
This chapter has investigated related work on formal anonymity definitions, in 
particular, strong and weak anonymity for voting systems. Moreover, a model of 
the conventional voting system has been used as a case study to validate these 
definitions, and using the process algebra CSP and the FDR model checker, 
it was demonstrated how to provide automated analysis of ballot-based non­
cryptographic voting systems with respect to the different anonymity definitions. 
In addition, the importance of underlying assumptions in the formal analysis of 
a protocol has been highlighted as well as the precise definitions of requirements 
presented in terms of comparing what an intruder is capable of doing under differ­
ent definitions and assumptions. In the next chapter there is further investigation 
into the assumptions under which certain protocols are claimed to  provide voter 
anonymity, such as Rivest’s ThreeBallot voting system.
Chapter 5
A u tom ated  A nalysis o f th e  
T hreeB allot V oting S ystem
This chapter* demonstrates the applicability of the framework introduced in the 
previous chapter, for automated anonymity analysis of non-cryptographic vot­
ing systems and emphasises the importance of security protocol assumptions. 
To this end, Rivest’s non-cryptographic voting system ThreeBallot [Riv06] is 
investigated. It is particularly interesting because it uses no cryptography, how­
ever, still aims to provide voter anonymity, integrity of the election, verifiabil­
ity and incoercibility. Moreover, although the ThreeBallot voting system has 
been the subject of analysis of one sort or another many times since its publica­
tion [Str06b, Str06a, CEA07, App07, dMPQ07, TPR07, CKW08, HSS09, K T V ll] 
(see Section 1.3 for details), it has not yet been subjected to autom ated formal 
verification.
In this chapter, a CSP model of ThreeBallot has been constructed and used 
to produce the first automated formal analysis of its anonymity property using 
FDR. Throughout the analysis, the anonymity definition given in Section 4.3 
Definition 2 , and the passive intruder model given in Chapter 4 will be con­
sidered. Additionally, various modified versions of ThreeBallot in the litera­
ture [KZIO, K T V ll] are investigated and it is shown tha t they suffer from the 
same attacks despite the improvements, such as Reconstruction Attacks. T hat 
is, with the information available to the intruder on the bulletin board, he may 
find out whether the voter has voted for a particular candidate just by match­
ing the mini-ballots on the bulletin board and the voter’s receipt to reconstruct 
valid multi-ballots. Consequently, Rivest and Smith [RS07] proposed the short 
ballot assumption (SBA), under which ThreeBallot is claimed to be secure. How­
*This chapter is mainly based on the published work for the 10th International Conference 
on integrated Formal Methods (iFM) [MHS 13].
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ever, during the analysis of this voting system, it emerges th a t the SBA is highly 
ambiguous in the literature. Roughly speaking, this assumption states tha t the 
information content of a ballot should be low. However, the phrasing of this 
assumption in the description of ThreeBallot is vague and open to a number 
of radically different interpretations. Consequently, various plausible precise in­
terpretations are discussed here, and it is discovered tha t in each case, the in­
terpretation was either unrealistically strong, or else failed to ensure anonymity. 
Therefore, a version of the SBA in relation to ThreeBallot tha t is realistic but still 
provides a guarantee of anonymity is adopted. Finally, because the approach to 
the analysis of voting systems considered in this thesis is possibilistic rather than 
probabilistic, two cases where the ThreeBallot voting system provides guaranteed 
anonymity without the SBA are verified automatically.
This chapter is structured as follows. In the next section, an outline of Three­
Ballot is provided as well as there being discussion on the SBA. In Section 5.2, 
ThreeBallot is modelled as a parallel composition of agents: voters, an authority, 
the bulletin board and a counter process. In Section 5.3 the first automated anal­
ysis of the ThreeBallot voting system and its versions are presented. Furthermore 
in tha t section, the analyses of the SBA interpretations are conducted manually 
and subsequently a better formulation for this assumption is given. Next, the 
ThreeBallot versions providing guaranteed anonymity without the SBA are veri­
fied using the model checker FDR. Finally, in Section 5.5 the chapter is concluded 
with a summary of findings.
5.1 The ThreeBallot Voting System
In this section, the original ThreeBallot voting system [Riv06] is briefly introduced 
as well as the short ballot assumption given by Rivest and Smith [RS07].
Voting in ThreeBallot proceeds as follows. Initially, the authenticated voter re­
ceives a multi-ballot from a poll worker, which consists of three mini-ballots (see 
Figure 5.1). The mini-ballots are all identical except for the IDs or serial numbers, 
located at the bottom, which are all unique and unrelated. In particular, there is 
no way of determining what mini-ballot serial numbers go together to make up 
a multi-ballot. The voter fills two bubbles in total for the chosen candidate, and 
only one bubble for each other candidate. The completed multi-ballot is inserted 
into a checker, which confirms tha t it has been correctly completed. Finally, the 
voter chooses one of the mini-ballots, and receives a duplicate of it as her receipt. 
She then separates the three mini-ballots, and casts them all individually into a 
ballot box. At the end of the election day, the cast ballots are scanned to the 
BB on which all mini-ballots are published along with a list of everyone who 
voted. The voter may then verify tha t the mini-ballot for which she has a receipt
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Alice • Alice • Alice O
Bob O Bob • Bob O
Chris O Chris O Chris •
David e David O David o
56248 04578 31489
Figure 5.1: A ThreeBallot multi-ballot, filled in as a vote for Alice
appears unaltered on the BB; if it does not, she can appeal using her receipt as 
evidence.
The number of votes for each candidate is counted as in the traditional voting 
system. As each voter fills in exactly two bubbles for the chosen candidate and one 
for the others, the number of voters can then be subtracted from each candidate’s 
final tally to find the correct number of votes for each candidate, i.e., this identifies 
those multi-ballots with two bubbles filled out. Subsequently, all the mini-ballots 
are posted on the bulletin board so the final tally can be verified by anyone and 
each voter can check whether their vote has been tampered with in any way, 
using their duplicate as evidence.
ThreeBallot is claimed in [RS07] to be secure under the short ballot assumption 
(SBA), which Rivest and Smith in [RS07, p.4] defined as:
“the ballot is short—there are many more voters in an election than 
ways to fill out an individual ballot [...] It is reasonable to assume 
under the SBA tha t each possible ballot is likely to be cast by several 
voters.”
However, ambiguities arise from the terms “Individual ballot” (mini-ballots or 
multi-ballots?) and “several voters” (how many?) employed by these authors. 
Moreover, according to  [CKW08] the SBA assumes tha t “the list of candidates 
on a ballot is short enough in order to guarantee security” and in [dMPQ07] it 
is stated tha t “the length of the ballots must be kept small (possibly by splitting 
them into several parts)” . In summary, in the literature no precise meaning of 
the SBA is to be found.
Because ThreeBallot is claimed to guarantee voter anonymity under the SBA, 
its analysis is not possible without a clear and unambiguous reading of the as­
sumption. The three possible interpretations of this assumption, which will be 
analysed later in this chapter, are provided next. Note tha t in each case the 
intention is tha t the assumption will be guaranteed probabilistically; tha t is, the 
number of voters, candidates, etc., will be sufficient to ensure tha t the assumption 
is broken with only negligible probability. In what follows, serial numbers will be
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ignored; th a t is, two mini-ballots will be considered the same if they contain the 
same marks but different serial numbers.
A ssu m p tio n  1 (SBA-multi). Every possible multi-ballot will be cast at least once.
The formulation of the SBA given in Assumption 1 requires th a t every possi­
ble way of completing a multi-ballot should be adopted by at least one voter. 
For small numbers of candidates, this is plausible, but even moderate numbers, 
though, the assumption quickly becomes less likely to hold.
Note th a t once a candidate has been chosen, there are then exactly three ways of 
completing each row: for the chosen candidate’s row, one must choose a bubble 
to leave empty, and for each other row, one must choose a bubble to fill. There 
are thus c • 3  ^distinct multi-ballots, where c is the number of candidates standing 
in the election. It is not feasible to calculate the number of voters required to 
make this reasonable, because it depends on the probability distribution of multi­
ballots: voters do not cast multi-ballots randomly (one hopes). A full calculation 
would require a realistic model of how voters cast their ballots. However, the 
best case scenario is when voters cast their multi-ballots randomly and so by 
assuming a uniform distribution, we can determine a lower bound on the number 
of voters required. T hat is, with a uniform distribution the expected number 
of voters needed to cover all possible multi-ballot patterns is: n  • XlILi I  where 
n =  c • 3^, is the number of possible multi-ballots. For five candidates, this comes 
out at 9331 voters; for ten candidates, 8.1 million voters are needed and for fifteen 
candidates, the number exceeds 4 billion.
For n  possible multi-ballots, and a uniform distribution, the number of voters 
required to ensure th a t the probability of covering every multi-ballot a t least 
once exceeds a given threshold can be calculated. However, since the security 
of ThreeBallot relies on the SBA, there would need to be confidence th a t (the 
correct interpretation of) it is satisfied by achieving an acceptable probability 
level pertaining to the number of voters required. For n  multi-ballots, and v 
voters, the probability th a t the v voters will cover all of the n possibilities is:
n—1 /  \  /  - \  u
J=1
This summary is difficult to calculate precisely but easy to calculate approxi­
mately because the first few terms dominate for large v.
For five candidates, to reach 95% probability of full coverage, around 12,250 voters 
are needed, whereas six candidates need around 50,000 voters and by the time 
ten candidates are running, 9.6 million voters are required to give 95% confidence 
th a t every multi-ballot turns up at least once. Note th a t these figures are rather
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conservative lower bounds: the distribution will not in fact be uniform, which 
will lower the probability and in any case 95% confidence is perhaps insufficient 
for a critical security assumption.
However, because these numbers are so high, they are considered to be unrealistic. 
Therefore, as this version of the short ballot assumption is suitable only for a very 
small number of candidates or an extremely large numbers of voters; it will not 
be considered further in this paper.
A ssu m p tio n  2  (SBA-mini). Every possible mini-ballot will he cast at least once.
Under Assumption 2 , each mini-ballot is required to be cast at least once, rather 
than each multi-ballot and clearly this is more likely to  be satisfied than Assump­
tion 1. For c candidates, there are only 2  ^ distinct mini-ballots, against c • 3"^  
distinct multi-ballots. For ten candidates, coverage of only 1024 mini-ballots is 
needed, rather than nearly 600,000 multi-ballots. It will be shown later th a t this 
interpretation of the SBA is insufficient to prevent attacks on ThreeBallot and 
since it is not a worthwhile formulation of the assumption, it is not necessary to 
calculate the likelihood tha t it will be satisfied.
A ssu m p tio n  3 (SBA-mini-n). Every possible mini-ballot will be cast at least 
n times (for some suitably chosen n).
A slightly stronger interpretation Assumption 3 requires each mini-ballot to  turn 
up at least a certain number of times and this, of course, needs more voters 
than Assumption 2 . However, it will be shown later tha t this formulation is also 
insecure, regardless of the value of n.
5.2 M odelling the ThreeBallot Voting Sys­
tem
In this section, the CSP model of ThreeBallot is given by first defining data-types, 
sets and the functions, and then describing each process individually. Subse­
quently, each is then run in parallel so as to reflect the behaviour of the voting 
system.
In this modelling approach, the multi-ballot of the ThreeBallot voting system 
is treated as a board with coordinates different to the CVS model. Here, a co­
ordinate (i , j )  defines a bubble on a mini-ballot, which is to be filled in—although 
the bubbles at the end of the each mini-ballot are allocated for serial numbers, 
the separation between a bubble for a mark and the bubble for a serial number is 
ensured in the process definitions. Thus, a multi-ballot consists of three columns
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Table 5.1: Bubbles returned by
Row(z) and Col( j )
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Table 5.3: Bubbles returned by
adjR(i,i)
Table 5.2: Bubbles returned by
nhdAII(i,  j )
j
o # # # # o
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o o
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Table 5.4: Bubbles returned by
adjC(i ,  j )
each representing: a mini-ballot; as many rows as the number of candidates 
racing in the election; and a single row at the end of the ballot allocated for 
serial numbers. Hence, the size of the board is determined by these parameters: 
the number of voters and the number of candidates. These parameters define 
the sets of voters, candidates and serial numbers (there are three times as many 
serial numbers as there are voters). Conventionally, the data-types for voters, 
candidates and serial numbers are denoted v, c and s, respectively. Note that the 
candidate order is predetermined numerically, i.e., the order of the candidate is 
fixed as ci,C2, . . . ,  Cn for all ballots.
In order to return a specific part of the board in a process description, several 
functions are used in the model. In more detail, the function Row( i )  returns 
the ith  row of a multi-ballot and Col ( j )  is the set of bubbles on the j th  column 
(Table 5.1). Likewise, some other functions are used to return the neighbouring 
bubbles of a given coordinate, such as, the function nhdAII( i , j ) ,  which returns 
all the neighbours of (z,j) in the current multi-ballot coordinates (Table 5.2). 
Similarly, a d j R ( i , j )  returns the coordinates adjacent to (i,  j )  in the same row 
(Table 5.3), and adJC(z, j )  returns the coordinates adjacent to (i,  j)  in the same 
column (Table 5.4).
5.2.1 M odelling Assum ptions
The assumptions made in the modelling of ThreeBallot are continuation of the 
ones in Section 4.4.1. T hat is, there is a limited number of voters, all of which
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follow the protocol steps honestly and choose the candidates to vote for before 
the registration phase. The rest of the assumptions regarding ThreeBallot is as 
follows. The voter is not restricted in how she votes, but the filling of the ballot 
form needs to be done efficiently in a left to right fashion (i.e., to limit the non­
determinism in the CSP). Therefore, this modelling assumption does not impact 
on the analysis, but facilitates the mechanised verification by reducing the state 
space (more details are given when describing the voter process in the following 
subsection).
All cast multi-ballots are valid. That is, in the original ThreeBallot system there 
exists a checker machine in the booth, which confirms tha t the multi-ballot in­
serted by the voter has been correctly completed. In modelling of ThreeBallot, 
this behaviour is already modelled in the voter process—the voter never makes 
a mistake when completing a multi-ballot, which are ensured by processes syn­
chronisation. This also means tha t we do not model incorrect voter behaviours 
either by mistake or intentionally as in all voting system models analysed in this 
thesis.
5.2.2 Honest Participants
In this subsection, the individual processes are defined and the channels tha t 
connect these processes as well as the information carried on each are explained. 
The ThreeBallot system model is formed by the parallel composition of the fol­
lowing processes (see Figure 5.2 illustrating the network for the ThreeBallot CSP 
model).
/  auth.id place.id.*
Authority Voter_____ ________ B.Board
alloc.id.serial.* ' receipt.id.serial.* ^
Figure 5.2: ThreeBallot CSP model communication channels (--^  private chan­
nel) and note that the counter process is considered a part of the bulletin board 
process.
V oter Process
The voter chooses the candidate that she wants to vote for before the election. 
She then authenticates herself to the election authority, and collects her multi­
ballot on the alloc channel. In the booth, she fills out two bubbles for the chosen 
candidate and one for the other candidates with the place events. Afterwards, 
she gets her receipt by choosing one of the mini-ballots allocated to her on the 
channel receipt, and leaves the booth before the election is closed.
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The VoterQ process performs place events in an efficient way, such th a t although 
it allows any legitimate completed multi-ballot, it reduces the state space by 
constraining the order in which bubbles are filled. That is, first a bubble from the 
first or second column is chosen for the candidate the voter wants to  vote for (the 
set Fi under the second non-deterministic choice in the process definition below 
determines what bubbles the voter can use first, where Fi = Row(x — 1) \ Col(2)) 
and X  is the chosen candidate’s id, such as 2 for the candidate C2, thus, the 
value X — 1 determines the row of the chosen candidate. Following this, the 
voter chooses another bubble for her chosen candidate in the same row, but in 
a left to right fashion, e.g., first marking the bubble (0 , 1), and then (0 , 2 ), thus 
eliminating the option of first marking (0,2) and then (0,1). This is illustrated by 
the voter choosing a bubble from the set F2 , where F2 = adjR(%, j) .  Afterwards, 
the process performs a place event in a top to bottom  manner for the other 
candidates—again the way th a t the voters fill in the bubbles is restricted in order 
to  reduce the state space required for the analysis. All empty bubbles tha t can 
be filled in by the voter in the next phase are transferred to the set Rest, where 
R est = nhdAII(%, j ) \  (Row(z) U Row(n)) and n  is the number of candidates, also 
corresponds to the serial numbers row on a ballot form. Once the voter has 
finished voting for the chosen candidate, she marks one bubble for the other 
candidates, and the row belonging to the particular one is discarded from the set 
(modelled as aset\ Row(fc) in the last line of the process definition). Finally, the 
voter determines one of the serial numbers as her receipt. That is, the mini-ballot 
with tha t serial number and the marked bubbles form her receipt.
Voter (v) =
/  choose.v.c -4- openElection  —>■ auth.v  -4  ^
alloc.v?si?(ii,ji) -4  alloc.vls27{i2,j2) —^ alloc.v7 s3 ?{is,js) -4  
enterBooth.v  -4
/  place.v.[H,jÀ) - 4  \
n  n   ^place.v.{i5,j3) \
K {h,h)EF2 \  V o te r i {v ,R es t , { s i ,S 2 ,S3 } , n - l )  J y
n
cEC
Voteri{v, aset, serials, 0) =
I receipt.v.s?{i,j) leaveBooth.v 
. , i  closeElection -4  STO P
sE ser ta ls  \
Voteri{v, aset, serials, r) =  
place.v7{k,l) -4
Voteri{v, a set\ Row (A:), serials, r  — 1)
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Thus the process representing all voters is described by the interleaving of the 
voters as follows:
Voters = IIugv Voter{v)
E lection  A uthority  P rocess
The authority (electoral official) in the polling station is responsible for authen­
ticating voters on the channel auth  and assigning the pre-printed multi-ballots 
(three unique serial numbers from the set S)  to  the voters with the alloc events. 
Moreover, the serial number allocations are performed non-deterministically and 
it is ensured th a t the serial number allocated is never assigned to another mini­
ballot. Because the last line of a mini-ballot is allocated for serial numbers, each 
is placed on the n th  column, where n is the number of candidates on the board 
(note tha t the row numbers range between 0 and n, thus ensuring th a t the serial 
numbers are always allocated at the bottom  of the ballot forms). Additionally, 
the allocation occurs three times for each multi-ballot form, and once three are 
allocated, the remaining serial numbers are carried forward to the next voter. 
When the election is closed through the closeElection event, no more ballots 
are allocated for any voter. Here we do not present the most efficient authority 
model used in the analysis for simplicity. Section 5.4 provides details of the need 
to define efficient model.
A u th o rity^  openElection  -4 Authorityi{S)
Authorityi{serials) =
au th iv -^  n ( )
Authority 2 {v, coord, 0) =  closeElection -4 STO P
A uthority 2 {v, {n, 2), serials) = A uthority\{setSerials)
A uthority 2 {v, (n,i),  serials) =
n  ^ alloc.v.s.{n,i + l ) A u t h o r i t y 2 {v , {n , i + 1 ), s e r ia ls \{s} )  ^
sEseria ls
T he B u lletin  Board Process
The process B-Board operates as a bulletin board where the cast mini-ballots 
are published. In detail, the votes are collected by this process as the voters cast 
their mini-ballots and a record is kept of the serial numbers and the bubbles tha t 
are filled in on tha t particular mini-ballot with the set hag. Once a serial number 
is allocated to a coordinate {i, j)  for any voter, the process traces the j t h  column, 
whenever a place event happens on tha t column, because the event place.v.{i,j) 
models a vote for the zth candidate on the candidate list. Subsequently, the 
value i is then stored in the set bag. Additionally, the process is also ready to
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give any of the mini-ballots as the voter’s receipt, with the serial number and 
bubbles filled in, if requested by them. After the election, the cast mini-ballots 
are published with the pub event. The whole process B-Board  is modelled as the 
parallel composition of individual mini-ballot processes as follows.
Board{s) =  alloc?v.s7{i,j) —> Boardi{Çl, s, {i, j))
Board\{bag,s, {i, j)) =
□   ^ place.v.{m ,n) -4  Boardi{bag U {m}, s, {i, j))  )
(m,n) eCol(j)
□ receipt!U.S.bag -4  Board2 {s,bag)
□ Boar d2 [s,bag)
Board 2 {s, bag) =  closeElection -4- pub.s.bag -4  bagempty -4  STO P  
B -B o a rd  = openElection -4  \\s^sBoard{s)
C ounter P rocess
The last process is Counters, which works as an electoral official counting the 
votes published on the bulletin board, keeping a record of place events for each 
candidate by following each row of ballot forms. That is, when there exists a 
mark on the %th row of a mini-ballot, it is counted as a vote for the candidate 
Ci+i. Moreover, when no more place events are happening, the number of total 
votes for each candidate is published on the channel total.
Counter{cx,r) =
□  ^ place.v.{i,j) -4 Counter[cx,r + 1) )
v EV
(zj)eRow(z-l)
□ bagempty -4  total.Cx.r -4  STO P  
Counters = ||cgC Countcric, 0)
System  P rocess
The following parallel composition of the processes defined previously models the 
behaviour of the ThreeBallot voting system.
System ^B  = Voters || Authority || Booth || B-Board || Counters
In the overall flow of the system process, as all voters are run in parallel and 
synchronise on openElection and closeElection events with the election authority 
pairwise. Thus, each voter performs an openElection event to  begin her voting 
process. Each voter must also perform a closeElection event after casting their
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individual vote and leaving the polling station. Additionally, the WBB publishes 
cast votes when all voters have finished vote casting and subsequently the election 
closed. Finally, the counter process announces total vote for each candidate when 
there is no ballot left to count in the ballot box.
A number of sanity checks are deployed in order to gain more confidence in the 
correct behaviour of the CSP model of the ThreeBallot voting system and the 
details can be found in Appendix A.2. In the following subsection, the passive 
intruder model is defined for the analysis of the ThreeBallot CSP model.
5.2.3 The Passive Attacker
Although the passive intruder model defined in the previous chapter is a generic 
framework, a few modifications need to  be made for individual voting system 
models, because the channels and data-types can be modelled differently for 
each. Regarding this, the intruder model in this analysis is similar to  the one 
defined before, however, the vulnerable data  on the channels needs to be hidden 
according to the needs of the ThreeBallot voting system model. More specifically, 
the intruder is able to see all the public channels, but not the private ones: alloc 
and place. Hence, these private channels need to be hidden from the intruder, 
forming the abstracted system process, S y s te m f^  below:
System ÿg  = System sB \  {| alloc, place |}
Note tha t the intruder in this model analysis is able to see all receipt events,
i.e., he can see all the receipts taken by the voters in an election (this is a strong 
assumption; however, it is safe in the sense th a t if the system is secure under this 
assumption, it will also be secure for an adversary who sees only some receipts.). 
In the following section the automated analysis of this voting system model is 
presented.
5.3 Autom ated Anonym ity Verification
The verification of this voting system is checked against the anonymity specifica­
tion defined in Section 4.3 Definition 2. To recall, when the two channels c.x and 
d.x are swapped over for all values of x, if the resulting process is indistinguish­
able from the original one, P, from an observer’s point of view, then it provides 
anonymity.
It is over channel choose th a t the voter determines a choice of candidate and 
consequently, the channels tha t need to be swapped over are: choose.v\.Cx and
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ch0 0 se.v2 .Cx for Cx E C. Consequently, the anonymity specification for the Three­
Ballot CSP model S y s te m f^  over the set A =  {[ choose |} can be described as:
SpecA {System f§) =
.Ca,, ch0 0 se.v2 .Cx j c h o o s e . v i . C x ^
Following this, the anonymity requirement of this voting system model is verified 
with the following trace equivalence.
SpecA iSystem fg)  = t  System ÿg
5.3.1 Results w ith no SBA
In this subsection, some of the results produced by the automated anonymity 
analysis of ThreeBallot without the SBA assumption are given.
Not unexpectedly, the previous trace equivalence does not hold for the ThreeBal­
lot voting system model, because there are situations in which a reconstruction 
attack is possible. T hat is, a coercer who has seen the receipts for vi and V2 
can deduce tha t they voted respectively for ci and cg, because there is no way 
of constructing a complete set of valid multi-ballots in which the voters voted 
other way around. The analysis shows tha t for the ThreeBallot voting system, 
whether the election run provides anonymity entirely depends on how the voters 
fill their multi-ballots, and also on which mini-ballots they choose as receipts. 
The following counter-examples produced by FDR in different voting scenarios 
give useful intuition about the situations in which anonymity is violated.
E x am p les  o f P riv a c y  V io la tio n s  o f  T h re e B a llo t
The FDR model checker returns several counter-examples which violate 
anonymity and the following illustrated ones are the election runs from the ob­
server’s point of view. Note tha t the receipts shown in the following figures are 
taken in sequence by the voters, i.e., the first receipt is taken by the voter vi, 
and the second by V2 , and so forth.
E x am p le  1. The first counter-example is taken from a protocol run with two 
voters, vi and V2 , and two candidates, ci and cg. It shows that in a voting 
scenario where the public information is displayed as in Figure 5.3 and v\ gets the 
mini-ballot S 2  as her receipt, and V2 chooses S 3 ,  the observer is able to reconstruct 
the multi-ballots, thus violating their anonymity. This is because there is only one 
possible way of forming valid multi-ballots with the public information shown in 
Figure 5.4 and therefore, the observer is able to deduce who voted for whom in
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this ThreeBallot election run. Although, the voters may have used different m ini­
ballots to cast their votes, such as instead of sq,  vi may have used S5 , this does 
not affect the candidate that v\ has voted for.
Receipts Mini-ballots on BB
Figure 5.3: Voting scenario 1
choose.vi.ci choose.v2 .c2
• 0 0 # e 0 e • 0 0 0 e
• • 0 0 e 0 e 0 0 • 0 #
S2 £3 So S i S4 S5 S2 S i S5 S3 So S4
Figure 5.4: Reconstruction attack 1
E x am p le  2. Figure 5.5 involves a counter-example in a voting scenario with 
two voters and three candidates. The counter-example trace shows that when the 
voters vi and % vote for  cg and ci, respectively, taking the mini-ballots with the 
serial numbers sq and S2 as their receipts, the observer can break their anonymity, 
because the only way of constructing valid multi-ballots is illustrated in Figure 5.6. 
In other words, there is no possible combination of these mini-ballots shown on 
the BB  such that the voter vi can vote for the candidate ci with the receipt s.O, 
and V2 can vote for  cg with the receipt s.2 .
Receipts Mini-ballots on BB choose.v1 .c3 choose.v2 .c1
0 0 0 # # • 0 0 e 0 e •
0 # # 0 0 0 0 • 0 e 0 0
0 0 # 0 • # 0 e e 0 0 e
So S2 Si S3 S4 £5 So S i S4 S2 S3 S5
Figure 5.5: Voting scenario 2 Figure 5.6: Reconstruction attack 2
E x am p le  3. The last counter-example involves an election with three voters and 
two candidates, as depicted in Figure 5.7. When the voter vi votes fo r  ci, V2  
votes for C2 , and V3  votes fo r ci, with the receipts s \, S2 and sq, respectively, the 
intruder is sure about the voter v\ not voting for C2 , but for c±. Figure 5.8 shows 
the only possible way of reconstructing the valid multi-ballots by comparing the 
public mini-ballots and the receipts taken by the voters.
Receipts Mini-ballots on the BB
e 0 0
0 e #
£1 S2 So S3
O
O
S4
0 • e
# 0 0
£5 S6 £7
Figure 5.7: Voting scenario 3
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choose.vi.ci choose.v2 .c2 choose.v3.c1
• e 0 0 0 • 0 e e
0 e 0 e • 0 e 0 0
Si S3 S4 S2 S5 S6 So £7 Sg
Figure 5.8: Reconstruction attack 3
P re v io u s ly  S u ggested  M o d ifica tio n s  to  T h re e B a llo t
So far it has been shown with the previous counter-examples tha t the ThreeBallot 
voting system does not provide anonymity. The following contains analysis of 
some of the proposed modifications for ThreeBallot in the literature tha t are 
claimed to be robust against such privacy attacks.
T ak ing  R ec e ip t B efo re  E x p re ss in g  P re fe re n c e  In this proposed modifi­
cation by [dMPQOT], the voter chooses her receipt just before expressing her 
preference. That is, she fills one bubble for each candidate, and decides which 
mini-ballot to copy as her receipt. Then, she fills out one extra bubble for the 
chosen candidate, but not on the mini-ballot tha t was chosen as her receipt. It 
is contended in [KTVll] th a t this new version of ThreeBallot provides a better 
level of privacy than the primary scheme (probabilistic privacy). However, the 
automated analysis of this modified protocol reveals th a t it is also vulnerable to 
reconstruction attacks without the SBA being met. In particular, although it 
might appear tha t a voter’s preference is not linked with her receipt as she has 
chosen it beforehand, the vote expressed through all three mini-ballots on the 
multi-ballot includes the one taken as a receipt.
E x am p le  4. By way of an example regarding this weakness, Figure 5.9 illustrates 
a voting scenario with this modified version of the ThreeBallot model involving 
two voters and two candidates. The public data on the BB and the existence of 
receipts mandate that the receipt S4 can only be combined with a fully-filled mini­
ballot and an empty one. Hence, the voter v i holding the receipt S4 has definitely 
voted for candidate c \, thus violating v i  ’5 anonymity. Figure 5.10 shows a possible 
composition of these public mini-ballots.
Receipts Mini-ballots on the BB
e 0
0 0
S4 S3
0 e e 0
e e e 0
So S i S2 S5
Figure 5.9: Voting scenario 4
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choose.vi.ci choose.v2 .c2
# • 0
0 • 0
S4 Si S5
0 0 •
0 • •
S3 So S2
Figure 5.10: Reconstruction attack 4
F o u rB a llo t The FourBallot scheme was proposed by Kutylowski et al. [KZIO], 
who claimed tha t it is immune to Strauss’ like attacks [Str06b, Str06a] (recon­
struction and pattern-matching (Italian) attacks'^) under the SBA. In this scheme 
a multi-ballot consists of four mini-ballots and a voter fills in exactly three bubbles 
for the chosen candidate and two for the others (see Figure 5.11). The tallying 
is also similar to the original system, with the only difference being th a t for the 
FourBallot scheme two times the number of voters should be subtracted from the 
to tal tally for each candidate. The following counter-example illustrates tha t the
Alice e Alice # Alice • Alice 0
Bob 0 Bob # Bob • Bob 0
Chris # Chris 0 Chris 0 Chris e
David 0 David 0 David # David #
56248 04578 31489 58201
Figure 5.11: A FourBallot multi-ballot form, filled in as a vote for Alice
proposed scheme without the SBA is vulnerable to reconstruction attacks for any 
number of candidates as it can be generalised.
E x am p le  5. In an election run with two voters and two candidates where the 
public data on the BB is as in Figure 5.12, a reconstruction attack can be illus­
trated as in Figure 5.13. With the public information on the BB and the receipts 
taken, the intruder violates the voters’ anonymity, because the receipts sq and S3 
can only be combined with a fully-filled (such as s i, S2) mini-ballot and an empty 
one, like S4, hence, deducing that v i has voted for ci and V2 fo r C2.
In an election where the only voter who votes for ci is vi, and all the others 
vote for the candidate C2, the observer could deduce some information about the 
vote for Cl, if he keeps track of all the allocated mini-ballots to reconstruct valid 
multi-ballots. This is simply because of the fact th a t if the only voter who votes 
for Alice  is vi with the multi-ballot filled as in Figure 5.14, there is no anonymity 
unless there is another voter, V2 who votes for Bob with the mini-ballots filled as
^The coercer asks the voter to fill the mini-ballots in an uncommon way (e.g., voting for the 
candidate who has the least possible chance to win the election), so he can then check whether 
the unusual mini-ballots appear on the bulletin board.
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Receipts Mini-ballots on the BB
• 0
0 •
So S3
• • 0 • • 0
# e 0 e • 0
S i S2 S4 S5 S6 S7
choose.vi.ci
Figure 5.12: Voting scenario 5: FourBallot
choose.v2.c2
• # # 0
0 e e 0
So S i S2 S4
0 e e 0
# e e 0
S3 S5 S6 S7
Figure 5.13: Reconstruction attack 5
in Figure 5.15. Therefore, no m atter how many other voters vote for Boh, when 
there is no such multi-ballot filled out as in Figure 5.15, there is no anonymity 
for the voter vi.
Alice • Alice • Alice 0
Bob 0 Bob • Bob 0
56248 04578 31489
Figure 5.14: A ThreeBallot multi-ballot voted for Alice
Alice • Alice 0 Alice 0
Bob 0
78452
Bob •
90732
Bob •
13797
Figure 5.15: A ThreeBallot multi-ballot voted for Bob
Therefore, there is no absolute anonymity unless another voter exists who holds 
the same pattern on their receipt, but has voted for another candidate. Neverthe­
less, no one can guarantee tha t such a ballot appears on the bulletin board. As 
a result, although the proposed alternative schemes may provide a better level 
of probabilistic privacy, they are, however, not powerful enough to guarantee 
anonymity.
5.3.2 The Short Ballot Assum ption
This section investigates the short ballot assumption by analysing the ThreeBallot 
voting system under two of the three possible interpretations of the SBA tha t 
were given earlier: Assumptions 2 and 3 (Recall tha t Assumption 1 seems to
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be implausible unless there are only very few candidates.). In this section, the 
analysis of ThreeBallot under the SBA versions is made manually except under 
the SBA-mini because the SBA versions require too many voters to  be involved 
in an election run, which cannot be checked using model checking tools. First, 
the ThreeBallot model under the SBA-mini is analysed mechanically using FDR, 
and subsequently, analysis of the model under the SBA-mini-n is provided using 
a hand-proof treatm ent. Finally, a better formulation the SBA-pro is presented.
A nalysis u n d e r  th e  S B A -m in i
Suppose Assumption 2 is adopted, under which all possible mini-ballots are as­
sumed to appear on the bulletin board at least once at the end of the election. 
The following counter-example shows tha t under such an assumption, the Three­
Ballot voting system model does not provide anonymity.
E x am p le  6 . Figure 5.16 is the voting scenario with three voters and three candi­
dates, holding the Assumption 2. That is, all possible mini-ballots appear on the 
BB at least once. Under such assumption, however, the receipt sq has two pos­
sible completion methods: it could be combined with S2 and S4 or sg (as depicted 
in Figure 5.17), or with S5 and S7, but in either case it represents a vote fo r the 
third candidate.
Receipts Mini-ballots on the BB
0 • • e 0 0 0 •
0 0 • e 0 • • 0
e 0 0 e 0 0 e #
So S3 Si S2 S4 S5 S6 S7
Figure 5.16: Voting scenario 6 : All possible mini-ballots appear on
O
O
o
«8
board
choose.v1.c3
0 # 0
0 e 0
• e 0
So S2 S4
choose.v2.c2
# 0 0
0 • •
0 0 e
S3 S5 S6
choose.v3.c1
• • 0
# 0 0
0 • 0
Si S7 Sg
Figure 5.17: Reconstruction attack 6
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A naly sis  u n d e r  th e  S B A -m in i-n
We now analyse the system under the Assumption 3, which ensures tha t every 
possible mini-ballot will appear on the bulletin board at least n  times for some 
suitable value of n  in the following lemma;
L em m a 3. The Assumption 3 is insufficient for ThreeBallot to provide 
anonymity regardless of how many times every possible mini-ballot appears on 
the BB.
Proof. The proof relies on a special construction of mini-ballots published on the 
bulletin board using the following two observations.
O b se rv a tio n  1 . A fully-filled mini-ballot can be combined only with an empty 
mini-ballot and a singleton (a mini-ballot with only one bubble marked) as in 
Figure 5.18.
• o e
e o o
# o o
Si S2 S3
Figure 5.18: A completion of a multi-ballot with a fully-filled s i, an empty S2 , 
and a singleton mini-ballot sg
O b se rv a tio n  2 . Any possible mini-ballot m  that is not empty, fully-filled or a 
singleton, can be turned into a completed multi-ballot that does not contain a 
fully-filled mini-ballot or a singleton such as the mini-ballot si in Figure 5.19. 
This can be done by combining it with another mini-ballot that is the complement 
o f m ,  but with one extra bubble and an empty mini-ballot, as in the following.
e # o
e O o
o # o
Si S2 S3
Figure 5.19: A completion of a mini-ballot si th a t is not empty, fully-filled or a 
singleton
A bulletin board tha t displays at least n  copies of every possible mini-ballot can 
be reached in the following way using these two observations above.
Each possible mini-ballot tha t is not empty, fully-filled or a singleton, like si in 
Figure 5.19, can be turned into a multi-ballot as described in Observation 2, and 
added to the BB. This gives at least n  copies of everything except singletons and
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fully-filled mini-ballots. Now each possible singleton should be combined with 
a fully-filled mini-ballot and an empty mini-ballot as in Observation 1 . Thus, n 
copies of each such multi-ballot are added to  the BB, meaning tha t every possible 
mini-ballot now appears at least n  times on the BB.
W ith such construction of the bulletin board, however, any voter taking a single­
ton as a receipt will have no anonymity, because the number of fully-filled mini­
ballots is the same as the number of singletons. That is, since each fully-filled 
ballot must be combined with a singleton and a blank one from Observation 1, it 
follows tha t the voter’s receipt must have been part of such a multi-ballot. How­
ever, in tha t case the mini-ballot reveals the candidate th a t the voter selected 
and hence, no value of n  is sufficient to  guarantee anonymity in ThreeBallot. □
S B A -pro : A  b e t te r  fo rm u la tio n
The possible interpretations of the SBA previously given are either not suffi­
cient or too unrealistic to provide anonymity and hence a much more plausible 
definition, one tha t is demonstrably strong enough for ThreeBallot, is given next.
A ssu m p tio n  4 (SBA-pro). Let M  he the set o f all mini-ballots cast during the 
election, where R  C M  is the set o f all receipts that are known to the adversary, 
and vote is a partial function, such that vote(mi, m 2, m3) =  c whenever the three 
mini-ballots m \, m 2 and mg together form  a valid multi-ballot that represents a 
vote fo r c. Additionally, for any two mini-ballots m% and m 2 , m \ ~  m 2 , i f  and 
only if, they contain the same sequence o f vote marks (i.e., m i =  m 2 , but the 
serial numbers are different).
For every r E R  and every candidate c, there is a vote cast consisting o f three 
(unordered) mini-ballots, m i, m 2, mg, such that:
1 . r ^  m i;
2 . vote(m i,m 2,mg) =  c;
3. m 2 , m g  E M \ R .
Informally, under this interpretation, for every receipt known to the adversary 
there is an equivalent one used in a multi-ballot for each of the candidates in the 
election.
T h e o re m  1. The assumption 4 is strong enough to prevent reconstruction attacks 
in ThreeBallot.
Proof. The key to the proof is the observation tha t if m ~  m ' then 
vote(m ,m 2,mg) =  vote(m ',m 2 , mg). This is clear from the fact th a t m and m '
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differ only regarding their serial numbers, which are not relevant for determining 
which candidate received the vote cast by a multi-ballot.
Suppose th a t r G R, and the adversary wishes to determine which candidate 
received the vote cast th a t included r, this not possible because r  could be a vote 
for any of them. By way of explanation, if r  did in fact occur in a multi-ballot 
along with m i and m 2 , as a vote for c, for any other candidate c', there was 
a multi-ballot cast containing m 3, m 4 , mg, such tha t vote(m3,m 4 ,m s) =  c' and 
r  ~  m 3 , and with 1714 and ms not known to the adversary. Consequently, this 
means th a t the adversary cannot distinguish the following two possibilities:
1 . a ballot of (r, m i, m 2) for c, and a ballot of (m3 ,m 4 ,m s) for c';
2 . a ballot of (m3, m i, m 2) for c, and a ballot of (r, m 4 ,m s) for o'.
In each case, the set of mini-ballots used by this partial reconstruction is the 
same, so it cannot affect further reconstruction of the remaining mini-ballots. 
In one case, r was used to  vote for c, and in another, for c' and since c' was 
arbitrarily chosen, it is concluded tha t r  could equally have been used to vote for 
any candidate. □
To see the improved plausibility of this interpretation, suppose the adversary 
has knowledge of r  receipts in an election run with n candidates. The SBA-pro 
requires at least n  • r  multi-ballots of the right type have been cast to protect 
anonymity. By contrast, the SBA-multi requires at least n  • 3" other appropriate 
multi-ballots and as long as r  is small, the SBA-pro is much less demanding 
compared with the SBA-multi. For instance, in an election with 10 candidates, 
the SBA-multi needs at least 590,490 multi-ballots and unless the adversary has 
seen somewhere in the order of 59,000 receipts, the SBA-pro is much more likely 
to be satisfied.
This efficiency argument is not absolute and to formalise it would require a full 
voter model; th a t is, it would need a probability distribution for the multi-ballots 
cast in an election. Producing such a model is probably unrealistic, since it would 
be affected by the prevailing political landscape at the time of the election and 
it is in any case outside the scope of this thesis.
5.3.3 Verified Privacy Cases
Apart from the SBA, several slight modifications for ThreeBallot have been pro­
posed to help the system provide absolute anonymity and by using FDR these 
modified systems can automatically be verified against reconstruction attacks.
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The first proposed modification allows the voters to exchange their receipts, and 
the second mandates th a t voters must fill in a t least one bubble in every column.
F loating or Exchanging R eceipts
Rivest [Riv06] has suggested a possible improvement to the original ThreeBallot 
scheme, with the idea of exchanging receipts in the polling station— the idea is 
originally known as the Farnel protocol and it considers exchanging ballot forms 
rather than receipts (see [ACW"‘06] for a full description of the idea in English). 
Here, each voter puts her receipt in a box, and takes someone else’s and indeed, 
this idea can be used in any paper-based election system. If voters are allowed 
to take a random receipt from the box in the polling station, then this eliminates 
reconstruction attacks as well as pattern-matching attacks, because the adversary 
does not have any knowledge of any part of the voter’s ballot.
This is modelled in CSP, such tha t all cast mini-ballots are collected in the polling 
station outside the booth and once the voters have finished casting votes, each 
collects a mini-ballot from the box as their receipt before the election is closed, 
i.e., the voters wait for each other casting their votes outside the booth and pick 
a mini-ballot from a collection of them. Although the adversary may be able to 
reconstruct valid multi-ballots, he cannot link them to the voters, as any of the 
voters could have voted for any candidate, because they can get any mini-ballot as 
their receipt providing tha t each candidate has received at least one vote. Hence, 
the automated analysis here using FDR has confirmed prior research [Riv06] th a t 
modified schemes, where voters are allowed to take any cast mini-ballots as their 
receipts or exchange them, provide guaranteed anonymity.
N o Single M ini-ballot Left B lank
In this version of ThreeBallot, the condition is tha t voters must fill out at least 
one bubble on each mini-ballot. Under this modified model, it has been auto­
matically verified tha t this condition is sufficient to guarantee anonymity with 
a two candidate election run in which case there are only two ways of filling a 
mini-ballot, and thus only two different receipts tha t can be taken by voters.
In the modelling of such voter behaviour, the voter process is forced to  place a 
mark on all three columns with an extra line. Hence, as in the original process, 
the voter places two marks for the chosen candidate, say on the coordinates (%,1) 
and (2, 2 ), with the extra line in the process, a place event, forced to happen on 
the 3rd column and any of the rows apart from the 2th, such as on the coordinate 
(2 -t-1,3). Following this, the voter fills in the multi-ballot form placing a mark 
for all the other candidates as in the original voter process.
However, in an election where there are more than two candidates, although
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intuitively the system provides better probabilistic anonymity than  the original, 
it cannot guarantee voter anonymity. The following illustrates a counter-example 
produced by FDR;
E x am p le  7. Figure 5.20 involves a counter-example in a voting scenario, where 
no mini-ballot is left blank, with two voters and three candidates. The counter­
example demonstrates that when the voters vi and V2 vote for  cg and ci, respec­
tively, taking the mini-ballots with the serial numbers S3 and si as their receipts, 
the observer can break their anonymity, because the only way of constructing 
valid multi-ballots is as illustrated in Figure 5.21. In more detail, the mini ballot 
Si cannot be combined with that of S5 and hence, according to the protocol, the 
only combination for the receipt S3 to form  a valid multi-ballot is S3 , sq and S3 . 
Therefore, the intruder can deduce how each voter has voted.
Receipts Mini-ballots on BB choose.v1 .c3 choose.v2 .c1
0 0 # • # 0 0 e 0 0 # e
0 • 0 0 0 • 0 0 # • 0 0
• • 0 0 0 • • 0 e e 0 0
S3 Si So S2 S4 S5 S3 So S5 Si S2 S4
Figure 5.20: Voting scenario 7: no 
mini-ballot left blank
Figure 5.21: Reconstruction attack 
7
5.4 Challenges Faced in the M odelling and 
Analysis
This section presents the challenges faced during the modelling of ThreeBallot 
and anonymity analysis of it. The ultim ate challenge was to  model the voting 
system in a way tha t is efficient for automated verification because the number of 
states of a CSP system can increase very quickly—especially for voting systems 
as they are complex and consist of a number of parallel components. In order 
to overcome this difficulty, the two methods, control processes and compression 
functions, were used.
The control processes helped us to reduce the states of the individual processes 
when the control process were applied. For instance, the voter process was re­
stricted in a way tha t a voter could mark her ballot in a left to right fashion when 
filling bubbles for the chosen candidate and top to bottom when filling bubbles for 
the other candidates. Similarly, the voters were made to authenticate themselves 
in a descending order, i.e., first the voter Vn, then Vn-i and so on. Moreover, there 
were some limitations for the authority process too. For instance, the authority 
process was forced to allocate serial numbers for each mini-ballot form in a left
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2v2c
2v 3c 
3v 2c 
3v 3c
Original 
States Time
239,905 7.8g
4,139,347 lm41.8s
No miiii-b empty 
States Time
56,841 5.3s
1,435,926 38.3s
67,409,391 22m49.3s
All mini-b appear 
States Time
240,055 7.0s
4,165,428 lm40.1s
Table 5.5: The FDR verification times for the ThreeBallot versions. As the
required state space grows quickly with the number of voters and candidates, it 
was not possible to produce results in some cases as FDR cannot handle with 
such huge states. Those are denoted as ” in the table.
to right style with respect to the coordinates allocated for serial numbers, e.g., 
for 2 candidate race, first serial is allocated to (2 , 0 ), then the second to (2 , 1) 
and the last one to (2,2). This reduces state space dramatically. Likewise, the 
occurrence of pub and total events could be performed in a descending order with 
suitable control processes.
The other method is the compression functions. We found two compression 
functions; sbisim() and diamond() useful to reduce the states to check the following 
refinement for automated anonymity analysis of ThreeBallot.
sbd\a{SpecA{Systemÿ^)) = t  Systemÿg,abs
where sbdia(P) =  sbisim(diamond(P)).
sbisim and diamond are two compression functions tha t do not modify the seman­
tics of the processes when they are applied to them. The former one is the strong 
bisimulation, which is an equivalence over labelled transition systems (LTS) (a 
set of nodes and a relation for each event in some set). The latter, diamond, is 
called diamond elimination. It is a function tha t removes all r  actions from an 
LTS, produces an LTS with minimal acceptance and divergence information and 
never increases the number of nodes (see [Ros97] for further reading for a variety 
of compression functions that may be used in different CSP models).
Moreover, to give an idea to the reader about the verification times, see Table 5.5 
(the results were produced using the efficient models). In the table, there are 
verification times for three different versions of ThreeBallot: the original Three­
Ballot, a version of ThreeBallot in which voter fills in all mini-ballots of her 
multi-ballot (leaving no empty mini-ballots), and another version in which all 
possible mini-ballots appear on the bulletin board.
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5.5 Summary
In this chapter, it has been demonstrated tha t the ThreeBallot voting system 
is vulnerable to privacy-related attacks, especially reconstruction attacks, even 
under some plausible interpretations of the short ballot assumption.
In the analysis, an abstracted CSP model of ThreeBallot has been used, which 
is defined as the parallel composition of agents in the system, and the passive 
intruder model defined in the previous chapter as pertaining to a person who can 
see all the public channels, including what each voter takes as a receipt.
Throughout a number of examples for different voting scenarios it was demon­
strated th a t ThreeBallot does not provide anonymity under various formulations 
of the short ballot assumption. However, given a reasonable and plausible inter­
pretation of this assumption, ThreeBallot is in fact protected from reconstruction 
attacks. Moreover, previously suggested modifications to ThreeBallot, such as, 
taking receipt before expressing her preference and FourBallot was shown tha t 
they are not adequate to prevent from reconstruction attacks. Finally, two dif­
ferent versions of ThreeBallot were analysed automatically using FDR, namely, 
exchanging receipts and no mini-ballot left blank.
Because of the state space problem, as mentioned in Chapter 2, a limited number 
of agents were considered. In most cases, the restriction did not affect the analysis 
of the systems and assumptions; however, as under the short ballot assumption 
a large number of mini-ballots are required, it was not possible to demonstrate 
automatic verification in such cases, but hand proofs were supplied where appro­
priate.
In the next chapter, the CSP approach to automated analysis of voting systems 
will be extended and applied to  a cryptographic voting system. Prêt à Voter, 
thereby presenting the first automated formal analysis of this voting system.
Chapter 6
M odelling and A nalysis o f  a  
C ryptographic V oting S ystem
This chapter* extends the framework introduced in Chapter 4 and used in the 
non-cryptographic voting system analysis in Chapters 4 and 5 to cope with cryp­
tographic voting systems and aims to demonstrate how this framework can be 
applied to the paper-based voter verifiable cryptographic voting system Prêt à 
Voter, This is the first automated analysis of this promising voting system us­
ing a reasonably abstracted model of it. Similar to the previous analyses, first, 
the behaviour of the honest participants is modelled and then the capabilities 
and limitations of the passive attacker as given in Chapter 4 are once again de­
termined. Finally, automated formal analysis of this model of P rêt à Voter is 
performed against the specification defined in Chapter 4.
The chapter is structured as follows. Firstly, in Section 6.1, the Prêt à Voter 
voting system is introduced, covering the voting ceremony, system properties 
and components. Secondly, in Section 6.2 the modelling and following th a t in 
Section 6.3 automated analysis of Prêt à Voter as well as the CSP approach to 
cryptographic voting systems are presented. Section 6.4 investigates the corrupt 
agent scenarios in this voting protocol. Finally, Section 6.5 concludes the chapter 
with a discussion and a summary of the findings.
6.1 The Prêt à Voter Voting System
Prêt à Voter is a paper-based, voter-verifiable cryptographic e-voting sys­
tem, introduced by Ryan [Rya04, Rya05] as an improvement on Chaum ’s 
scheme [Cha04]. Since then, it has been further improved and enhanced in
"This chapter is mainly based on the published work [MHS 12].
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many different ways [CRS05, RP05, RS06, Rya06, Hea07, Rya08, RBH'^09, RPIO, 
XCH+IO, BCH+12b]. In the modelling and analysis in CSP for this work the fo­
cus is on the re-encryption mixes version of P rêt à Voter, as proposed by Ryan 
and Schneider [RS06]. Hereby, this version of Prêt à Voter will be abbreviated 
as Prêt à Voter.
Figure 6.1 illustrates a simple Prêt à Voter ballot form cast for Alice in a single­
winner electoral method as in F P T P —although. P rêt à Voter can be used for 
preferential voting systems, these are not covered here. In the left-hand column 
of the ballot form is printed a random permutation of the candidate names and 
an encrypted onion called registrar onion. I t embeds the candidate order, so 
tha t once it is scanned, the voting machine can decrypt the value and print the 
candidate list on the ballot form on demand. Moreover, in the right-hand column 
are the boxes in which the voter can mark her choice as well as a unique serial 
number at the top and the cryptographic value at the bottom of this column. It 
is called teller onion and embeds the candidate ordering on the left-hand side, 
and is encrypted under the tellers’ public-key. This public-key is a threshold key 
for an appropriate homomorphic encryption algorithm, such as ElGamal [E1G84] 
or Paillier [Pai99]; the precise algorithm is not im portant for the purposes of this 
thesis. Moreover, there is a perforation line between the two halves to facilitate 
separating them. The following subsections present the voting ceremony for Prêt 
à Voter in general and the re-encryption version in detail.
9X3ht
Bob
Alice X
Ghris
i5vTf 2iP6d2
Figure 6.1: Prêt à Voter ballot form
V oting w ith  P rêt à  V oter
Voting with Prêt à Voter is (by design) quite similar to  voting in the conventional 
voting system. That is, an eligible voter goes to a polling station, authenticates 
herself to  the election official and takes a random ballot form in an envelope. 
These ballot forms have been produced by the election authorities before the 
election day and are kept sealed (Although there are forms of Prêt à Voter tha t 
use on-demand printing, they are not considered here.). Once the voter goes into 
the booth, she then marks her choice with a cross on the right-hand column, tears 
the ballot form down the perforation line, and shreds the candidate list. Finally, 
she scans her ballot and takes the right-hand column as her receipt. Later, all the 
scanned right-hand sides will be published on a web bulletin board (WBB), and
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she will be able to use her receipt to check tha t her vote has not been changed 
or deleted. As the candidate name order in the left-hand column is random, the 
right-hand column reveals nothing about her vote.
B a llo t G en e ra tio n : Prêt à Voter introduces a distributed ballot generation by
a number of election authorities or clerks using the ElGamal encryption system 
and re-encryption mixes in order to eliminate single point failures.
For the distributed generation of ballots, several clerks are used jointly, with each 
of them contributing to the construction of the cryptographic seeds, which form 
the onions at the bottom  of ballot forms. The registrar onion (on the bottom  
left) can be decrypted by the voting machine in the polling station, however, the 
teller onion (on the bottom right) can only be decrypted by a threshold of tellers, 
because it is encrypted under a distributed secret-key among a number of tellers. 
The distributed ballot generation is performed as follows.
Suppose tha t the ElGamal public key parameters (a, 7 , p, q) are chosen and made 
public according to the ElGamal protocol, where p  and q are two large primes, 
such tha t p = 2q + l, and a  and 7  are generators of the cyclic group Z^. Addi­
tionally, a set of tellers generate the secret key x t  E Z* in a threshold fashion and 
publish the public key (p, a , a^^) in order to  generate the teller onion. Similarly, 
another secret key x r  G Z* is chosen by the voting machine, and the public key 
(p ,a ,a^^)  is revealed. For convenience, the registrar’s public key is denoted as 
/3r  = and the tellers’ public key in the following.
Initially, clerk Cq (one of the I clerks) generates a batch of seeds randomly 
from a binomial distribution and a batch of pairs of onions by encrypting each 
with the public keys of registrars and tellers in the form 7 “ ’'^. Thus, the pair 
(Epfe^(7 “ i^ ), Epfcy(7 “ ’’i )) is the encryption of a randomly chosen r? under the 
corresponding public keys. In the case of ElGamal, the pair is expressed as:
.7  ^i), .7  ^^), where x^ , y f  are chosen from
The next clerks will perform a combined re-encryption with freshly injected en­
tropy seed values, such tha t for each pair of the onion the same entropy is added 
so as to ensure tha t these values still continue to match. Assume x, ÿ  are fresh 
random values taken from JP* and f  are random values independently generated 
by the clerk Cj with a binomial distribution mean 0 and standard deviation a.  
Then the transformation for each onion pair in the batch is as follows.
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{a^^’ , .'J~0 ) {ay‘’ , 0 ^ /  .7 " ’^  )
, where
w=  yl
= x^ -  ^ -h x j(m odq)
+  y{ (mod q)
r j = r j  + r](m o d g )
After having transformed each onion pair, clerk C j  performs a secret shuffle and 
forwards the result to the next clerk Cj+i, and so forth. Thus, the final output 
after I -  1 mixes {I is the number of clerks) is /3g '.7-^ ') for the registrar 
onion, and (a^'%/3ÿ%7-''^) for the teller one. As the teller onion is encrypted 
under the random seed values n ,  the encrypted values can only be revealed when 
all clerks collude. In the case of a ballot demand from a voter in the booth, these 
values can be revealed by a threshold set of registrars or the onion encoding 
candidate list can be decrypted by the voting machine using the corresponding 
secret key. Once the seed values are revealed, the candidate order tt can be 
derived and the Prêt à Voter ballot form Figure 6.1 can be printed out in the 
booth on demand.
T ally ing; In the tabulation phase, the existence of the index value as well as the 
onion may be used by the intruder to  partition the mix and hence, the index values 
need to be absorbed into the onion value [RS06]. Suppose, the candidate order is 
determined by the cyclic shift rather than the full permutation tt as previously, 
and n  is the cyclic shift for the ith. ballot and s is the index value. Now, the teller 
onions in the form of (a^Sjdÿ.7 " ''')  can be transformed into (a^S .7 ^ 7 " ’’0  
after the election and before the tabulation phase. Subsequently, the new terms 
are sent to a re-encryption mixnet, where the new terms are re-encrypted and 
posted to the WBB in random order. Following this, a threshold set of decryption 
tellers take these terms and decrypt them to extract the plaintext value in the 
form 7 “^ ^*(modp). The original vote is then computed as s -  rj(m odn), where 
n  is the number of candidates.
A u d itin g : As Prêt à Voter is intended to be a transparent and trustworthy
voting system, auditing is an im portant counter-measure against incorrectly con-
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structed ballots, incorrect recording of the votes and corrupt tellers. In order to 
audit ballot construction, a two sided ballot form mechanism is adopted in [RS06], 
which requires some modifications to generic P rêt à Voter ballot forms (see [RS06] 
for further information). However, there are other ways of auditing ballot con­
struction, such as, using a single dummy vote or given the onion value, in which 
case the tellers are expected to  return the candidate list on th a t ballot form. 
Moreover, in order to audit any malfunction or corruption by the mix tellers a 
mechanism called randomised partial checking (RPC), as proposed in [JJR02], 
can be performed. That is, the tellers reveal a randomly chosen half of their 
input and output links in such a way tha t there is no complete route from input 
to output, so tha t no ballot receipt can be traced, and the remaining links are 
hidden. A modification of a single value has a 50% chance of being caught and 
a corrupt teller therefore has only a ^  chance of getting away with modifying 
n  votes.
A n A bstract P rêt à V oter System  Structure
Figure 6.2 illustrates an election run with voter v and her interaction with the 
voting system, which also shows the approach and abstraction level taken when 
modelling Prêt a Voter. In detail, the protocol operates as follows:
• The authority in the voting system chooses a random value r  from a seed 
space, R, computes the candidate list permutation tt, using a publicly 
agreed function / ,  (so / ( r )  =  tt), and finally encrypts the random value 
r  using the tellers’ public key, Epfc^(r), finally sending the data  {tt, Epkj.{r)} 
to  the voter.
• The voter chooses a candidate c, marks the ballot form finding the corre­
sponding index value, i, and sends {i, Epk^{r)} to  the WBB, discarding the 
permutation, tt.
The election official signs the receipt {z, Epfc^(r)} and sends it back to the 
voter.
The WBB first mixes the cast votes using re-encryption mixes and then 
publishes {z, Ep^^ (r)}. The teller takes over the vote and reveals the random 
value r  using its secret key, skx, then it calculates tt candidate perm utation 
as / ( r )  =  TT.
In the following subsection, a reasonably abstracted CSP model of P rêt à Voter 
is presented.
100 Chapter 6. Modelling and Analysis of a Cryptographic Voting System
C,pkr
Voter V
C, {pkT,skT), -R, V 
System
{tt, Ep^T (^)l
- chooses r E R
- computes tt := f{r)
- calculates Epfc (^r)
/ \
- chooses c e C
- finds c in 7T
- discards tt
\ /
{î, Ep^ T (^)}
SsfcT p^fcx (^)) - 5îpn5 {î, Epfc^(r)}
- mixes Epfc (^Epfc (^r))
- publishes {i, Epfc^(r)}
- decrypts (Epfc^(r))
- computes tt := /(r)
- counts c
Figure 6.2: P rêt à Voter voter interaction with the system
6.2 M odelling Prêt à Voter
This section presents the CSP model of Prêt à Voter by first defining data-types, 
sets and the functions used, and then describing each process as in Chapter 5. 
Although, some of the processes are similar to the previous voting systems anal­
ysed for this research, each process behaves slightly differently depending on the 
modelling approach. For instance, in the previous chapter, ThreeBallot was mod­
elled with the help of coordinates, however, in the Prêt à Voter modelling the 
approach used will be th a t introduced in Chapter 4.
To begin with, Figure 6.3 illustrates the message sequences between the protocol 
agents tha t form the P rêt à Voter voting system. In order to achieve the abstract 
behaviour of the voting system shown in this figure, the individual processes need 
to be modelled as follows:
In the following paragraphs, the functions, data-types and sets used to construct 
the events and the processes are described. Similar to the framework used in
6.2. Modelling Prêt à Voter 101
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registration phase
{ l ,s ,
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vEpfc^ (Cg), Epfc^ (cfc)))nth(i,
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choose c G C
shred l
authenticate
mark ballot s 
i  := find(c,l)
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decrypt 
Dsfcr (^ pfc-r (^ ) )
Figure 6.3: P rêt à Voter system model: the election process for a voter u, and 
candidate c.
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Section 3.3, encryption is considered as a formal symbolic operation. The en­
cryption function encrypt(pfc,  m) is the public-key encryption of the message m  
under the public key pk, and it uses a constructor E ncryp t.{f, f ) ,  which is de­
noted as Epk{f), where T  is the set of facts and f  E fF. In a similar manner, the 
re-encryption is modelled as a null operation (i.e., encryption does not change), 
so, reencryp t(p /c ,  Epk{m)) = Epk{m) and therefore, the property of re-encryption 
is abstracted away in this model. Additionally, the key pair formed by pkp  and 
skx  is the teller’s encryption key pair and the public key is used to construct 
the ballot forms by the authority during the election. It is also used in the 
re-encryption phase by the mixnet. As the teller knows the secret key, he can 
extract the re-encrypted shuffled values and the onion values, which embed the 
actual vote, in the tallying phase. Moreover, in order to avoid state explosion 
in the model checker, the number of agents is limited in the model, with only 
two candidates, two voters and two serial numbers being used. For convenience, 
the names of the sets are abbreviated as follows: candidates as C, voters as V, 
serials as <S. Some of the other sets tha t are useful in modelling messages as 
data-types are:
candidates = { 0 1 , 0 2 } 
voters = { ' 1^1,'^2}
serials = { s i ,S 2}
keypairs = {(pkp^skT)}
A Prêt à Voter ballot form (Figure 6.4) consists of a LHS and a RHS. On the LHS, 
there is a candidate list, and on the RHS, there is a serial number, a grid tha t 
the voter places her mark in and an onion, representing the encrypted candidate 
list. The set indices consists of natural numbers, such as {1,2} here in order to 
symbolise marking action by the voter. For instance, suppose tha t two candidates 
are running in the election and the candidate list on the LHS is (ci, C2). When 
the ballot form is given to the voter, the marking boxes are initially empty, so 
they are modelled with the data-type em ptylist. If she wants to vote for ci, she 
chooses 1, whereas if her preference is for candidate C2, she fills in 2 and so on. 
Note th a t the voter can mark a ballot form only for the chosen candidate.
S i
Cl
C2 2
{^pkx ( c i )  j (C2) )
Figure 6.4: Prêt à Voter ballot model in CSP: a vote for C2 is expressed with the 
index value 2.
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The function listsÇ) below produces the set of all possible candidate lists on a 
ballot form taking the candidate list C as a parameter. Similarly, the set onions 
covers all possible onion values, which embed the encrypted candidate lists under 
the teller’s public key, pkp, and are located at the bottom right of a ballot form. 
The sets of indices, lists and onions are abbreviated as X, C and O, respectively.
lists{C) =  {(c)"a I c € C, a G lists(C \ {c})} 
onions =  {(Ep/jj.(ci), (cj)) | ci,Cj G C}
Two special functions called find and n th  as defined next are used to describe the 
actions taken by the agents. The find function is used by the voter process to see 
the corresponding grid for the candidate she has chosen. The function is defined 
by means of the head  and ta il  functions; the former returns the first element of a 
non-empty sequence, the latter returns all but the first element of a non-empty 
sequence, for instance; h e a d ( ( c i ,  C2, C 3 ) )  =  (c i )  and t a i i ( ( c i ,  C2, C 3 ) )  =  ( 0 2 , 0 3 ) .  The 
function n th  is also defined using hea d  and ta il to extract the n th  element of a 
sequence.
f ind(o. I) =
n th (z ,  m ) =  <
1 i f  0 =  head(Z)
1 4- find(o, tail(Z)) i f  0 7^ head(Z)
f  h e a d ( m )  i f  z =  1
[ n t h ( z  — l , t a i l ( z n ) )  i f  z 7^ 1
Subsequently, the message formats transm itted on the network can be modelled 
using the sets, functions and data-types above as follows.
ballotforms = {{I, (s, z, o)) | Z f -  X,
s i —  <5, 
i i— X,
castrhs =  {(s, z , o) | s - f -  «S,
Z i — X,
encryptions = { Epkj. (0), Epfc^  (Epk^ (0)) | 0 C}
atomicfacts =  { /  | /  G- U{V,X}}
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6.2.1 M odelling Assum ptions
The assumptions made in the modelling of CVS in Section 4.4.1 are also valid 
in the modelling of Prêt à Voter in this section. In addition to those, a real 
Prêt à Voter ballot form consists of a registrar and a teller onion. These are 
encrypted values embedding security sensitive informations and assumed not to 
be decrypted without the corresponding secret key. Additionally, the purpose of 
the registrar onion is to audit for malfunctioning voting machines and such like, 
it is not within the ambit of this thesis. Hence, in the modelling of Prêt à Voter, 
the ballot form includes only the teller onion, but not the registrar one as in the 
real system.
Additionally, the mixnet is treated as one single entity because the mixnet, which 
consists of a number of mix tellers, is assumed to be honest in the original pro­
posal. Thus, in terms of modelling an honest mixnet there is no difference between 
an honest mixnet having multiple mix tellers and a mixnet with only one mix 
teller behaving honestly by shuffling all its inputs non-deterministically. Con­
sequently, the mechanism for the threshold decryption of the encrypted votes 
cannot be used in the modelling of Prêt à Voter here as the onion values are 
only encrypted once by the honest mixnet using its public key. Thus, a single de­
cryption teller knowing the corresponding public key can decrypt the encrypted 
values. Therefore, the decryption tellers working in a threshold way in the real 
system is not considered in the modelling of P rêt à Voter in this chapter. For the 
assumptions regarding cryptographic primitives and CSP, see Chapter 2.
In the re-encryption version of Prêt à Voter, the ballots can be pre-printed or 
can be printed on-demand in the booth machine. The former is considered here, 
whereby the election authority creates the ballot forms using the teller’s public 
key and forwards pre-printed ballot forms to the voters (in practice, the ballot 
generation code is run on a diskless workstation, which generates the ballots, 
prints them, and then shuts down, keeping no record of its actions. The candidate 
lists are kept in only two places: printed on the ballot papers and on the WBB 
encrypted under the threshold public key). However, the election authority in 
this modelling behaves as an electoral official who creates ballot forms and issues 
them to the voters directly. Moreover, information about the candidate list is 
considered as flowing over a private channel, collectform, modelling an envelope, 
which ensures the privacy of the ballot form. Furthermore, the candidate list 
on the LHS is modelled here as a full permutation of candidates rather than 
cyclic shift—there is no difference in the case of two candidates as the set of 
permutations for these is the same as the set of cyclic shifts. However for the 
number of candidates more than two cyclic shifts should be used in the model to 
reflect the correct behaviour of the system. Using a cyclic shift, which is a subset 
of the set of permuted candidate lists, decreases the cardinality of the set of all
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possible candidate lists, cutting down the required state space for the automated 
verification.
In the next section, the honest participant processes are defined.
6.2.2 Honest Participants
In the following subsections the individual processes that comprise the Prêt à 
Voter voting system model are expressed in CSP. Additionally, for each definition 
the abstraction level will be clarified further by comparing the real system and 
the CSP model of it.
E lection  A uthority  P rocess
The election authority first opens the election with the event openElection. Hav­
ing taken possession of the list of eligible voters, serial numbers to assign, and the 
list of candidates, the authority authenticates the voters with their identification 
upon request from them, and issues each with an empty ballot form, containing a 
non-deterministically chosen serial number and a candidate list, over the channel 
collectform. The authority can perform these actions for as long as there are 
eligible voters and serial numbers to allocate. Finally, he closes the election with 
the closeElection event.
Authority = openElection -4- Authority^ (V, S , C)
Authority^ {ids, serials, lists) =  
closeElection -4- STOP  
□
/  auth.v —>
□
vEids
/ collectform.v.{I, s, emptylist, E p k j , { I ) ) \
\  lE lists  /
As in the conventional voting system model, the alphabet of each process is the 
set of all events tha t a process may perform. Thus, the alphabet of Authority is 
as below; the alphabets for the remaining processes in the system can be inferred 
from the CSP definitions.
a Authority = {\openElection, auth, collectform, closeElection\}
V oter Process
Having chosen a candidate to vote for, the voter authenticates herself and accepts 
any ballot form given by the election authority. Then, she goes into the booth 
to select a candidate on the channel m ark, and after destroying the candidate
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list, she leaves the booth. Afterwards, she casts her vote under the supervision 
of the election authority using the voting machine supplied. Having cast the 
ballot form, the voter is provided with a receipt of her vote, which is the RHS of 
the ballot form, including the serial number—in the real system, the receipt is 
signed by the electoral official as a proof of casting the vote, hence, if the voter 
cannot find a matching receipt on the WBB, she can appeal using the signed 
receipt as her proof. However, in this modelling it is omitted as its purpose, i.e., 
verification, is not within the scope of this thesis. Once the voter gets her receipt 
and leaves the polling station, voting finishes for her. The serial numbers on the 
receipts are used by the voter for verifying whether her ballot appears on the 
WBB unchanged.
Voter{v) =
/  choose.v.c —> openElection  -4  auth.v -4- \
f  collectform.v.{l, s, em ptylist, E p k j . { l ) ) \  
enter Booth.V -4  
m ark.{l,s,i,Epkj.{l)) -4 
shredLHS.{s, i, Epkj.{l)) -4  
leaveBooth.v -4  
cast.{s,i, Epkj.{l)) -4 
receipt.{s,i,Epkj.{l)) -4 
\  y closeElection  —4 STO P J  /
n
cec □lec
sES
i:=find(c,Z)
The above process should be followed by all eligible voters and hence the voter 
processes for each voter are put in parallel in order to model the behaviour of all 
voters in an election run.
Voters =  IIugv Voter{v)
M achine P rocess
The Machine process models the voting machine located in the polling station 
outside the booth, which is a multi-function machine that can scan the votes and 
print the receipts for the voters. T hat is, it synchronises on the event openElection 
with the authority and the voters, then starts receiving the cast right-hand sides 
of the ballot forms and printing out the receipts for the voters before the election 
is closed. Because the machine accepts any RHS cast by the voters, the external 
choice operator is used. W hen the process is combined with the other agents on 
the channel receipt, it will send the copies of the receipts to the WBB.
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Machine =  openElection  -4  Machine i 
Machinei =closeElection  -4  STOP  
□
□  ^ cast.r  -4  receipt.r  -4  Machine^ ^
rE castrh s
W eb B u lletin  Board P rocess
The WBB stores and publishes all cast ballots for verification purposes as well 
as requesting shuffling from the mixnet, which anonymises the cast votes.
The following process Wbb starts receiving the digital copies of the cast right- 
hand sides returned by the Machine process on the channel receipt, once the 
openElection event has occurred. It keeps track of the receipts in a set called 
bag, which is initially an empty set. The WBB process can also request shuffling 
for the votes by sending them, one by one, to the mixnet process on the channel 
mixReq—in the Prêt à Voter voting system, the mix requests can also be sent as 
a batch of votes rather than one by one. This does not affect the analysis here as 
the votes are shuffled and output by the mixnet non-deterministically. However, 
serial numbers are stripped off beforehand. Once the election is closed and all 
votes have been sent for shuffling, the process publishes all cast votes kept in the 
set bag. These consist of a serial number, an index indicating where the mark is 
and an onion value, which is the encryption of the candidate list on the LHS of 
the ballot form.
Wbb =  openElection -4- Wbbi (0)
Wbbi{bag) =  c l o s e E l e c t i o n W b b 2 {bag)
□
 ^ receipt, {s, i ,o)  ^
□  mixReq.x\t\\{i,6)
y W b b i{b a g O {{ s , i ,o ) } )  )sESiEX
oEO
W66g(0) =  bagem pty-¥  STOP
Wbb2 {bag)=  f l  pub.r ^  Wbb2 (b a g \{r } )
rE castrhs
M ixnet P rocess
The Mix process behaves as a mixnet, which performs a mix for the digital copies 
of the receipts. Although a number of mix tellers exist in the real system, only 
a single honest mix server is considered. The following process below behaves 
as a perfect mixnet, which anonymises the cast votes arbitrarily. In more detail, 
as the cast votes arrive to the mixnet, one by one, the process keeps them in a
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set called Batch, which is initially empty. Before shuffling the votes, the process 
M ix re-encrypts each encrypted vote with the teller’s public key, pkp,  which does 
not change the actual vote. W hen all the votes have been re-encrypted (no vote 
left to mix as indicated by the event hagempty), the teller takes over the shuffled 
votes non-deterministically and one by one.
In this model of the mixnet, it is assumed th a t the mix is honest and does not 
reveal any information about the mapping from input to output. As having more 
than one mixnet would not make any difference as a consequence of the non- 
deterministic construction of the mixnet, one is enough to re-encrypt and shuffle 
the votes here. In the process, the param eter i is used to create a bag-like set, 
where the same data  can be stored many times unlike normal sets.
Mix = openElection —)■ M ix i{ 0 ,th)
M ixi (z. Batch) = closeElection  -4 M ix2 {Batch)
□
 ^ mixReq.Epkj.{c) -4- ^
reencrypt.Epkj.{Epkj,{c)) -4- 
y M i x i { i l , B a t c h U  {{i,Epkj.{c))}) j
□
cEC
MzTg(0) =  hagempty -4 STO P
M ix2 {bag)= f l m ixO ut.e ^  M ix2 {bag\{(i,  e)})
(i,e)Ebag
D e c ry p tio n  T eller P ro cess
As remarked previously, the existence of a threshold set of decryption tellers is 
present in the real system, however, here, only a single honest teller is considered 
enough to model the CSP decryption of teller process as given below.
The Teller process takes over the shuffled re-encrypted onion values from the 
mixnet, transferred on the channel mixOut. Because re-encryption and ballot 
generation are performed under the teller’s public key pkp,  he can decrypt each 
of the encrypted cast votes, and tally the plaintext values according to the candi­
dates. Finally, the process announces the result for each candidate on the channel 
total
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Teller = openElection -4 Telleri {0, 0)
Teller i { m , n )  =
(  mixOut.Epkj.{c) —>
decrypt.Dskri^pkTic)) -4 
tally.c —4
/  if c =  Cl then Teller i {m-\- l , n )  \
else (  =  \
y y Telleri{ m ,n  + 1 ) else STO P j
n
hagempty -4- total.c\.m  -4 total.C2 .n SKIP
□
cec
S y stem  P ro cess
The following process Systempav models the abstract behaviour of the P rêt à 
Voter voting system. Similar to previous systems modelling, a number of sanity 
checks are deployed in order to  gain more confidence in the correct behaviour of 
the CSP model of this voting system and the details regarding these are presented 
in Appendix A.3.
Systempav =  Voters || Authority || Machine || Booth || Wbb || Mix || Teller
In the overall fiow of the system process, all voters synchronise on openElection 
and closeElection events with the election authority pairwise. Thus, each voter 
performs an openElection event to begin her voting process. Each voter must also 
perform a closeElection event after casting their individual vote and leaving the 
polling station. Not only all voters synchronise on election opening and closing 
with the authority, but also other system components, such as, the WBB and 
mixnet processes. In addition, the decryption teller process announces the result 
for each candidate once there is no ballot data  left to decrypt and count.
The following subsection defines the intruder model for the analysis of this voting 
system.
6.2.3 The Passive Attacker
The passive intruder framework defined in Chapter 4 will be deployed in this 
analysis and similar to the previous analysis, the capabilities of the intruder need 
to be specified. Regarding this, as usual, the intruder is able to observe any public 
data. As mentioned in the A uthority  process, the authority or electoral official 
should not get to know the candidate order on the Prêt à Voter ballot form th a t is 
used by a particular voter because this could then be used to violate her privacy. 
Note tha t the voter anonymity or vote privacy in Prêt à Voter depends on the 
link between the candidate order and the receipt. Hence, no one should be able
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to know the corresponding candidate order for a specific receipt. Moreover, the 
event m ark, which models the voter marking her ballot form, also needs to be 
unobservable. Therefore, the channels; collectform and mark, need to be private 
and hence, any data on these channels should be hidden from the intruder. The 
following reflects the system model with the private channels abstracted and the 
rest of the channels in the model are public including the receipts taken away by 
the voters.
System'pg^y =  System pav \  {| collectform, mark |}
The previous assumptions made above are model-specific, i.e., depending on the 
model, channels th a t need to be hidden may change. Moreover, the generic 
assumptions tha t can be made for any cryptographic voting system are as fol­
lows. Firstly, it is assumed here tha t the public-key infrastructure is secure, and 
the observer does not have enough computational power to break the key pairs. 
As encryption and decryption are modelled symbolically, any cryptographic vul­
nerabilities and attacks are not considered. Similarly, two ciphertexts encoding 
different plaintext should look the same to the intruder as long as he does not 
possess the secret key tha t he can use to decrypt and compare them. In other 
words, the encryptions on the channels need to be masked, so the intruder cannot 
distinguish them. To this end, the special function maskFact() is deployed, which 
converts all encrypted data to one single value, ciphertext, but leaves other data 
unchanged. Note tha t in CSP a function can be defined as the following due to 
its pattern  matching property. Hence, the data item is tried in top to bottom 
order, i.e., if it fails to match the pattern in the first function definition, then the 
second is tried.
maskFact(Epfcy(m))= ciphertext 
maskFact(a;) =  x
Similarly, as the onions on the ballot forms are sequences of ciphertexts, mask() 
is defined as follows:
mask(O) =  0
mask((a:)"a:s) =  (maskFact(a:))"mask(a:s)
As a result, the abstracted model of the Prêt à Voter voting system, System^p^y, 
can be defined as follows.
6.3. Automated Anonymity Veriûcation 111
System^PgY =
jcasZ.(s, X, mask(o))yg^g^^g^
Receipt, {s, x, m a s k ( o ) )  f  receipt.{s, x, o )]]  
jp w & .(s , rr, m a s k ( o ) ) o ) ] |
^mixReq.m^skienc) y rnixReq.en^
^mixOut.rx\^sk{enc) y  jnixOnt.enc^ 
j j ' r e e n c r y p t .m a s k ( e n c )  y  y e e n c r z /p t .e n c ] ]
It is further assumed tha t the computing devices are legitimate unless it is stated 
tha t the device is corrupted. The assumptions relating to the channels collect­
form, mark are tha t the booth is private, and the envelope with the ballot form 
inside tha t is given to  the voter hides the candidate order from the intruder. The 
following section presents the first automated anonymity analysis of P rêt à Voter.
6.3 Autom ated Anonym ity Verification
This section checks whether the Prêt à Voter model with honest participants, 
System^PgY, meets the anonymity requirement defined in Section 4.3 Definition 2 
under the presence of the passive attacker model. Informally, according to the 
definition, the normal system and the system in which two votes are swapped over 
should be trace equivalent. The latter is the specification tha t needs to be defined 
in order to check the system against it. As the voter decides which candidate 
to  vote with the choose event, these events need to be anonymised. Thus, the 
specification for System^p^y: where A  = { \ choose |} is defined as follows:
SpecA iSystem fgy) =
ohoose.V2.Cx^QfiQQg^ y^ choose.vi.Cx^
Consequently, in order for the Prêt à Voter model to provide anonymity, the 
following trace equivalence should hold.
SpecAiSystemf^y) = t  S y s te m f^ y
FDR verifies tha t the trace equivalence holds, meaning tha t the intruder cannot 
distinguish between these two systems and hence, the Prêt à Voter model provides 
anonymity.
6.4 Analysis under Alternative Assum ptions
In the previous section. P rêt à Voter was analysed with respect to a passive 
attacker who can observe the public information on the channels th a t are available
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to him. This section investigates anonymity from the insider point of view, such 
as th a t of a corrupt electoral official. The framework is flexible enough to  model 
such behaviours in cryptographic voting system models too with the renaming 
and hiding operators.
In the case of a corrupt authority or electoral official, it is expected tha t the 
private information held by them is no longer secret. T hat is, the private channel 
collectform, on which all ballot information is transferred from the official to the 
voter, is no longer private, and can be used to deduce how the voter has voted. 
In order to verify whether the anonymity is broken in such a case, it is necessary 
th a t collectform is not hidden any more. Hence, the new abstracted model from 
authority’s point of view can be defined using the following process rather than 
the process S ystem 'p^y  used before.
System "Pay = System pav \  {| mark |}
Consequently, the abstracted process System^p^y should be defined in terms of 
System "pgy  exactly the same way as described above and in order to verify 
whether the requirement is held by this model the same trace equivalence needs 
to be checked with this new abstracted model.
As expected, FDR produces a number of counter-example traces, meaning that 
the trace equivalence does not hold. One of the traces is as follows:
{choose.v1 .c2 ,
choose.v2 .c1 ,
openElection,
auth.vi,
collectform.vi .{{ci, C2 ) , S i , emptylist, (Ep&^(cj), EpAr(cg))), 
enter B  0 0 th .vi,
shredLHS.{si, 2, {ciphertext, ciphertext)))
The trace illustrates tha t when the voter v\ votes for C2 casting the ballot form 
with the candidate order (ci, C2), the intruder deduces for whom the voter v\ has 
voted. This is because the first time tha t the intruder can see v i s  RHS on the 
shredLHS channel, he can observe tha t the RHS of the ballot form has a mark for 
the second candidate (shown as 2), which corresponds to the candidate C2 on the 
candidate list he observed before. Therefore, the intruder, with the additional 
information from the corrupt electoral official, can break the anonymity of the 
voters in this modelling of Prêt à Voter.
A similar approach can be taken to model any corrupt agents on the system in 
the sense th a t they follow the protocol, but leak information. For instance, the
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intruder may be allowed to see one of the voter’s candidates list or the voter can 
share what she knows with the intruder, which can be modelled by only hiding 
u i’s private channels, but not However, this would create a corner case, 
where in an election there exists only one honest voter, which was discussed in 
Section 4.6. Moreover, a corrupt mixnet may also be modelled and to  do so, its 
non-deterministic behaviour needs to  be made deterministic. For instance, the 
mixnet can output the re-encrypted votes in a first-in-first-out (FIFO) fashion or 
last-in-first-out (LIFO). In such cases, the intruder would notice the difference 
between the normal system and the system where two votes are swapped over, 
because a sequence of mixnet output for one is not possible for the other. Such 
scenarios can easily be modelled in CSP, and checked using FDR.
6.5 Conclusion
Although, the analysis in this chapter has been performed with a reasonably ab­
stracted model of P rêt à Voter, which does not cover some of its aspects, such as 
a threshold set of tellers, registrar onion and so on, it has sufficed to show how 
some of the cryptographic primitives in voting systems can be modelled using 
the framework defined in Chapter 4. Moreover, this analysis further validates 
the suitability of the anonymity definition given in Section 4.3 Definition 2. Ad­
ditionally, it was demonstrated tha t the passive attacker model is very flexible to 
capturing any information leakage from the corrupt system participants.
6.6 Challenges Faced in the M odelling and 
Analysis
This section presents the challenges faced during the modelling of P rêt à Voter 
and anonymity analysis of it. The main issues was to come up with a model of 
Prêt à Voter tha t behaves as close to the real system as possible and th a t could be 
used for the automated verification. Thus, a number of abstractions were needed 
in the model due to state explosion problem. For instance, a perfect mixnet 
was modelled consists of only one mix server unlike the real system in which 
the mixnet consists of at least 5 mix servers. These abstraction are explained in 
detail in Section 6.2.1.
Another difficulty was to get rid of false-positives during the automated analysis. 
For instance, when the encrypted messages are left as they are in the model, 
the intruder can distinguish two different ciphertexts as if he possesses the corre­
sponding secret key. Thus, a masking function, maskFact(), was needed in order 
to hide the differences between two ciphertexts. This function renames a number
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of events, which carry confidential information th a t should be hidden from the 
observer (see Section 6.2.3 for further details about this masking function).
6.7 Summary
In this section, the paper-based voter verifiable cryptographic voting system Prêt 
à Voter was modelled in CSP and its first automated analysis with respect to the 
anonymity requirement was performed. It was shown tha t P rêt à Voter provides 
anonymity under the assumption of honest behaviour of the participants in the 
system. Furthermore, the model has also been investigated under different trust 
assumptions, such as, the presence of a misbehaving electoral official and mixnet. 
In both cases, it was verified th a t the abstract model of Prêt à Voter does not 
provide anonymity. However, in the real system, these two assumptions are not 
an issue. T hat is, for the former, as the election authority in this modelling of 
Prêt à Voter is a combination of a diskless distributed ballot generation engine 
and a poll worker, who does not see the candidate orders on the ballot forms, in 
the real system, the secret information on ballot forms can only be leaked by the 
envelopes, which do not leak by assumption. For the latter, assuming a corrupt 
mixnet would be against the protocol design as it is a distributed process and 
assumed not to be so.
In the next chapter, autom ated analysis of cryptographic voting systems under 
an active and more powerful intruder than the passive attacker along the lines of 
a Dolev-Yao intruder [DY83] as defined in Section 3.3 will be investigated.
Chapter 7
A dapting  th e  D olev-Y ao  
Intruder M odel to  V oting  
S ystem s
This chapter* presents a novel intruder model for automated reasoning about 
anonymity and secrecy properties of voting systems. It is much stronger than 
the passive attacker used in the previous chapters as it behaves as a Dolev- 
Yao intruder model [DY83]. This type of intruder not only observes a protocol 
run, but also interacts with the protocol participants, overhears communication 
channels, intercepts and spoofs any messages tha t he has learned or generated 
from any prior knowledge. This approach is inspired by lazy spy [RG97], which 
is designed for cryptographic protocol analysis and called “lazy” as it avoids the 
eagerness of pre-computation of unnecessary inferences [Ros97]. The approach 
has already been introduced in Chapter 3, however, in order to apply this intruder 
model to voting systems, a few modifications are needed in relation to existing 
channel types and the deductive system. For the former, we benefit from Creese et 
al [CGRZ03, CGH'^05], who defined various channels for different threat models 
in ubiquitous computing environments. For the latter, a large deductive system 
is constructed regarding the messages transm itted on the voting system model 
channels.
When describing the approach followed in this chapter, the vVote voting sys­
tem will be used, which is based on Prêt à Voter [Rya04, GRS05], and is un­
der development for use in Victorian Electoral Commission (VEC) elections in 
2014 [BCH+12a, BCH'^12b, Cull3] in Australia. The intended system will be 
used in these elections, involving over three million voters, electing 88 legislative
*This chapter is mainly based on the paper accepted by the 13th International Workshop 
on Automated Verification of Critical Systems (AVOCS’13) [MH13].
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assembly and 40 legislative council representatives, using a mixture of the alterna­
tive vote (AV), also called instant-runoff voting (IRV), and the single transferable 
vote (STV). Most of the key features of Prêt à Voter are retained in the vVote 
system. However, to adapt the system to such a complex election setup, a num­
ber of modifications have been necessary in the system design; for instance, the 
inclusion of distributed ballot generation, an electronic ballot marker to assist 
the voter in filling out the ballot, and print-on-demand ballots for voters who are 
voting away from their registered polling station.
In terms of voting system requirements addressed during the analysis of the 
vVote system, the anonymity definition given in Section 4.3 Definition 2, and 
an adaptation of the secrecy definition used in the analysis of the NSPK in 
Section 3.3.4 are covered.
The participants of the vVote voting system will be modelled in CSP as usual, 
however, the processes will involve more cryptographic primitives than the previ­
ous chapter and the intruder model will be much more complex than the passive 
attacker. That is, this chapter will involve analysis of a complex system tha t 
requires much more state space than the previous analyses of voting systems 
in this thesis. However, it will be demonstrated tha t the FDR model checker 
and the CSP formal language are suitable methods for mechanically analysing 
cryptographic voting systems.
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 7.1 presents an overview of the 
vVote voting system. In Section 7.2, the vVote voting system is modelled in 
CSP except for some parts of it, such as distributed key generation, and the lazy 
spy intruder model is further extended for the analysis of voting systems with 
additional data-types, channel types and deduction rules. Section 7.3 analyses the 
system model regarding the formal specification of anonymity, whilst Section 7.4 
investigates the analysis of the model under alternative assumptions, such as, 
there being a corrupt election authority, who is preparing and distributing digital 
ballots. In Section 7.5, a formal specification of secrecy is given for voting systems. 
Section 7.6 presents a conclusion and discussion on the findings, with a chapter 
summary being provided in Section 7.8.
7.1 The vVote Voting System
Over the last few decades many trustworthy voting systems have been proposed. 
However, only a few have been deployed in large-scale real elections. Regard­
ing these, Scantegrity II [CCC'^08] was the first E2E voting system deployed 
in a binding governmental election on November 3, 2009 [CCC'^10], involving a 
relatively small electorate with 1728 voters. Additionally, Norway used an in­
ternet voting protocol [CjqlO] in the municipal elections in September 2011, in
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which more than 25,000 voters cast their votes using this protocol. Moreover, 
STAR-Vote [BBK“^ 12] is another voter verifiable DRE-style voting system, which 
is going to be used in Travis County, Texas, the United States, involving over
450.000 registered voters.
The vVote voting system is an E2E paper-based electronic voting system based 
on Prêt à Voter [Rya04, CRS05]. However, a number of modifications have been 
made to the original P rêt à Voter system. The main difference is th a t an electronic 
device is deployed in order to facilitate accommodating a candidate list with 
over 30 candidates on the ballot forms. This also helps voters to indicate their 
preferences among many other candidates. However, deploying these computers 
requires further trust on them as they know about the voters’ choice at the time of 
voting. Hence, a misbehaving device can violate voter anonymity or vote privacy 
and as a result, for further confidence in the design of this promising real-world 
voting system, formal verification is needed.
The vVote ballot form illustrated in Figure 7.1 is similar to a P rêt à Voter one. 
On one side there is a randomly permuted candidate list and a QR code a t the 
bottom tha t records the permuted candidate order, on the other are marking 
boxes, a unique serial number and another QR code, corresponding to the onion 
tha t embeds the candidate order.
In the construction of onions, exponential and normal ElGamal public key algo­
rithms are used. For instance, for the legislative council election, a value in Gq 
is chosen to represent each party  name. Suppose the value is a, then the cor­
responding onion for this party  is the ElGamal term Epk{a) = (g'^,ah7'), where 
h =  p®, r  G Z* is a random value and a; G Z* is a random secret value.
7.1.1 Ballot Generation
Ballot generation can be realised on the machine tha t prints the ballot form in 
the booth or in a distributed fashion th a t is similar to tha t described in [Rya06, 
RTIO], i.e., a number of candidate list mixers shuffle the encrypted candidate 
names for each vote, which ensures tha t the candidate ordering is random and 
not generated by a single party. This eliminates single point failures. In the 
distributed version, a list of encrypted ballots, including a serial number, the 
onion encoding the candidate list, and the list of encrypted candidate names for 
the printer with a proof of correspondence is produced. The printers’ (print-on- 
demand (POD) client) candidate list is encrypted under a threshold key shared 
across a set of candidate list key sharers, called the POD service. Hence, in order 
for a printer to obtain the candidate list, it generates a blinding factor, encrypts 
it under the POD service public key, and sends it to the POD service with a proof 
of knowledge. Afterwards, having received the encrypted candidate list blinded
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Figure 7.1: vVote ballot form [Cull3]
by itself, the printer removes the blinding factor, and prints the candidate list.
7.1.2 Election Phases
In the following paragraphs the election phases covering the voting ceremony and 
the vVote system components are explained.
P re -e le c tio n  The pre-election phase covers the preparation of election material 
before the polling station opens. In this period, digital ballots are generated in a 
distributed fashion tha t are encrypted under the POD service’s and the election 
authority’s public key, before being committed to the public bulletin board. In 
order to speed up decrypting of the votes, a lookup table of all possible voting 
permutations is created. Additionally, mixnets are set up, and key generation is 
performed in this phase.
V o te  C a s tin g  This phase starts with polling stations opening and lasts until 
the election is closed, with no further votes being allowed to be cast. The POD
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service allocates and transfers pre-prepared digital ballots to a print station in 
the polling booth during the election. Having registered with the poll worker, 
the voter or the former interacts with the POD service to get a ballot paper as 
illustrated in Figure 7.1. The POD client will derive the permuted candidate list 
on the ballot form when it is actually being printed in the polling station and the 
ballot paper format in vVote is similar to the Prêt à Voter one. However, instead 
of an onion for the encrypted candidate list, it has a QR barcode tha t consists of 
a digitally signed serial number. Having scanned this barcode to the electronic 
ballot marker (EBM), the voter can see and cast her ballot form in an electronic 
environment. The EBM is a new front-end component tha t interacts with the 
WBB to submit the vote and receive a digitally signed receipt for it, which is then 
printed for the voter for verification purposes by a receipt printer in the booth. 
The WBB commits, records and broadcasts the ballot data generated during 
the election and also signs the serial numbers allocated by the ballot manager, 
thereby ensuring their uniqueness. Once the voter has cast her vote and received 
her receipt, she then leaves the polling station.
P o s t E lec tio n  Post election is the phase where the cast votes are mixed by the 
mixnets, decrypted and tallied by a set of key sharers, such tha t only a threshold 
set of these sharers can perform decryption. The results are then announced by 
the bulletin board.
7.1.3 vVote PO D Service and Protocol
The POD service (also called candidate list key sharers) provides distribution of 
digital ballots in a distributed manner to  the polling stations in any district. As 
the digital ballots are prepared and committed to the WBB before the election, 
this service facilitates the print-on-demand ballot distribution in real time (The 
details about the POD service and any other part of the vVote system can be 
found in the software design technical report [Cull3]. Despite the fact th a t it is 
still being updated in respect of design changes, it is considered to be a natural 
stable description for use in the analysis in this chapter).
In the ballot generation procedure, the randomised candidate order of a ballot 
is encrypted under the election public key pksA  and it is then transformed to 
an encryption under the POD service’s public key pkps  without revealing the 
underlying message, as described in [Jak99]. The same transformation technique 
is also used in the POD protocol illustrated in Figure 7.2 to transform the en­
cryptions on the digital ballots into the designated POD client’s public key p kp c  
and these transformed ciphertexts cannot be decrypted by anyone other than the 
designated printer.
In more detail, when the voter authenticates in the polling station, the poll
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worker requests a random nonce-like sessionID  from the adm inistrator machine. 
Following this, the poll worker sends the sessionID  to  the POD service, where 
it is signed and stored. Having received the signed sessionID , the poll worker 
hands it to the voter in barcode form. Then, the voter scans the barcode to 
the POD client, which signs the sessionID  and submits it to  the POD service. 
Subsequently, the POD service signs the district and the sessionID  and submits 
them to the ballot manager. Following that, the ballot manager finds the next 
available serial number for tha t district, assigns it to the submitted sessionID , 
and notifies the WBB for this assignment by signing them using its secret key 
skBM- The WBB then sends a confirmation of this assignment to the ballot 
manager, which returns this to  the POD service. Now, the transformation of the 
public keys tha t encrypt the ballot form takes place from pkps  to  pkpc- Finally, 
the POD service signs the serial number and sends along with the transformed 
ciphertexts to the POD client, which can then decrypt these and print the actual 
ballot for the voter.
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Figure 7.2: Message sequence chart of POD protocol
In this new system, the electronic ballot marker (EBM) is particularly interesting 
as it forms the key distinctive characteristic of vVote, being the only device in 
the system tha t knows how a particular voter has voted. T hat is, when the 
voter transfers her actual ballot form to the EBM, the candidate list on her form 
is also transferred to  the EBM, while it is destroyed and kept secret in Prêt à
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Voter. One of the assumptions made in [BCH'^12a, BCH'*‘12b, C u ll3] is tha t the 
POD client, where physical ballot form is printed, and the EBM, are located in 
a private environment, such as, a voting booth.
In the next section the vVote voting system is modelled in CSP as well as there 
being description of the adaptation of the lazy spy intruder model for the analysis 
of voting systems.
7.2 M odelling vVote and A ctive Intruder
Conventionally, security protocols consist of several agents sending messages to 
each other on the medium they share or on direct communication channels. The 
vVote voting system is modelled in terms of a number of agent processes tha t 
run in parallel and these processes behave as the corresponding components of 
the voting system.
In the following sections, the messages sent on the channels of the model are 
defined. Secondly, the different kinds of channels tha t are needed for the analysis 
are introduced along with the process definitions for each agent, which compose 
the voting system model. Following this, the lazy spy intruder model acting as a 
Dolev-Yao intruder is adapted to analyse such voting systems. Finally, the system 
model and active intruder model are put together in order to reason about the 
system as a whole later in the analysis section.
7.2.1 D ata-types and M essages
As introduced in Chapter 3, cryptographic primitives, such as encryptions and 
signatures, are modelled as symbolic objects like the agents, the public and secret 
keys, the nonces and serial numbers. For instance, encryption: Epk{f), decryp­
tion: Dgkif),  signature: Sskif)-  Additionally, apart from these, the other mes­
sages, which can be a collection of these cryptographic primitives, are also mod­
elled as the data-types. In this respect, the message including a serial number and 
an encrypted candidate list (called raw ballots here) is denoted as Raw(s, Epfc(Z)), 
and a digital ballot message formed by a signed serial number and an encrypted 
candidate list is modelled as DigB(Ssfc(s), Ep/j(Z)). Similarly, a ballot form con­
sisting of a candidate list, a serial number, and an index value, is B(Z,s, Ind.z); 
a message with a serial number and an index value forming the marking boxes 
on the ballot form, called castrhs, which is demonstrated as RHS(5, Ind.i); and a 
receipt is the signed castrhs denoted as R(Sg^(RHS(s, Ind.z))). Finally, a message 
consisting of an index value and an encrypted candidate list is called a vote and 
shown as V(lnd.z, Epfc(Z)). Figure 7.3 depicts how these messages are composed 
in the model.
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In order to  compose these messages, the model consists of several finite sets of 
facts, J ’, as listed below. The abbreviation W  stands for the web bulletin board,
T  is Tom, the poll worker, E A  is the election authority, P S  and P C  are the POD 
service and client, respectively, and B M  is the ballot manager. For convenience, 
names are abbreviated as follows: the set of candidates as C, voters as V, agents 
as A , serial numbers as «S, nonces as J\f, and public-keys and secret-keys as PK, 
and <S/C, respectively.
C = {Zoe, V ictor}
V =  {Alice, Bob, Jam es}
A  = U(V, [Tom, authority, wbb, teller, podservice, 
podclient, ballotmngr, ebm, prin ter})
S  ={S1,S2:S3}
J\f =
VlC={pkA  I  A ^ { W , T , E A , P S , P C , B M } }
SK, = {skA \ A e { W ,  T, EA,  PS,  PC,  B M } }
The agents send various kinds of messages to each other, which need to be de­
fined in terms of data-types. The messages mentioned above and illustrated in 
Figure 7.3 form the message set A i. The names of the sets are indicative of what 
messages they represent. However, to remove the ambiguity; castrhs represents 
the cast ballots, C is the set of all possible candidate lists, and X  is the set of in­
dices with how the voter is modelled to fill in the marking boxes for her preferred 
candidate.
In the next section, the communication channels, on which these messages are 
transm itted, are described.
7.2.2 Channel Types
As in the NSPK analysis in Section 3.3, the channels have the form A .A M ,  
where A  is the set of agents and M  is the set of messages th a t agents may wish 
to transm it over the channels and these are listed in Figure 7.3.
The framework introduced in Section 3.3 involves only (InS) Insecure channels, 
i.e., the whole network is not secure, and hence, any message can be manipulated 
in many ways by the intruder. The intruder can block, overhear and spoof 
any message transm itted on the insecure communication channels between the 
legitimate agents. This kind of communication channels are directly connected to 
the intruder using the renaming operator in CSP. Hence, there is no restriction 
in the intruder process about what he can or cannot perform on the insecure 
communication channels. In order words, he can act as the Dolev-Yao intruder 
model on such channels.
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Figure 7.3: Message types used in the modelling
Such an assumption is too strong for voting systems tha t require an environment 
for the voters to  be able to vote privately, such as a voting booth, at least if the 
action of receiving a ballot form is modelled as a message. This is also the case for 
most of the remote voting systems, where it is assumed th a t no one is watching 
over the voters’ shoulder while she is casting her vote. Hence, this necessitates 
the existence of private channels in the voting system model. To this end, the 
agents in the model are enabled to communicate over a secure channel (S), called 
scomm, on which the intruder has no power a t all. The intruder cannot block, 
overhear or spoof transm itted messages over the secure communication channels. 
For instance, when the voter is given the ballot form by the poll worker, mes­
sages including the sensitive data regarding the candidate order, are transm itted 
over scomm  channels. If there was no private channels, the intruder would ob­
viously violate the voter’s privacy by overhearing communication channels on 
which vulnerable data flows. In the modelling of such channels, different channel
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names, like scomm, are used to distinguish the secure channels from others in 
order to hide the crucial information from the Dolev-Yao intruder. As stated 
previously, the intruder’s ability is modelled using the renaming operator in the 
process definition of the intruder. This is to  say th a t the intruder can perform 
all his bad behaviour on the channels tha t are connected to his process definition 
using renaming. Hence, the secure channel scomm  is shared only between honest 
agents, and not with the intruder. Therefore, as the intruder does not have any 
connection with secure channels, he cannot block, overhear or spoof messages on 
such channels.
Prom the observations made throughout the analysis in this thesis (it will be 
explained further in Section 7.6), it is assumed tha t at least two eligible honest 
voters are able to vote, and the cast votes are tallied at the end of the election. 
Otherwise an attack regarding the voter’s privacy occurs in which the intruder 
blocks all the communication channels except the one on which the target voter 
communicates in order to cast her vote. Thus, the intruder would learn how the 
voter has voted. Therefore, at least two honest voters should be able to cast their 
votes without any blocking so tha t the intruder cannot deduce how each of them 
has voted. This assumption requires tha t there exists a channel in the voting 
system model such tha t the communications made by these two honest voters 
with the other agents are No Spoofing and Blocking (NSB) channels modelled 
as nsbcomm  here, and they are combinations of two different channel types; No 
Blocking (NB) and No Spoofing (NS) channels. On such channels the intruder 
can overhear the communication, but cannot block its occurrence and spoof any 
messages. Creese et a l [CGH+05] describe various kinds of channels for pervasive 
computing environments. For instance, the No OverHearing channel c {NOHc)  is 
th a t which cannot be overheard, the No Blocking channel c {NBc) is the channel 
th a t cannot be blocked and the No Spoofing channel c {NSc)  is the channel 
type th a t cannot be spoofed. The three NOHc,  NBc  and NSc  form the secure 
channels scomm  in the modelling. The NB channels in CSP are modelled when 
the intruder process is renamed to take/block messages from the channels on the 
network.
Using CSP the set of messages tha t make sense to the protocol (they are from 
real communications between agents), called comms, can be defined as the union 
of sets of data objects for each message type. For instance, the following defines 
the vote messages sent by one agent to  another.
commVotes = {a.b.m  | m  4— votes, a <— A ,b  ir- A , a b}
These are also useful when the intruder is afforded the ability to modify the mes­
sages on the insecure channels or not to block and fake certain data  from specific 
agents as it may be confusing as to whether the message is already known or
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has just been learned from the real communication tha t the intruder overhears. 
This is used in modelling the intruder by defining the set of legitimate insecure 
messages sent from one agent to another Ucomms, i.e., they are from real com­
munications of agents, which can be overheard, learned and said by the intruder. 
This set on which the intruder can behave as the Dolev-Yao intruder in the anal­
ysis of vVote in Section 7.2.5 is defined as the following.
Ucomms =  \J{{q-qCf | q.q '.f i— comms, q 4- {James}, q' 4 -  agents},
{q.q'-f I q.q '.f 4 -  com m s,q  4 -  agents, q' i -  {James}})
The set defines real communication messages between the agent James and other 
agents on the network, meaning tha t all messages tha t are sent by and to  James 
are transm itted on the insecure communication channels (InS). Similarly, insecure 
NB messages Nbcomms from real communication can be defined so using such 
sets and later used to determine what the intruder can overhear, spoof but not 
block.
Although, the existence of NB channels solves one problem, which is the unwanted 
privacy attack previously mentioned, there is another plausible attack where the 
intruder does not block the messages on NB channels, but can later modify and 
spoof the messages, i.e., the intruder cannot take/block, but he can still fake 
messages overheard from the NB channels. Hence, if the intruder can modify 
and spoof one of the messages sent from one of those honest two voters, he can 
then deduce the other private message by looking at the election result as in the 
previous attack. Therefore, there is a need for a channel th a t cannot be spoofed, 
called No Spoofing (NS) channels. On NS channels, the intruder can overhear but 
cannot block or spoof messages. This is exactly what we need in order to allow 
two honest voters to cast their votes without any interruption and modification. 
As such a channel is no blocking and spoofing channel, it will be called as No 
spoofing and blocking (NSB) channel from now on, and in the CSP definitions of 
the voting system and intruder model it will be expressed as nsbcomm.
As mentioned earlier, secure channels are combinations of NB, NS and NOH 
channels. NOH channels are the channels tha t the intruder cannot overhear any 
messages on. On such channels the intruder can block and spoof messages, but 
cannot overhear the communication channel. The implementation of this channel 
in CSP is similar to the others’—it is modelled by restricting what the intruder 
can overhear with a defined set of network messages.
For the analysis of vVote later in this thesis, we need to define what information 
flows over: secure channels scomm, insecure channels comm, and no spoofing 
and blocking channels nsbcomm, because of the reasons explained previously. 
This can be done in two ways: the first one is tha t all agents on the network
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work on insecure communication channels (comm) in which case secure, and no 
spoofing and blocking channels need to be defined. The second way is tha t all 
agents communicate over a NSB channel {nsbcomm), and the secure and insecure 
channels are defined accordingly. As we know what information should be shared 
with the intruder, it is easier to define the insecure communications than defining 
the others, meaning tha t the second way of defining channels is the one to follow 
for the ease of modelling. This will also help to reduce the size of the required 
state space for automated analysis. In terms of the deduction system that is 
used in the model, following the second way does not have any impact on the 
deductions tha t may be made by the intruder because the same set of information 
is given to the intruder and the deduction system remains the same in each case. 
Table 7.1 illustrates the intruder’s capabilities on different channels used in this 
analysis.
Secure No OverHearing No Spoofing and Blocking Insecure
(S) (NOH) (NSB) (InS)
overhear X X / /
block X: v / , X . /
spoof X V /
Table 7.1: The intruder’s capabilities on different channels
Finally, there exist a number of other channels tha t regulate the protocol run, 
such as; openElection, closeElection, enterBooth, leaveBooth, bagempty and done. 
However these will not be discussed any further.
7.2.3 M odelling Assum ptions
Although the aim in the modelling of voting systems is to obtain a model that 
reflects real system behaviour, there are a few assumptions tha t need to be made 
in order to avoid state explosion, which also result in abstractions in some of 
the features of the vVote voting system. For instance, although vVote supports 
the AV and STV electoral methods, FPT P will be modelled due to its simplicity 
in this analysis. Thus, possible privacy attacks to the system tha t may occur 
in the AV and STV electoral methods are not considered here. Additionally, 
in the original vVote system, ballot generation is made in a distributed fashion, 
which allows verifiable generation of ballot forms by distributing the trust among 
various entities. However, in the modelling of vVote, it is assumed that there 
is one honest single entity, election authority, who generates the candidate lists 
and digital ballot papers. This assumption can also be read as the entities that 
are responsible for distributed generation of ballot forms are honest and work as 
a single process. Similarly the web bulletin board (WBB) is a threshold-based
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service, which signs messages by co-operation. As in all threshold parties in the 
voting system models in this thesis, the threshold parties in the vVote model are 
treated as single entities too.
The vVote voting system uses a mixnet to shuffle the encrypted votes cast during 
the election as in Prêt à Voter. Previously, in Section 6.2.2, a CSP model of 
the mixnet has been given, which works as a perfect mixnet (no link between 
its inputs and outputs due to its non-deterministic behaviour). However, here in 
vVote modelling we omit this mixnet process as the WBB process already outputs 
the encrypted messages non-deterministically to the decryption tellers. This can 
also be thought as tha t the mixnet process is embedded in the WBB process, 
removing the communication between a WBB process and a mixnet one. Thus, 
there is no point of having two subsequent non-deterministic choices over the 
same inputs in terms of efflcient and effective modelling. Regarding the analysis 
of this voting system model without a mixnet process, as the communication 
channels between WBB and mixnet is no blocking link because of the reasons 
given in Section 7.2.2 and the messages are encrypted under authorities public 
key, there is not much tha t the intruder can do over these channels. Additionally, 
everything tha t the intruder can perform over the channel from the mixnet to 
the WBB can also be realised over the channel from the WBB to the decryption 
tellers because the messages and channel types are of the same format.
The vVote voting system employs a district information for each voter in order 
to allow them to vote in different constituencies. Because the modelling and 
analysis of this voting system does not cover this aspect of voting, the district 
information, used in the POD protocol, is omitted. Hence, with this abstraction, 
the possible privacy-related attacks to the system tha t may emerge with if the 
district information was used are not touched here.
Finally, the assumptions made in Section 5.2.1 regarding the voter behaviour 
when choosing the candidate to  vote for and the number of booths are also valid 
for this modelling too. Similar to the assumption made on the number of booths, 
it is assumed here tha t there exists only one poll worker, which opens a session 
for each voter with a fresh nonce. This would not impact our analysis as in the 
case of existence of multiple poll workers in a polling station, voters could only 
authenticate themselves without awaiting each other with different poll workers. 
However, if the cast votes were to be published on the BB one by one in the 
model, then there might have been issues regarding this assumption. This is 
because in the current model voters cast their vote in order and if the intruder 
could see the cast votes published on the BB in the same order, then he could 
violate voter anonymity.
The following subsection presents the honest participants’ CSP definitions.
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7.2.4 H onest Participants
The vVote voting system model developed for this work is defined by the pro­
cesses illustrated at the top of Figure 7.4. All the processes are involved in the 
protocol by sending, receiving messages on the synchronised channels and the 
model behaves exactly as in Figure 7.4. Moreover, the model covers all phases 
of the vVote, including the POD protocol. The following subsections present the 
CSP descriptions of the individual protocol participants.
T e l l e rPrinterE B MV o t e rP o l l  W o r k e r  P O D  S e r v i c e  P O D  C l i e n t  A u t h o r i t y  B a l l o t  M n g r  W B B
(nonce]
S e r i a l N o ,  n o n c e )
i s t ) )
S e r i a l N o ,  E  p f c p g ( C a n d £  
- i a l N o ) ,  { C a n d L i s
B { C a i i d L i s t ,  i n d . O  S ,k p s { S e r i c  I N o ) )
B { C a n d L i s i , I n d . O ,  [ S e r i a l N o ) )
I n d i
4 S ( S , t p s ( 5 ' e  " W  V o ) ,  I n d ,
S s k p s i S e r i a l N o ) , \ n d . i ) ^  
( a H S ( S , t p s  S e r i a l N o ) ,  n d i ) ) )  
/ ( I n d . t ,  E p kp , ( C a n d L i s t )  I_ _ _ _ _ _ _
l((S,t^(RHSl
ZOE.m, MCTOR.n
Figure 7.4: vVote system model
V oter P rocess
W ith the parameterised process Voter{v, c), the behaviour of a voter v E V 
voting for a chosen candidate c G C is modelled. There exist two honest voters, 
Alice and Bob, and a misbehaving one, James, who behaves honestly in the 
model at first, but his secret will be shared with the intruder later on and whose 
communications, even the private and NSB ones, are used by the intruder.
Having authenticated herself on the NSB channel with the poll worker, Tom, the
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voter receives a ballot form from the POD client with the candidate list printed 
on it and scans her ballot data to the EBM on the secure channel, where she can 
see her ballot in an electronic environment. After indicating her preference by 
sending the index value (lnd.%) to the EBM th a t corresponds to the candidate she 
wants to  vote for—the index i is found by using the function find(c, Z), which finds 
the candidate c in the sequence of candidates I and is defined in Section 6.2—, 
she then receives her signed receipt and leaves the polling station.
Voter{v, c) =
openElection  -4- nsbcom m.v.Tom.v -4
f  scomm.podclient.v.B{l,Sskps{ )^-> '^^ -^ )^
scomm.'y.e6m.B(Z, Ssfcpg(s), Ind.O) -4  
/  nsbcomm.V.ebm.\x\d.i -4□
leCs^S □
y  i:=find(c,Z)
nsbcomm.printer.v.R{Sskw{^^^{^skpsi^)^ ind.i))) -4  
closeElection -4  STOP
All eligible voters, Alice, Bob and James, follow this protocol, which is modelled 
as the parallel running of all individual voter processes synchronising on open­
Election and closeElection pairwise with the election authority. T hat is, each 
voter performs an openElection event to begin her voting process. Each voter 
must also perform a closeElection event after casting their individual vote and 
leaving the polling station.
Voters = \\v^cyoter(v,c)
P o ll W o rk er P ro cess
The poll worker, Tom, authenticates voters and starts a fresh session for each of 
them by choosing a nonce n from the set of nonces Af. He ensures th a t he always 
authenticates a different voter, and commences a new session with a fresh nonce. 
The poll worker is not involved in any private communication as he only sends 
and receives signed nonces from and to the POD service and sends nonces to the 
POD client.
Pollworker{V,A/) =
closeElection -4  STOP  
□
/  nsbcomm.v.Tom.v -4
( nsbcomm.Tom.podservice.Sskpi'i^) \  
nsbcomm.podservice.Tom.Sskps (^)
nsbcomm.Tom.podclient.n  -4  
\  y P ollw o rker{V \{v} ,A f\{n }) J
□
vev n
neM
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E lection  A uthority  P rocess
Authority is the election authority process, which assigns a random candidate list 
from the list C for a particular serial number th a t has been asked for along with 
a nonce from the ballot manager. Following this. Authority submits two copies 
of the raw ballot form: one is encrypted under the election authority’s public 
key pksA  and sent to the WBB, the other is encrypted under the POD service 
public key pkps  and sent to  the POD service. Hence, the WBB and the POD 
service keep the same candidate list associated for a particular serial number, but 
encrypted under different keys.
Authority =  openElection  -4  Authorityi (<5, C)
Authority 1 (0, C) = closeElection  -4  STOP  
Authority 1 («S, C) =
□
f  nsbcomm.ballotmngr.authority.
( nsbcomm.authority.wbb.Ra\N{s, Epfcp^(Z)) 
nsbcomm.authority.podservice.Rb\n{s^ Epfcps (0) 
 ^ A uthority i{S \{s}.,C )
□
neNf
n
IGC
P O D  Service P rocess
Following a fresh session, the POD service (candidate list key sharers) receives 
a serial number s from the ballot manager and the encrypted candidate list 
Epkps(l) associated with s from the election authority, which is called a raw 
ballot. Subsequently, the digital ballot form consisting of a signed serial number 
and the encrypted candidate list is sent to the POD client after a transformation 
made on the encrypted candidate list from the POD service’s public key pkps  to 
POD client’s public key pkpc^
Podservice =
closeElection  -4  STO P  
□
 ^ nsbcomm.Tom.podservice.Sskp[n) -4  
nsbcomm.podservice.Tom.Sgkps (^)
nsbcomm.podclient.podservice.Sskpc (^) 
nsbcomm.podser vice.ballotmngr.Ssk PS (^)
f  nsbcomm.ballotmngr.podser vice.S skw 1 \
f  nsbcomm.authority.podservice. \
Ra\N{s,Epkps{l)) 
nsbcomm.podser vice.podclient.
DigB(Ss/;pg(s), Ep/jp^(Z)) -4  
V \  Podservice /  /  J
□
neNf
□
sG<S □
I G C
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P O D  C lien t P ro c e ss
The POD Client process is responsible for printing out the ballot form, which has 
been received as a digital ballot from the POD service (note tha t this should not 
be confused with the receipt printer). The candidate list on this digital ballot I 
is encrypted under the POD client’s public key p kp c  with empty marking boxes 
denoted by Ind.O. Having extracted the candidate list, the POD client prints the 
actual ballot form for the voter on the private channel.
Podclient =
closeElection -4 STO P  
□
f  nsbcomm.Tom.podclient.n
nsbcomm.podclient.podser vice.Ssk PC (^)
f  nsbcomm.podser vice.podclient.
DigB(Ssfcpp(s), Epfcp (^Z)) -4
scomm.podclient.v.E{l,Sskps{s), Ind.O) -4
□
nÇj\f □
n
V  Z g / 3  V  vEV Podclient
B allo t M a n a g e r P ro c e ss
The ballot manager apportions the serial numbers to each ballot form uniquely 
and commits them to the WBB. Additionally, it also notifies the election author­
ity and the POD service about the serial number being used.
Ballotmanager = openElection  -4 Ballotm anager{S) 
Ballotmanager{0) =  closeElection -4 STO P  
Ballotmanager {S) =
closeElection -4 STO P  
□
/  nsbcomm.podservice.ballotmngr.Sskpsi^) 
f  nsbcomm.ballotmngr.wbb.SskpM ?^ ) 
nsbcomm.ballotmngr.authority.Sskpui^i 
nsbcomm.wbb.ballotmngr.Sskwi^') ^) 
nsbcomm.ballotmngr.podservice.Sskwi^i ^)
\  \  Ballotm anager{S\{sY)
□
neN n
T h e  E lec tro n ic  B a llo t M a rk e r  (E B M )
The EBM is a device to  help voters to mark their preferences. Having received 
her ballot form from the POD client, the voter goes into the booth and scans her 
ballot form to transfer the ballot information to the EBM on the secure channel 
scomm. She then fills out the electronic ballot form on the screen by interacting
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with the machine and choosing the index value Indi corresponding to her chosen 
candidate. Although no one is supposed to  be observing voter interaction with 
the EBM, it is assumed here th a t the index value sent from voter to the EBM 
can be observed by the intruder, as it will be observed anyway once she takes 
her receipt from the receipt printer. Afterwards, the EBM sends the marking 
boxes side of the ballot form, RHS(Sgkpg(5), Ind.z), to  the WBB, which can then 
be checked by the voters.
E B M  =closeElection  —> STOP  
□
/  scomm.u.eZ)m.B(Z, Ssfcps(s), Ind.O) —> 
nsbcomm.V.ebm.\r\d.i -4
nsbcomm.ebm.wbb.RHS{Sskpsi^)■> Ind.i) -4 EBM
R eceip t Printer P rocess
The receipt printer process behaves as a typical printer, i.e., it receives the receipt 
r  from the WBB, and prints it out for the voter v. Note tha t the POD client 
and this printer process are two different printers located in different places in 
the polling station.
P rin ter  =closeElection -4 STOP  
□
I nsbcomm.wbb.printer.r -4 \
gV \  "^^^(^omm.printer.v.r -4 P rin ter  J
rEreceipts
T he W eb B u lletin  Board P rocess
The WBB is a public bulletin board tha t broadcasts the committed data  during 
the election, such as submitted votes and signed serial numbers. Moreover, there 
is nothing private about this process as everything is publicly verifiable. Having 
received all the cast votes and sending the receipts for each voter, the WBB 
transfers them in the form of V(lnd.%, Epfc^ (^Z)) to the decryption teller (election 
key sharers) non-deterministically. Note th a t a mixnet, such as re-encryption 
mixnet used in Prêt à Voter, shuffles the cast votes arbitrarily and here a separate 
mixnet processes is not necessary as the WBB already outputs the cast votes 
non-deterministically. Hence, it can be thought of there being a perfect mixnet 
embedded in the WBB and this also helps in terms of the state space. Having 
finished the tallying, the teller then sends the result for each candidate (Zoe and 
Victor) to  the WBB.
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WBB  = openElection -4 WBBx{tH)
WBBi{hag) =
closeElection-A- W BB 2 {hag)
□
( nsbcomm.ballotmngr.whh.SskBM^^i'^) 
nsbcomm.wbb.ballotmngr.Sskw
/  nsbcomm.authority.wbb.Ra\N[s., Epfc^ (^Z))
(  ns6comm.e6m.£t;Z)6.RHS(Ss^p^(s), I n d i ) -4 \  
nsbcomm.wbb.printer.
Sskw(RHS(SgkpgW, Indi)) -4 
\  \  \  WBBi{bagU{y{\ud. i ,Epk^^{l))})  J
□
ueM
sES □
lEC □
iEX
WBBg(0) =  bagempty -4 nsbcomm.Zoe?t^ -4
nsbcomm. Victor?t2  -4 done -4 STOP  
W BB 2 {bag)=  □  n sb c o m m .w b b .te lle r .v W B B 2 {bag\{v})
vEvotes
D e c ry p tio n  T eller P ro cess
The decryption teller process—it is a thresholded setup, called decryption key 
sharers, but here this property is abstracted away and modelled as a single CSP 
process—is responsible for decrypting the votes encrypted under the election 
authority’s public key pkpA  and tallying them for each candidate. The results 
are then sent back to  the WBB. W hat happens in the third line of the process is 
tha t because the decryption teller possesses the shared secret key skpA  (shared 
in the real system), it can decrypt and extract the candidate list of the cast votes 
as in I := Dsfcp^(Epfcp^(Z)). The teller then identifies for whom the vote is by 
checking the zth element of the list Z. Accordingly, it increments the to tal vote 
received by tha t particular candidate by one. Once there are no more votes to  
tally, the teller announces the to tal votes for each candidate.
Teller =  openElection -4 Telleri{0, 0)
Telleri{m , n) =
f  n s b c o m m . w b b . t e l l e r . \ / { \ x \ d . i . , E p k p j ^ { l ) ) \  
( \in th{i, Dsfcs^(Epfcp^(Z))) =  Zoe then Teller 1 (m +  i , n) ^
else (  Dgkg^(EpA;^^(Z))) =  Victor then  \
y y y TeZZerj(m, n +  J?) else 5 T 0 P  J J  J
□
iEX
lEC
□
bagempty -4 nsbcomm.Zoe.m  -4 nsbcomm. Victor.n -4  SKIP
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7.2.5 Adapting Lazy Spy
Lazy spy [Ros97] is an efficient intruder model as it avoids state explosion by 
following only its findings (deductions through the messages he has seen or from 
his initial knowledge). This intruder model provides active attacks against the 
system by not only observing the communication channels, but also blocking 
messages or generating and sending fake messages to  any agents on the system. 
The framework has already been introduced in Section 3.3 in detail. The frame­
work should be altered so it can work with the cryptographic voting systems. 
In particular, the vVote voting system model is equipped with a number of vot­
ing system specific messages as well as the cryptographic ones (see Figure 7.3). 
Hence, the existence of these messages requires further deduction rules tha t need 
to be defined so th a t the intruder can act as he is supposed to  regarding those 
messages. Secondly, the initial knowledge of the intruder IJC is also model spe­
cific, hence, it needs to  be defined according to the voting system model and as 
this set of knowledge is used to specify what the intruder knows and what he 
can learn, it needs to be defined carefully. Lastly, because of the introduction of 
various channel types in the analysis of voting systems, the intruder model needs 
to  be amended so tha t the private channels stay private and NSB channels are, 
indeed, not blocked or spoofed by the intruder.
In order to allow the intruder to compose messages, there are a number of deduc­
tion rules. Recall tha t a deduction is a pair (X, / ) ,  where X  is a finite set of facts 
and /  is the fact tha t can be generated, providing th a t the intruder possesses 
X  and these inferences are denoted as X  h / .  It should be ensured tha t the 
intruder deals with a finite set of facts because FDR cannot handle with infinite 
number of states. Thus, nesting of encryptions and sequences need to be avoided. 
To do so, the set of data-types are limited to the types th a t are enough to build 
protocol messages. Although, the intruder can generate “bad” facts (objects that 
are not of the form real messages sent among protocol agents), these facts will 
do him no good [RSG+00]. T hat is because the agents in the protocol can only 
communicate with the messages tha t they understand—the messages need to be 
in the same form as they are expected. Hence, the deduction rules with which 
the intruder is able to build and decompose all protocol messages are adequate 
for the analysis.
The deduction rules regarding this analysis V  are the union of deductions de­
fined previously in Table 2.4, which are related to cryptographic primitives and 
in Table 7.2 are specific to  the vVote voting system. The new deduction rule 
BALLOT-COMP enables ballot forms to be composed if the intruder possesses 
the set {I, Ssk{s), lnd.%}, where I is the candidate list, s is serial number and Ind.i 
is the index value, corresponding to the chosen candidate and conversely the 
deduction rule BALLOT-DCMP helps the intruder to decompose ballot forms
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and obtain all the data on it. Similarly, the intruder can also work on any com­
position and decomposition of any other messages in the model. For instance, 
RHS-COMP and RHS-DCMP are the deduction rules related to cast ballot forms, 
consisting of an index value and a signed serial number {Ind.z, Ssfc(s)}- VOTE- 
COMP and VOTE-DCMP are the deduction rules related to the votes, in the 
form of V(lnd.«, Epfc(Z)) (note tha t these do not contain a serial number). The 
deduction rules regarding the digital ballots, consisting of a signed serial num­
ber and an encrypted candidate list, {Sg^(s), Epfc(Z)}, are DIG.BLT-COMP and 
DIG.BLT-DCMP. Similarly, RAW.BLT-COMP and RAW.BLT-DCMP are the 
two deduction rules tha t help the intruder compose and decompose the raw 
ballots,{s, Epfc(Z)}, and IND-COMP and IND-DCMP are the index related de­
duction rules. Hence, with this set of deduction rules, T>, the intruder is enabled 
to deduce messages th a t are used to attack the protocol.
BALLOT-COMP. {Z,Ssfc(s), Ind.?} h B(Z,Ssfc(s), Ind.?)
BALLOT-DCMP. {B {l,Ssk(s), Ind.?)} 1- l,Ssk{s), Ind.?
RHS-COMP. {lnd.?,Ssfc(s)} h RH S(lnd.?,Ssfc(s))
RHS-DCMP. {R H S(SsA:(s ), Ind.?)} 1- \nd.i,Ssk{s)
VOTE-COMP. {Ind.?, Epfc(Z)} 1- V(lnd.?, Epfc(Z))
VOTE-DCMP. {V(lnd.?,Epk(Z))} 1- Ind.?, Epfc(Z)
DIC.BLT-COMP. {Ssfc(s), Ep/j(Z)} h DigB(Ssfc(s),Epfc(Z))
DIC.BLT-DCMP. {DigB(S,jk(5),Ep&(Z))} h SgA;( )^, Ep^ j(Z)
RAW.BLT-COMP. {5 , Ep/j(Z)} h Raw(s, Epfc(Z))
RAW.BLT-DCMP. (Raw(s,Epfc(Z))} h Epfc(Z)
IND-COMP. h Ind.?
IND-DCMP. {Ind.?} h ?
Table 7.2: Deduction rules capturing the properties of vVote voting system mes­
sages
As mentioned earlier, the set comms needs to be defined for all messages in the 
model illustrated in Figure 7.3 so th a t the intruder can justify tha t a message 
being heard is actually from a real communication between agents. As in the 
protocol, no agent sends any message to himself, for such communications are 
ensured to be omitted with a ^ h  below, which also implies tha t if an agent sends 
a message to himself, it cannot be blocked or spoofed by the intruder.
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comms {a.h.m  1 m  4— A4, a -f- A, & •<— A, a 6}
The messages in the model tha t make sense to  the intruder are; comms, all the 
messages from real communications, Nshcomms, the set of messages th a t cannot 
be blocked or spoofed by the intruder, and Ucomms, the set of insecure messages 
tha t the intruder can act as in the Dolev-Yao intruder model [DY83].
As all honest participants communicate on the NSB channels, not including a 
message type in the set Nsbcomms means tha t the intruder cannot even overhear 
tha t kind of message. Hence, the messages in the form of a ballot are not included 
in this set, as the intruder should not be able to observe any communication 
involving a ballot form between honest participants (denoted as commBallots). 
For example, a voter scanning her ballot form to the EBM should not be observed 
by the intruder and this is how he is prevented from overhearing and blocking 
the private channels.
Nsbcom m s = comms \ com m Ballots
The insecure messages th a t the intruder can overhear, block or use in any way 
in the line of Dolev-Yao model, are defined with the set Ucomms as follows. It 
should be noted tha t the set in the analysis of vVote covers all the messages tha t 
are communicated by the dishonest voter James.
Ucomms = \J({q .q '.f | q^q'J  4- comms, q ^  {James}, q' G- agents],
[q .q '.f I q.q '.f 4 -  comms, q i -  agents, q' 4 -  {James}})
The set Ucomms can be extended with any set of information. For instance, the 
insecure communications in Ucomms do not yet include the receipts taken by the 
voters during the election. Hence, the intruder cannot cannot block the voters 
taking their receipts as they are still on the no blocking channel. However, if 
we add the set of receipts tha t can be taken away by any voters (denoted as 
commReceipts) to  the set Ucomms, then the intruder could also block the voters 
taking their receipts because in such case receipt information would flow on the 
insecure communication channels. However, it should be noted th a t the more 
information is given to the intruder, the longer the automated verification takes 
due to  the increased number of deductions made by the intruder.
The intruder also needs a way to  identify the facts tha t are relevant to the mes­
sages, A4, and as in the NSPK analysis, those facts can be identified by using 
the explode function defined in Section 3.3. However, the function needs to be 
extended to  all messages in the set of messages A4 as shown in AllFacts below.
AllFacts =  {explode{m) | m  4— A4}
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The intruder’s possible deductions now can be found by applying all these facts 
to the deductions function deductionsÇ), which takes the message types as the 
param eter and returns the possible deductions according to the deduction rules 
displayed in Figure 7.2.
AllD eductions = deductions {Allfacts)
In order to  reduce the cardinality of the set of possible deductions, the facts 
tha t cannot be reachable by the intruder are omitted, which depends on his 
initial knowledge X /C . This knowledge covers the names of the candidates, voters 
and any other agents, such as, the POD service, and the public keys tha t any 
honest agent may know XJC = \J{A,C ,{pka  | a 4— A}). Subsequently, if the 
framework procedure as in Section 3.3 is followed, the learnable facts and then 
the deductions, T>, can be defined as follows:
PossibleBasicKnowledge =  K now n  U A4 
KnowableFacts = Close(PossibleBasicKnowledge)
Leamablefacts = KnowableFacts \ Known
V  = {(X, / )  I (X, / )  G AllDeductions, 
f  G Leamablefacts,
X  \ Knowablefacts = 0}
Now, the processes tha t form the intruder model can be defined. These processes 
use the channel leam  to learn a fact, and the say channel to say the fact to 
the other agents. Moreover, the channel infer allows deductions between facts. 
Thus, the process Ignorantof below ensures th a t all facts in Leamablefacts have 
the state: the process can always learn a fact, but it can only say it once it is 
known. The process is the same as used in the NSPK analysis except for the line 
where it flags up when the intruder knows a secret (This will be discussed when 
studying the secrecy specification in Section 7.5).
Ignorantof ( f)  = f  G A4 L: learn, f  -4 Knows{f)
□ infer? t e { { X , f )  | (X, / ' )  e V , f  = f } ^  Knows (f)
Knows(f) = f  E A4 k. sa y .f -4 Knows{f)
U f  E A4 k  learn, f  -4  Knows{f)
O G { ( X , f  ) | (X , / )  G D , /  G X }  XTZowg(/)
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Consequently, the intruder process can be defined as a parallel composition of 
facts, where AlphaL[f) defines the alphabet of each fact and the internal events 
infer are hidden.
In truder  =
chase(( || {Ignorant{f), A lphaL{f)))\{\infer\])
f  ELeam ablefacts
III Say Known
The process SayKnown defined below ensures tha t the proper messages th a t are 
already known are learned and said, since the facts tha t are of relevance to the 
initial knowledge X/C are not included in the Leamablefacts and AllDeductions.
SayKnown =  sa y .f  G Known PI A4 -4 SayKnown
□ learn, f  G Known D A4 -4 SayKnown
7.2.6 P utting the Network Together
Figure 7.5 illustrates how the intruder is connected to the dishonest voter James, 
and the honest voter Alice, whereby Alice’s private channel scomm  is kept private, 
but her insecure NSB channels can be observed by the intruder, whereas all the 
channels of James are under the control of the intruder. That is, the intruder 
can overhear all insecure communications acting as a medium, but he can only 
intercept and fake the messages in the form of insecure data Ucomms (it defines all 
communications from and to James) as defined in the previous section. Moreover, 
he has no power over the private channels of the honest voters.
The processes tha t construct the voting system model and the intruder model are 
connected by using the renaming operator. That is, nsbcomm.a.b.m  and learn  
channels are renamed to a take  channel, and the nsbcomm.b.a.m  and say channels 
are renamed to a fake channel from the agent a ’s point of view. Similarly, the 
intruder process is also renamed and the aim is to connect them as is done in 
Figure 3.2. Hence, the intruder channel learn.m  is mapped to the events of the 
form take.a.b.m, and say.m  is renamed to fake.a.b.m. To this end, a renaming 
function for the process P  and agent name p  can be defined as follows:
r{P,p) = nsfecomm.pJI
^sbcomm.a.p, fake.a.p p | ^ E A])
pcomm.p, ta/ce.p y gcomm.p, scomm.p{^
^comm.a.p, f a k e . a . p J p  | a g
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scorn m.f
/ nsbcomm.].a.f
Jam es ' scom m .j.a.f
nsbcomm.a.j.f 
scom m .a.j.f
nsbcomm.f
earn.f
ntrudert
nsbcomm.f
Figure 7.5: The lazy spy intruder model
Hence, the renamed voter process for the voter v, for instance, can be defined as 
follows. Note that, the private channel scom m  is renamed to the take  and fa k e  
channels, because this models the malicious behaviour of a corrupt voter.
r( Voter{v, c), v) =
Voter {v, c)
]^shcomm.v, agbcomm.f, nshcomm.v^
/o,A:e.(z.rynsbcomm.a.r, asbcomm.a.t; | a G A]]
pcom m .v, take.v! scomm.v, scomm.v}[
/aAre.a.fygcom m .a.f, scom m .a.r | a G A.]]
Similarly, the other processes tha t construct the vVote voting system model are 
renamed as in the above example. Consequently, the voting system model. Model, 
which is ready to be modified by the intruder, is defined as the parallel compo­
sition of all those renamed processes.
Model =
rVoters || rPollworker || rAuthority  || rE B M  || rPodservice || rPrinter  
II rB a llo tm anager  || rP odclien t || r W B B  || rT e ller
The parallel composition (interface parallel) above is constructed in a way tha t 
the processes only synchronise on the nsbcom m  and scom m  channels on which
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they send messages to each other, leaving the insecure channels {take, fake)  
vulnerable to  be used by the intruder. The following shows how two processes 
are put in an interface parallel and therefore, the above parallel composition of 
Model should be constructed in this way.
Model =
rVoters || rPollworker || . . .
%
where
X  =  {\nsbcom m .v.Tom ,nsbcom m .Tom .v,
scom m.v.Tom , scom m.Tom .v  | u 4— V |}
Similarly, the intruder process is prepared by renaming as below so tha t the 
intruder can overhear the messages on the insecure NSB channels {Nsbcomms) 
and act as the Dolev-Yao intruder on the insecure channels {Ucomms). For the 
vVote analysis, these sets are defined in the previous section.
r In truder =
In truder
|say, learn !  say^
p.p'.f € Nsbcomms,
./, . / y/earn./, Zearn./ | q.q'.f E Ucomms, ]]
p f  y , 9 f  9^
^fake.p.p . / fsa y .f | p.p'.f € Ucomms, p ^  p']]
The process SysterUyVote is then defined in terms of the parallel composition of 
Model and rintruder, which synchronise on the channels they share.
SystenriyVote =  Model || rintruder
II nsbcomm, take, fa k e  j}
Having modelled the system, it is ready to be automatically analysed under the 
anonymity requirement in the next section.
7.3 Autom ated Anonym ity Verification
In this section, the first fully-automated analysis of the vVote voting system is 
presented under a Dolev-Yao intruder model and using the anonymity definition 
given in Definition 2 as the specification. It requires tha t when the two chan­
nels c.x and d.x are swapped over for all values of x, if the resulting process is
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indistinguishable from the original one, then the process provides anonymity. In 
the previous section, the system where the honest agents of the voting system 
model and the intruder interact has been modelled as the process SystemyVote- 
In this system, the process rVoters is defined as the parallel composition of the 
rVoterÇ) processes for each of the voters: Alice, Bob and James. However, the 
anonymity specification in this chapter is approached in a different way whereby 
the two systems, which are expected to be indistinguishable, are defined as two 
separate system behaviours without using the renaming operator. Hence, the 
following processes, namely, rVotersi and rVoters2  model the two different vot­
ers’ behaviour, which may result in two different system behaviours: on the one 
hand Alice votes for Zoe, Bob votes for Victor and James can vote for either Zoe 
or Victor, whereas on the other hand, Alice votes for Victor, Bob votes for Zoe 
and again James can vote for any of them. The resulting two different system 
behaviours are System ' a n d  S y s t e m " respectively. Note tha t the misbe­
having voter, James, shares his knowledge with the intruder, thus his behaviour 
is modelled with the renamed voter process rVoteri), which allows the intruder 
to use his knowledge, whereas the honest voters Alice and Bob are modelled using 
the honest voter model VoterQ. However, the NSB channels can still be observed 
by the intruder, meaning th a t the intruder acts passively on these channels.
rVotersi ={Voter{Alice, Zoe) ||| Voter{Bob, Victor))
III {rVoter{James, Zoe) □ rVoter{James, Victor))
rVoters2  ={Voter {Alice, Victor) ||| Voter {Bob, Zoe))
III {rVo ter {James, Zoe) n  rVoter{James, Victor))
The systems are modelled in such a way tha t the intruder can see everything 
James does, including his private messages, whilst Bob and Alice can vote freely 
without any interception/blocking or spoofing. That is, although the intruder 
can still overhear the public channels and inference from those messages, Alice 
and Bob vote under the private and NSB channel assumptions.
As in the Prêt à Voter analysis, the observational equivalence th a t is used for 
the analysis necessitates masking of the encrypted values in order to avoid false 
positive attacks, as the intruder can distinguish two ciphertexts, even if he does 
not know the secret key—this was not a case in the NSPK [NS78] analysis as the 
secrecy specification is different from the anonymity used in this analysis. To this 
end, a masking function maskFact is deployed. The function renames all messages 
encrypted under a public key, whose corresponding secret key is not known by 
the voter, to a data ciphertext and if the secret key is in the intruder’s initial 
knowledge, then he is allowed to differentiate two ciphertexts by not masking 
them.
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maskFact(Epfc(m)) =
if dual(p/c) e  XJC then Epfe(m) else ciphertext
The masking function m ask(P ) can also be defined for the processes, which masks 
all encrypted facts of a given process, P , using the maskFact function for all the 
data  th a t appears in this process. (No keys are ever sent over the network, so 
if the intruder does not know a secret key at the beginning, he will not learn it 
later.)
m ask{P) =
p^achannel.a.a' .D\gB{Ssk (&), maskFact(Epfc (/))}/achannel.a.a' .D\gB{S sk (&), Epfc (0)]] 
^channel.a.a'.Raw{s, fr\Bskf3ct{Epk{l)))^dQ]i(iiineLa.a'.Ra\N{s, Epfc(/))]]
^achannel.a.a'.V(Ind.i, maskFact(Epfc(/))) j achannel.a.a'.V{\udi.i, Bpk(/))]]
where achannel E {nsbcomm, take, fa k e] , the serial number s e S ,  the candidate 
list I E C and the index value i EX.
After applying the masking function to  both System 'yVote S y s t e m ' ' they
are ready for the analysis under the anonymity specification. To this end, the 
anonymity requirement of this voting system model is checked with the following 
trace equivalence in which the private channels are hidden.
mBsk{System'yyo te )  \  { I  scomm  |} = t  mask{System''yy^te) \  { I  scomm  |}
FDR verifies th a t the two systems refine each other, meaning tha t they are trace 
equivalent and hence tha t the intruder cannot distinguish them. As a result, the 
vVote voting system model provides anonymity under the Dolev-Yao intruder 
model.
7 .4  Analysis under Alternative Assum ptions
In the previous section, the analysis was conducted under the assumption of hon­
est protocol participants except of the third voter James, and of the existence 
of a Dolev-Yao intruder interacting with the participants. Although, the frame­
work used in the previous section provides a firm comprehensive foundation for 
analysis of voting systems, it is also im portant to see whether the framework sup­
ports further extensions to those assumptions made previously, because one of 
the im portant challenges in electronic voting systems may be to maintain require­
ments even under the assumption of the corrupt agents, for instance, misbehaving 
participants. Such analyses are possible with slight modifications to the voting 
system and the intruder models. The following paragraphs present two of these 
analyses of the vVote under different assumptions.
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C o rru p t P O D  S erv ice The POD service is an im portant part of the print- 
on-demand protocol. It receives raw ballot data  including a serial number s 
and candidate list encrypted under pkps, and sends the digital ballot by signing 
the serial number to the POD client. If the POD service is corrupt, which is 
modelled as tha t the POD service’s secret is possessed by the intruder, the raw 
ballot received by the POD service, say Raw(s3 , Epkps{Sq.{Zoe, Victor))), can be 
captured and decrypted by the intruder. Hence, the intruder can extract the 
candidate list Sq.{Zoe, Victor) and deduce its association with the serial number 
S3 . Following this, when he observes th a t Alice’s receipt with the index value Ind.l 
has the serial number S3 on it, he is then able to infer th a t Alice has voted for the 
first candidate of the candidate list Sq.{Zoe, Victor), which is Zoe. Therefore, 
the intruder distinguishes the two systems as Alice cannot have voted for Victor. 
This counter-example is produced by FDR automatically and illustrated by the 
following partial trace.
( • • •
nsbcomm.author ity.wbb. Raw(s3 , ciphertext),
nsbcomm.authority.podservice.RBVj{s‘i, Epfcp^(Sq.(.Zoe, Victor))),
nsbcomm.podservice.podclient.D\gB{Sskps ciphertext), 
enter Booth. Alice, 
nsbcomm. Alice.ebm.\x\d.l)
It can be observed from the above trace tha t the intruder cannot decrypt the 
ciphertext in the message sent from the authority to the WBB, as it is encrypted 
under the authority’s public key pkpAi which is seen as ciphertext in the trace.
This scenario emphasises the importance of the single point failure in the protocol 
security. In the real system, however, the POD service is thresholded, meaning 
tha t all threshold parties, sign, encrypt or decrypt messages jointly, without any 
party learning the ballot order. Therefore, the above would be a threat against 
vVote, should all threshold parties collude.
C o rru p t A u th o r ity  A similar approach can be taken to model a corrupt elec­
tion authority, who leaks sensitive information th a t can be used by the intruder. 
Since the authority is responsible for assigning random candidate lists to  each 
requested serial number from the ballot manager, the candidate list encrypted 
under the authority’s public key will be revealed when he is corrupt. Therefore, 
the intruder’s accurate deduction about the candidate lists would violate voter 
anonymity by revealing the candidate list of a ballot form used by a particular 
voter. The following trace produced by FDR demonstrates tha t when the au­
thority is compromised, which is modelled as the intruder knows his secret key 
skpA, the intruder violates Alice’s anonymity by deducing how she has voted. In
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more detail, the intruder can overhear the candidate order Sq.{Zoe, Victor) on 
Alice’s ballot form before she casts her vote. Once Alice indicates her preference 
by the index value Ind.l, the chosen candidate, Zoe, is revealed to the intruder.
( . . .
enter Booth. Alice
nsbcomm.author ity.wbb.Raw {s I, Epkp^ (Sq.(Zoe, Victor))), 
nsbcomm.authority.podservice.Raw{si, ciphertext),
nsbcomm.podservice.podclient.D\gB{Sskps (^i), ciphertext),
nsbcomm. Alice.ebm.\r\d.l)
Although no one is supposed to  be observing voter interaction with the EBM, 
it is assumed here th a t the index value Ind.z sent from voter to the EBM can 
be observed, as it will be observed anyway once she takes her receipt from the 
receipt printer. Thus, the two counter-examples above were found by FDR when 
the intruder could observe these index values. If the intruder was not allowed 
to do so, the counter-examples would still appear once the voter has taken her 
receipt in a protocol run. Moreover, the two counter-example traces above include 
only nsbcomm  events, which illustrates tha t the intruder does not need to  block 
or spoof messages on those channels and hence a passive observer possessing the 
corresponding secret keys would also be able to  attack the system.
There are numerous corruption scenarios one can think of and th a t can be mod­
elled and analysed using this framework. In particular, the two presented here 
emphasise the importance of the case of a corrupt single entity, such as the elec­
tion authority and POD service, where the voters are at a high risk of losing their 
anonymity. The vVote voting system has a solution to these problems, to  some 
extent, by having the ballot forms generated by the threshold election authori­
ties. However, if the other trusted entities, like the EBM, are acting dishonestly, 
the system is vulnerable to  various attacks. Additionally, it was observed tha t 
a corrupt WBB does not reveal anything useful for the intruder to break the 
anonymity requirement of the system, because the WBB is public anyway.
The next section investigates the modelling and analysis of the secrecy require­
ment for voting systems.
7.5 Secrecy Analysis using Lazy Spy
The lazy spy intruder model [RG97] was used to verify the authentication and 
secrecy requirements of security protocols (the la tter is also introduced in Sec­
tion 3.3.4). In the NSPK analysis in Chapter 3, a secret is defined as the terms 
{A toB , B toA }, and the intruder model is defined so th a t when the intruder learns
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one of the secrets in a protocol run, the process flags it up using the channel 
intruder know 8 . W hen this event occurs in a protocol run, the secret is not se­
cret any more. Previously, in the anonymity requirement analysis of vVote, this 
event was omitted because such an event was not needed for the formal speci­
fication of this requirement. However, perhaps not for the paper-based voting 
systems, where the voters are generally not required to use public key pairs to 
encrypt their votes, but especially in remote voting systems, this specification 
can be used to verify whether the voting systems maintain the secrecy of the 
votes. T hat is, it can be verified whether the intruder ever gets to  know a secret 
originated by a particular voter or any other agent. Moreover, the secret data 
can be defined more specifically for each voting system, such as, a candidate en­
crypted and cast by the voter as in the FOO scheme [F0092], in which a voter 
encrypts her vote, blinds the encrypted version and sends it to the registrar. To 
this end, the highlighted expression below is added to the intruder model to flag 
up the intruder’s knowledge about a secret /• from the set of secrets Banned.
Ignorantof ( f)  = /  E M. Szlearn .f —> Knows{f)
O E {(% ,/) | (A, / )  e  D, /  =  / }  -4^
Knows {f) = /  E say.f Knows(f)
D f  E M. Sz learn, f  —)■ Knows{f)
O E { ( % ,/ ' )  | (%, f  ) E D , /  E ^
□ /  E B a n n e d  Sz i n t r u d e r k n o w s . f  —> K n o w s ( f )
Consequently, for the secrecy specification of a voting system, the following trace 
refinement needs to be checked.
STO P  E t  System  \  {| intruder knows |}
where B  is the alphabet of the process System :
=  {| nsbcomm, take, fake , intruder knows |}
7.6 Discussion
In the beginning of the modelling of vVote and the intruder, a need for different 
channel types was mentioned. Regarding this, the need came out when the model 
was initially analysed under the full Dolev-Yao intruder model tha t can overhear, 
intercept and spoof any messages on all channels other than the private channels. 
From this initial analysis, the following counter-example was produced, which
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shows th a t with such an intruder the vVote voting system is open to  anonymity 
attacks, which verifies the observation made in [KR05] about the FOO voting 
system [F0092].
( • ■ •
scomm.podcUent.AUce.B{Sq.{Zoe,Victor),Sskpsi'^^)^ Ind.O),
comm.Æzce.e6m.Ind.l,
scomm.podclient.Bob.B{Sq.{Zoe, V ictor), Sskpsi^2)i Ind.O),
comm.Ro6.e6m.lnd.2,
closeElection,
comm.wbb.teller.y  (lnd.2, ciphertext), 
take.wbb.teller.y  {\nd. 1, ciphertext), 
comm.teller.wbb.Zoe.B)
W hat the intruder does here is to block or intercept with the channel take  all 
the other votes except Bob’s. In this case, Alice has voted for Zoe with the index 
value Ind.l and Bob has voted for Victor with lnd.2 on the private channels—the 
candidate orders on the private channels scomm  are hidden in the analysis and 
they are revealed here just for illustration. Once the election is closed, tallying 
starts and the votes are transferred from the WBB to the teller, the intruder 
intercepts the vote with the index value Ind.l, and waits until Bob’s vote is 
counted. Having seen tha t no one has voted for Zoe, the intruder then deduces 
th a t Bob has voted for Victor. This is a genuine and generic attack—not only to 
vVote, but it is applicable to  any voting system. However, as it is not possible 
in a real system th a t the intruder can block all votes but one, it was assumed in 
the analysis tha t at least two honest votes are tallied at the end of the election. 
This was modelled with the existence of NSB channels adapted from Creese et 
al. [CGRZ03, CGH+05] and therefore, there exist at least two honest voters who 
vote on the NSB channels nsbcomm. On the other hand, the intruder works fully 
on James’ messages on the public and private channels as if he votes in public.
Having modified the system with the adaptation of insecure NSB channels, it was 
verified th a t the vVote voting system provides anonymity. This, together with 
the corrupt agent scenarios, demonstrated tha t the abstract models and formal 
definitions of requirements are adequate for the automatic verification of voting 
system protocols. Additionally, it was shown tha t the active intruder model used 
in this chapter is much more powerful in terms of mounting various kinds of 
attacks than the passive attacker model used in the previous analyses [MHS12, 
MHS 13], which can only observe the messages on the public channels.
7.7. Challenges Faced in the Modelhng and Analysis 147
7.7 Challenges Faced in the M odelling and 
Analysis
This section presents the challenges faced during the modelling of vVote and 
automated verification of it. Similar issues in the previous voting system models 
occur in this modelling gathering around the state explosion problem.
Recall tha t in Section 7.2.3 we abstracted away some of the system components, 
such as; thresholded decryption teller, distributed ballot generation and mixnet 
(see 7.2.3 for the detailed information about the abstracted components). The 
framework adapted here is much more complex than the original lazy spy as we 
have more deduction rules in our framework than lazy spy. Hence, even with this 
abstracted model it requires the use of compression techniques in order it to be 
checked by FDR. Hence, the compression function chase() was used as it is the 
most beneficial part of the original lazy spy framework. However, although the 
process P  may have a number of paths of rs  to follow to a final state, ch a se (P )  
chooses one path to follow. Although, chase does not preserve the semantics of 
nondeterminism in the processes, it does not, however, impact on the processes, 
for example lazy spy [Ros97]. Hence, it is safe to use in the analysis of voting 
systems. The operator was used in the In truder  process when the intruder learns 
new facts with the event, infer. The r s  tha t come up by hiding the occurrences 
of infer events, and th a t are chased by the operator represent the facts learned 
by the intruder.
In truder =
chase(( || {Ignorant{f), A lphaL{f)))\{\infer\})
fE L eam ablefacts
III SayKnown
Additionally, as the states needed for analysis grow quickly, some of the system 
behaviour can also be omitted, however, this would need an extra effort in order 
not to  lose possible system attacks. In the modelling of vVote here, the voter 
always takes her receipt—the intruder never blocks the channel on which the 
voter takes her receipt. However, if it is desired, then more power could be 
given to the intruder in order him to block these channels by extending Ucomm 
as demonstrated in Section 7.2.5. On the other hand, the impact of this for 
FDR would be huge. After giving such power to the intruder, the number of 
states th a t FDR needs to check increases from 16,063,214 to 42,945,122 million 
states. Therefore, some of the system behaviour tha t would give no advantage 
rather than postponing the verification may be restricted in order to get a small 
number of state search.
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Similar to the analysis of Prêt à Voter in the previous chapter, a masking function 
was needed to be employed here too in order not to produce false-positives when 
the intruder can distinguish encrypted ciphertexts.
Table 7.3 illustrates the verification times of the automated analysis of vVote vot­
ing system based on the efficient models. In the table, the restricted Dolev-Yao 
(D-Y) is the intruder model tha t is restricted to only a subset (James’s communi­
cations) of all messages, whereby he can act as in the Dolev-Yao intruder model. 
The restriction is modelled with the existence of private and NSB channels. Ad­
ditionally, the full D-Y model is where the intruder can act maliciously on all 
channels (there does not exist any NSB channel), but the private ones voters’ 
privacy is still maintained. However, the refinement does not hold, which neces­
sitates the NSB channels in the model (see Section 7.6 for a discussion about the 
need for the NSB channels and a counter-example trace). The restricted and full 
D-Y results cannot be compared with each other, as the verification times vary 
depending on the voters’ being honest or dishonest, they give some idea about 
how large a model FDR can handle before state explosion for each test.
3v 2c 
3v 3c 
4v 2c 
4v 3c
Restricted D-Y 
Refine States
/  16,063,214
Time
IhlAmbGs
Full D-Y
Refine States
2v 2c 
2v 3c 
2v 4c 
3v 2c
X
X
899,494
5,040,658
Time
lm45s
227n26s
Table 7.3: The FDR verification times for vVote. As the required state space
grows quickly with the number of voters and candidates, it was not possible to 
produce results in some cases as FDR cannot handle with such huge states. Those 
are denoted as ” in the table.
7.8 Summary
In this chapter, a formal approach to modelling and analysis of cryptographic vot­
ing systems has been proposed. In addition to the previously defined anonymity 
requirement, a CSP approach for formal specification of secrecy has been given in 
terms of trace refinements. In order to validate the suitability of the framework, 
the vVote voting system was analysed against the anonymity requirement. To do 
so, in addition to the cryptographic deduction rules expressed in Section 3.3, an 
extensive number of other such rules regarding voting systems have been defined. 
These enable the intruder to learn and deduce further from his knowledge so as to 
able to use it to break the protocol objectives. Moreover, special channel types.
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private and NSB channels, have been introduced in order to reason about voting 
systems under appropriate assumptions, as it has been observed tha t no voting 
system model is anonymous under the full Dolev-Yao intruder model. Moreover, 
as voting systems are too complex to  model and analyse in full detail, some of 
the properties of vVote, such as, distributed ballot generation with a thresholded 
POD service, have been abstracted away by assuming th a t thresholded parties 
work as a single honest agent.
The automated verification of these refinements has been conducted using the 
FDR model checker. It was shown tha t even though the voting system models 
are too complex resulting in a number of deduction rules being needed for rea­
soning about them, FDR together with lazy spy is adequate in the analysis of 
such systems thanks to  the la tte r’s efficient structure, thus avoiding unnecessary 
inferences. It has also been seen th a t the framework used in this chapter is very 
efficient in terms of cutting down the unnecessary states and quite flexible for 
modelling any misbehaviour by corrupt agents, when analysing voting systems 
under different assumptions, for instance, with a corrupt authority and a POD 
service.
Chapter 8
C onclusion and Future W ork
This chapter reviews the results tha t were achieved in this thesis, presents the 
limitations of this work tha t have been identified and the future direction tha t it 
might be useful to focus upon.
This thesis will help the evaluation of voting systems by defining some of the 
security requirements and providing novel approaches to automatic analysis in 
formal methods. In particular, having shown tha t for a rigorous security protocol 
analysis, suitable and concise specifications of the requirements are needed, an 
anonymity definition has been given tha t has been demonstrated to be appropri­
ate for the analysis of voting systems through analysing of this feature for four 
cryptographic and non-cryptographic voting systems.
Throughout the analysis, it is has been shown tha t the underlying assumptions of 
voting system designs play a crucial role when claiming tha t the scheme provides 
certain desired properties. That is, an assumption made when designing a voting 
system should be precisely defined so as to understand whether the system truly 
provides what it is claimed. Moreover, a voting system may be secure under an 
assumption, which is not realistically satisfied in practice, thus requiring an effi­
cient realistic assumption. In summary, the assumptions under which protocols 
are secure should be: realistic and precisely defined. This conclusion has been 
made clearer during the analysis of the ThreeBallot voting system. T hat is, it 
was demonstrated tha t this system does not provide anonymity under various 
formulations of the short ballot assumption. However, given a reasonable and 
plausible interpretation of this assumption, the ThreeBallot is, in fact, protected 
from reconstruction attacks.
Cryptographic voting systems, which are similar to security protocols for many 
aspects, may contain flaws in their design, requiring rigorous formal analyses. 
However, as such protocols are too complex for analysis at a full level of de­
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tail with current methods, it is hard to provide a technique to analyse them. 
Hence, the thesis has provided a novel approach to  the formal analysis of crypto­
graphic voting systems using lazy spy [RG97], acting as the Dolev-Yao intruder 
model [DY83], with a number of modifications to the model so as to capture 
voting system properties. Moreover, the framework was also found to be flexi­
ble when analysing voting systems under alternative assumptions such as there 
being a corrupt mixnet or election authority. Additionally, the framework pre­
sented here has been shown to be applicable for secrecy analysis in general, but 
in particular for remote voting systems.
In the analyses throughout this thesis, the FDR model checker [GGH+] has been 
used. It has been demonstrated th a t FDR, together with the lazy spy intruder 
model or the passive attacker model, was efficient for automatically finding pos­
sible attacks on voting systems, for instance, the CVS, ThreeBallot, Prêt à Voter 
and vVote voting systems, should they fail to  meet the anonymity requirement.
8.1 Limitations
State space considerations meant th a t only relatively small models with a few 
voters and candidates could be verified as shown in Tables 5.5 and 7.3. More­
over, although automated analysis has been shown to be a successful approach 
as proved by finding counter-examples for a failure of the protocol requirement, 
proving directly th a t the system meets the claimed properties would need an 
infinite-state model. In order to  generalise the verification to models of arbitrary 
size, there are several techniques in the literature th a t can be employed, such as 
structural and data-independent induction [Ros97, Laz99, HealO, RoslO]. How­
ever, data-independence techniques do not easily apply to the models tha t have 
been developed here as the established results require rather strict conditions, 
which have not been satisfied in our models. It is not currently clear whether it 
is possible to manipulate them into the appropriate form, but it seems unlikely. 
For instance, using functions (such as card )  on data-types and the replicated par­
allel operator is not allowed in the models so as to satisfy data-independence 
technique, which are key features in our models presented in this thesis. More­
over, inequality tests are also forbidden in CSP models, and these are implicit in 
determining a winner in our models. The most im portant limitation with these 
techniques is regarding the specifications: there should be no hiding or renam­
ing operators used in the specification. However, the anonymity specifications 
applied in this work are based on these operators. Similarly, the structural in­
duction technique also appears to  be a promising approach, but there are a few 
limitations with this technique too. For instance, it will be necessary to be cre­
ative so to find a finite-state description of the behaviour for use in the inductive 
step [RoslO], and it is not clear th a t this is possible as larger models will have
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more states unless a way can be found of abstracting them away. T hat is, this 
technique will not be applicable to any model tha t publishes a final tally, because 
the addition of extra voters increases the number of possible results and hence 
impedes clear finite description. On the other hand, a generalisation based 
on the following opinions can be made, along the lines of work by Ryan et al. 
[RSG+00]:
“Any attack on Anna and Bob tha t could ever arise through the 
intruder using any number of third party identities could equally arise 
if all of these were replaced in the trace by a single identity other than 
Anna or Bob.”
Moreover, Roscoe [Ros97] observes tha t
“W ith the great majority of protocols it would not improve the 
intruder’s prospects to have any more identities (Donald, Eve, etc.) 
to play with. This is because any attack which involved more than 
one of these identities acting would also work with them all being 
Cameron.”
Similarly, Syverson et al. [SMCOO] have established tha t the Dolev-Yao intruder 
with multiple identities can be reduced to one.
In the case of the vVote analysis, for instance, there existed two honest voters and 
a dishonest one James. Under the statements above, it therefore seems likely tha t 
the existence of other dishonest voters, like James, in an election run, would not 
change the analytical results achieved during the analysis of this voting system. 
This is because the existence of more than one dishonest voter would not give 
any further information to the intruder tha t could be used to attack the protocol 
requirement.
It should be noted th a t although the CSP models were aimed at refiecting the 
voting system protocols, it was not possible to model them completely and con­
sequently, some parts of the voting systems had to be abstracted away, such as: a 
threshold set of agents, decryption key sharers and a complete mixnet. Nonethe­
less, they were sufficient to demonstrate the appropriateness of the framework in 
automated verification of cryptographic and non-cryptographic voting systems. 
Additionally, due to the abstracting away of cryptographic algorithms and as­
suming they work perfectly, the attacks tha t may be caused by them have not 
been covered in the analyses of cryptographic voting systems in this thesis.
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8.2 Future Work
There are several directions which can broaden research on the analysis of voting 
system protocols. Firstly, the frameworks proposed in this thesis could also be 
used to analyse such protocols against a number of other requirements, such as 
fairness. Although, the term is used to describe different desirable properties, 
what is meant here is tha t no partial results, which could affect voters’ prefer­
ences, are revealed before the tallying phase. This property is described in terms 
of reachability and observational equivalence as a secrecy property and has been 
used to analyse the voting system FOO [F0092] in [KR05]. Hence, the frame­
work proposed in this thesis for the secrecy property can also be used to verify 
voting systems regarding such properties th a t can be defined in terms of secrecy.
Additionally, other privacy-related voting system properties tha t are worth in­
vestigating are coercion-resistance and receipt-freeness. Heather and Schnei­
der [HS12] proposed a framework for autom ated verification of these properties. 
It is stated tha t their framework does not seem possible for mechanised analysis 
due to the structure of the refinement used in their coercion-resistance definition. 
In more detail, each instruction tha t may be given to the voter by the coercer 
needs to be defined as a CSP process so as to compose the set of all possible 
instructions. However, it is not realistic or plausible to define all possible coercer 
instructions as a CSP process because the coercer can misbehave in so many ways 
th a t we may not foresee. Therefore, further research regarding these properties 
(coercion-resistance and receipt-freeness) is a future direction worth pursuing.
An attem pt to automate the analysis of these properties was conducted by 
Backes et a l [BHM08] using the symbolic definitions of them by Delaune et 
a l [DKR06]. However, it was not fully mechanised as some human effort was 
needed when transforming each of the equivalences in the coercion-resistance def­
inition into a biprocess. This researcher’s intuition is tha t coercion-resistance can 
be automatically checked by modelling the most im portant instructions given by 
the intruder to the voters, such as randomisation, Italian and forced-abstention 
attacks, and analysing voting systems against these attacks individually.
As mentioned in the limitations section, the Prêt à Voter and vVote voting system 
models used in this thesis are not complete versions, because it was assumed that 
certain parts of the systems work honestly and correctly, such as there being: a 
distributed ballot generation, a threshold set of mixes and th a t the WBB works 
in a distributed fashion. Hence, a logical next step would be automated analysis 
of these complex mechanisms, in terms of such aspects as: robustness, correctness 
and anonymity. Moreover, because of the abstraction level in the analyses in this 
study, it was not possible to investigate some of the cryptographic primitives 
th a t are used in voting systems especially in mixnets, such as, zero-knowledge
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proofs and homomorphic encryptions. Hence, the applicability of such primitives 
in the adapted approach remains an open research question requiring further 
investigation.
The four voting systems investigated in this thesis were all paper-based including 
two cryptographic and two non-cryptographic. In order to extend the application 
domain of the framework presented, some of the remote voting systems, such 
as JC J [JCJ05] and P retty  Good Democracy (PGD) [RT09] requiring different 
kinds of trust assumptions, should be considered for analysing automatically. 
Although voting remotely is more convenient than voting in polling station, there 
exist issues in authentication between the voter and voting system server, and 
trustworthiness of the integrity of the election results as well as voter anonymity 
and secrecy of the vote. In terms of secrecy in remote voting systems, it can be 
defined in many ways depending on the methods tha t are used in system design. 
For instance, the secrecy of the vote in postal voting depends on the secrecy 
of the conventional mail system. Moreover, in an internet-based remote voting 
system where the voter uses her public key to encrypt her vote, the secrecy of 
the vote depends on the secrecy of her secret key and the strength of the public 
key algorithm. To sum up, for automated analysis of remote voting systems, 
definitions of the requirements, such as, secrecy, may differ from the ones in 
paper-based voting systems, and channel types tha t are different than  the ones 
used in this thesis may be required.
It has been observed tha t other process calculus tools and approaches, such as spi- 
calculus [AG97] and the automated tool ProVerif [BlaOl] as well as the process- 
algebraic language /iCRL and its toolset [BFG'*'01], have also been used in the 
analysis of voting systems. Moreover regarding this, a comparison between these 
tools has been occasionally asked for by the reviewers of the published papers and 
hence, further endeavours to this end could be undertaken. Similarly, as the ap­
proach in the analyses in this research was possibilistic, deploying a probabilistic 
framework in accordance with some of reviewers’ comments of work previously 
submitted by this researcher could prove beneficial. For instance, in Chapter 5 
when measuring the likelihood of the privacy assumptions’ being fulfilled in the 
ThreeBallot voting system, a probabilistic approach might have been deployed, 
such as in the line of [DPP07], in order to capture levels of privacy rather than 
an absolute measure. However, ThreeBallot has already been subjected to such 
treatm ent in [Str06a, Str06b].
A ppend ices
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A ppendix A
Sanity  Checks
In model checking, one can question the correctness of the system model. Such 
possible errors in designing the desired behaviour of systems can be detected by 
further reasoning via various sanity checks written as specifications. If the system 
model behaves correctly for all possible cases, then one can be sure th a t the model 
is correct. However, it is not an easy task to  try  all the possible cases, instead, 
a number of necessary sanity checks can help to  gain confidence in the model. 
The following sections present sanity checks performed for each voting system 
modelled and analysed in this thesis. The CSPm  codes for the CSP models and 
the analysis of the voting systems involved are available on [Mori3]. Note th a t 
they may differ slightly from the ones presented here in terms of the syntax used.
A .l The Conventional Voting System  M odel
Before performing a formal analysis on the CVS model, it is wise to check th a t 
the voting system preserves some desired properties, by means of appropriate 
sanity checks (see Section 4.4 for the analysis of the model).
A. 1.1 N o one can vote after the election
The model should not allow a voter to vote after the election is closed. T hat 
is, no cast event should be observed following a closeElection event. The sanity 
specification and the assertion to be checked can be expressed as follows:
S a n ityS p ec i =closeE lection  -4- Closed 
□
O  ( cast.v.s.c  -A S a n ityS p ec i I  
vev
sGS
cec
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Closed = closeElection -4- Closed
Sanity-Speci Ç t  System cvs  \  ^ \ { |  closeElection, cast |}
A .I .2 The number of votes tallied corresponds to the  
number of cast votes
The model can also be checked as to whether the number of votes tallied at the 
end of the election run with the model corresponds to  the number of votes cast 
during the election. The specification S a n ityS pec 2  and the assertion for this test 
can be defined as follows:
Sanity-Spec2  =  Count {0)
Count{n) =
O  (  cast.v.s.c  -4  if n  <  card(V) then C ou nt(n+ l)  else STO P  )
vev
sEScec
□
O ( total.c\.i -4  Counti {n — i) )
ie {0 ...c a r d (V )}
Counti (s) =
□
je {0 ...c a r d (V )}
 ^ total.C2 . j  -4  if s =  j  then total.c^.O -4  SKIP  else  ^
I iîO  < s  — j  and s — j  <  card(V) then \
^ y  to ta l.cs.{s — j ) S T O P  else STO P j  y
Note th a t the processes are restricted in order to avoid an infinite number of 
states as FD R  cannot handle this, such as, s -  j  <  card(V) above. It is not 
necessary for the process itself, but useful for FD R.
Sanity—Spec2  E t  System cvs  \  ^ '{ 1  cast, total |}
As expected, the sanity checks are satisfied showing tha t the model does not 
allow votes after the election is closed, and nor does it miscount the total number 
of votes. There are other sanity checks tha t it is wise to  perform on the model, 
but for brevity just these two above are discussed here.
A. 2 The ThreeBallot Voting System  M odel
The following sanity checks are used to gain more confidence in the correct be­
haviour of the ThreeBallot model analysed in Chapter 5.
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A.2.1 No one can be authenticated twice
It is ensured in the ThreeBallot model th a t a voter can be authenticated only 
once to prevent multiple voting attacks. Thus, the specification for this check is 
modelled as follows:
Auth(v) = auth.v  -4  STO P  
Sanity-Spec3 = \\\^^yAuth{v)
Hence, the assertion th a t needs to be checked is:
Sanity-Specs E t  Systemss \  T"\{| auth |}
A .2.2 No one can fill in a ballot form before being
authenticated
W ith the first sanity check of the ThreeBallot model, only the eligible voters can 
vote and they can vote only once in an election. Because only the auth  and the 
place events are involved in this sanity test, all the other events can be hidden. 
Thus, regarding this sanity check, the specification SanitySpec^  can be w ritten 
as follows:
Check{v) =  auth.v  -4  Authed{v)
Authed(v) =  □  place.v.{i,j) -A- Authed{v) )
{i , j )ECoords
□
auth.v  -4  Authed{v)
SanitySpec^ = \\\^^yCheck{v)
and the refinement tha t needs to  be held is:
SanitySpec^  E t  Systemss \  ^ '{ l  auth,place |}
A .2.3 No one can vote after the election
For the sake of fairness and the correctness of the election results, all eligible 
voters should be able to vote during the election — once the election is closed, 
casting ballots should not be allowed. For this sanity check, all irrelevant events 
can be hidden except the closeElection and place events. Thus, the aim is not to 
let the System sB  process allow any place events happening after a closeElection 
event. In consequence, the specification SanitySpecs  can be expressed as follows:
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SanitySpecs =closeElection —> Closed 
□
□  (  place.v.{i,j) -> SanitySpecs  )
vev
{ i , j )eCoords
Closed = closeElection  -4 Closed
The following is the refinement check for this sanity test.
SanitySpecs  E t  SystemsB  \  ^ \ { |  closeElection,place |}
A .2.4 The number of votes tallied corresponds to  the  
number of cast votes
It can be verified whether the model reflects the number of cast votes to the final 
tally. Hence, if the total number of place events is the same as the number of 
votes tallied for each candidate at the end of election (total number of votes is 
announced with the total events), the specification is satisfied. Because only the 
events place and total are dealt with, the rest of the events can be hidden. The 
corresponding specification SanitySpecs  can be defined as follows;
Sanity S p e c s=  Count {0)
Count{p) = □  ( p l a c e . v . { i , j ) C o u n t i p  + I) ^
vev
{ i , j )e Coords
□
□  (  total.c -4 C ountiip  — %) )
c G C \{ c i }
C o u n tiij)  =  to ta l.c\.j -4 STO P
Therefore, the following refinement check needs to be held in order for the model 
to  satisfy this sanity test.
San itySpecs  E t  SystemsB \  {| total,place, done |}
As expected, the sanity checks above were successfully satisfied by the ThreeBal­
lot CSP model.
A.3 The Prêt à Voter Voting System  M odel
The following four sanity checks provide more confidence tha t the behaviour of 
P rêt à Votermodel is as expected, which is analysed in Chapter 6.
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A.3.1 N o one can be authenticated twice
The following is the  specification for th is sanity check, which ensures th a t no one 
can be au thenticated  m ultiple tim es in the  model.
Auth(v) =  auth.v  -4  STO P  
S a n ityS p ec j =  \\\^^>^;Auth(v)
Hence the  refinement below, in which the events in E  o ther th an  the  event auth 
are hidden, should be satisfied by the  P rê t à  Voter voting system  model. A 
violation of the  specification would m ean th a t the model allows a voter to  be 
authenticated  twice.
S an ityS p ec 7  E t  System pav  \  {| auth |}
A .3.2 No one can fill in a ballot form before being
authenticated
This sanity  is involved w ith the authentication and m arking events auth  and 
m ark, respectively, and hence the o ther events from E  can be hidden. A ddition­
ally, th is specification is not concerned w ith how m any tim es a voter can au then­
ticate  herself to  the  election official. Thus, the specification process S a n ityS pecs  
can be modelled as:
Check(v) =  auth.v  -4  Authed(v)
Authed(v) =  □  ^ m ark.v .x  -4  Authed(v) )
X E markedforms 
□
(  auth.v  -4  Authed(v) )
S an ityS pecs  =  \\\y^y Check (v)
The following refinement check ensures th a t the  P rê t à  Voter model allows only 
authenticated  voters to  m ark a ballot form.
S an ityS pecs  E t  System pav  \  {| auth, mark |}
A .3.3 No one can vote after the election
The P rê t à  Voter CSP model System pav  process should not allow a  cast event 
after a  closeElection event. Hence, the  following ensures th a t  such a trace  is not 
possible in the  model. Similarly, the  events in E  except for the  closeElection and 
cast events can be hidden.
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SanitySpecg  =closeE lection  -4  Closed 
□
O  cast.x  -4  SanitySpecg  )
xEmarkedRHSs 
Closed =  closeElection  -4  Closed
Hence, the  following refinement needs to  be checked for th is sanity  test. 
S anitySpecg  E t  SystempaV \  ^ ' { |  closeElection, cast |}
A .3.4 The number of votes tallied corresponds to  the  
number of cast votes
W hat is checked here is w hether the  to ta l num ber of cast votes is the  same as the  
num ber of votes tallied a t the  end of the  election. Because the  events th a t  are 
involved in th is sanity  check are the  cast and total events, the  rest of the  events 
in E  can be hidden. The specification San ityS pecio  and the  refinement check 
can be defined as follows:
San ityS pecio  =  Count(O)
Count(n) =  □  ^ cast.x-A' C ou n t(n+ l)  )
xEmarkedRHSs
□
O  f  to ta l.c i.i -4  Counti{n  — 0  )
ie {0 ...c a r d (V )}
Counti (j)  =  total.C2 .j -4  STO P
The following refinement verifies w hether the  P rê t à  Voter system  model satisfies 
th is sanity  test.
S an ityS pec io  E t  SystempaV \  ^ ' { |  cast, total |}
FD R  confirms th a t all th e  sanity  checks defined above are satisfied by the  P rê t à  
Voter voting system  CSP model.
A.4 The vVote Voting System  M odel
The following four sanity  checks provide more confidence th a t the  behaviour of 
vVote model is as expected and the  analysis of this is carried out in C hapter 7.
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A .4.1 N o one can be authenticated twice
The following is the  specification for th is sanity check, which ensures th a t no one 
can be authenticated  twice in the  model.
Auth(v) =  nsbcomm.v.Tcm.V  —> STO P
S a n ityS p ec ii =  \\\^^yAuth(v)
T he events in E  other th an  the  events where the  voters au thenticate themselves 
can be hidden and hence, the  following refinement check should be satisfied by 
the  vVote voting system  model. A violation of the  specification would m ean th a t 
the  model allows a voter to  be au thenticated  twice.
S a n ityS p ec ii E t  Sysiem^vote \  -^'{1 nsbcomm.v.Tom.v | G V |}
A .4 .2 N o one can fill in a ballot form before being  
authenticated
As the  authentication and m arking events, nsbcom m .v.Tom .v  and 
nsbcomm .v.ebm.i, respectively, are involved in th is sanity  check, the  o ther 
events from E  can be hidden. Additionally, th is specification is not concerned 
w ith how m any tim es a voter can be au thenticated  and thus, the  specification 
process S a n ityS p ec i2  can be w ritten  as:
Check(v) =  nsbcom m .v.Tom .v -4  Authed(v)
Authed(v) =  O  ^ nsbcomm .v.ebm.i-A-Authed(v) )  
iEl 
□
(  nsbcom m .v.Tom .v -4  Authed(v) )
Sanity-Speci2  =  \\\.^^^yCheck(v)
The following refinement check ensures th a t the  vVote model allows only au then­
ticated  voters to  send an index value, corresponding to  the  chosen candidate, to  
the  EBM.
S a n ityS p ec i2  E t  System^vote \  E \  A
, where A =  {| nsbcom m .v.Tom .v, nsbcomm.v.ebm  | f  E V |}.
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A .4.3 N o one can vote after the election
The vVote CSP model, SysterriyVote, should not allow a vote casting event, mod­
elled as nsbcomm.V.ebm.i after a closeElection event. Hence, the following en­
sures such a trace is not possible in the model.
San itySpecis  =closeElection -4- Closed 
□
O f nsbcomm.V.ebm.i -4  San itySpecis  )  
vEV  
i G l
Closed = closeElection -4  Closed
Hence, the following verifies whether the model satisfies this sanity test. 
San itySpecis  E t  SystemyVote \  E \  A  
, where A  = {\ nsbcomm.v.ebm, closeElection | u G V ]}.
A .4.4 The number of votes tallied corresponds to  the  
number of cast votes
W hat is checked here is whether the total number of casting events modelled 
as nsbcomm.V.Ebm.i is the same as the number of votes tallied, which is the 
sum of votes received by the candidates Zoe and Victor. Hence, the specification 
San ityS p ec ii can be defined as follows:
S a n ityS p ec ii = Count(O)
Count(n) =  □  f  nsbcomm.V.ebm.i -4  Count(n-f-l) )
v EV
iEX
□
O f nsbcomm.teller.wbb.Zoe.i -4  Counti {n — i) )  
ie { 0 .. .c a r d (v )}
C ountiij) = nsbcomm.teller, wbb. Victor, j  -4  STOP
The following refinement verifies whether the vVote system model satisfies this 
sanity check.
S a n ityS p ec ii E t  SystemyVote \  E \  A
, where A  = {\nsbcomm.v.ebm,nsbcomm.teller.wbb  | u E V |}.
FDR confirms tha t all the sanity checks defined above are satisfied by the vVote 
voting system CSP model.
B ibliography
[ACW+06] R. Araujo, R. Custodio, A. Wiesmaier, T. Takagi, and Technis- 
che Universitat Darmstadt. An electronic scheme for the Farnel 
paper-based voting protocol. In ACNS, 2006.
[Adi08] Ben Adida. Helios: Web-based open-audit voting. In Proceedings of 
the 17th USENIX Security Symposium, pages 335-348, 2008.
[AG97] M artin Abadi and Andrew D. Gordon. A calculus for cryptographic 
protocols: the spi calculus. In Proceedings of the f th  AC M  Confer­
ence on Computer and Communications Security, GGS ’97, pages 
36-47, New York, NY, USA, 1997. AGM.
[App07] Andrew W. Appel. How to defeat Rivest’s ThreeBallot voting sys­
tem. Unpublished, 2007.
[BBG04] BBG:website. Florida ballot papers go missing, October 2004. h t tp :  
//n e w s .b b c .c o .u k / l/h i/w o rld /am erica s /3 9 6 0 6 7 9 . stm.
[BBK+12] Josh Benaloh, Mike Byrne, Philip T. Kortum, Neal McBurnett, 
Olivier Pereira, Philip B. Stark, and Dan S. Wallach. STAR-Vote: 
A secure, transparent, auditable, and reliable voting system. CoRR, 
abs/1211.1904, 2012.
[BGH+12a] Graig Burton, Ghris Gulnane, James Heather, Thea Peacock, Peter 
Y. A. Ryan, Steve Schneider, Sriramkrishnan Srinivasan, Vanessa 
Teague, Roland Wen, and Zhe Xia. A supervised verifiable voting 
protocol for the Victorian Electoral Commission. In Electronic Vot­
ing, pages 81-94, 2012.
[BGH‘^ 12b] Graig Burton, Ghris Gulnane, James Heather, Thea Peacock, Peter 
Y. A. Ryan, Steve Schneider, Sriramkrishnan Srinivasan, Vanessa
167
168 Bibliography
Teague, Roland Wen, and Zhe Xia. Using Prêt à Voter in Victoria 
State elections. In E V T  /  WOTE, 2012.
[BFG+Ol] Stefan Blom, Wan Fokkink, Jan  Friso Groote, Izak van Langevelde, 
Bert Lisser, and Jaco van de Pol. /iCRL: A toolset for analysing 
algebraic specifications. In CAV^ pages 250-254, 2001.
[BG02] Dan Boneh and Philippe Golle. Almost entirely correct mixing with 
applications to voting. In Proceedings o f the 9th AC M  Conference 
on Computer and Communications Security, CCS ’0 2 , pages 68-77, 
New York, NY, USA, 2002. ACM.
[BHM08] Michael Backes, Catalin Hritcu, and M atteo Maffei. Automated 
verification of remote electronic voting protocols in the applied pi- 
calculus. In CSF, pages 195-209, 2008.
[BlaOl] Bruno Blanchet. An efficient cryptographic protocol verifier based 
on prolog rules. In CSFW, pages 82-96, 2001.
[Bla09] M att Blaze. Is the e-voting honeymoon over?, March 2009. h t tp :  
/ / www.crypto. co in /b log /vo te_ fraud_ in_ken tucky /.
[BP05] Mohit Bhargava and Catuscia Palamidessi. Probabilistic anonymity.
In M artin Abadi and Luca de Alfaro, editors, CONCUR 2005 - Con­
currency Theory, volume 3653 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 
pages 171-185. Springer Berlin /  Heidelberg, 2005.
[BRS07] A. Baskar, R. Ramanujam, and S. P. Suresh. Knowledge-based mod­
elling of voting protocols. In TARK, pages 62-71, 2007.
[BT94] Josh Benaloh and Dwight Tuinstra. Receipt-free secret-ballot elec­
tions (extended abstract). In STOC, pages 544-553, 1994.
[CanOl] Ran Canetti. Universally composable security: a new paradigm for 
cryptographic protocols. In Proc. f 2nd IEEE Symp. Foundations of 
Computer Science, pages 136-145, 2001.
[CCC+08] David Chaum, Richard Carback, Jeremy Clark, Aleksander Essex, 
Stefan Popoveniuc, Ronald L. Rivest, Peter Y. A. Ryan, Emily Shen, 
and Alan T. Sherman. Scantegrity II: End-to-end verifiability for 
optical scan election systems using invisible ink confirmation codes. 
In Proceedings of the Conference on Electronic Voting Technology, 
pages 14:1-14:13, Berkeley, CA, USA, 2008. USENIX Association.
[CCC'^IO] Richard Carback, David Chaum, Jeremy Clark, John Conway, Alek­
sander Essex, Paul S. Herrnson, Travis Mayberry, Stefan Popove­
niuc, Ronald L. Rivest, Emily Shen, Alan T. Sherman, and Poorvi L.
Bibliography 169
Vora. Scantegrity II municipal election at Takoma Park: the first 
E2E binding governmental election with ballot privacy. In Proceed­
ings of the 19th USENIX Conference on Security, USENIX Secu- 
rityTO, pages 291-306, Berkeley, CA, USA, 2010. USENIX Associa­
tion.
[CCK12] Rohit Chadha, Stefan Ciobaca, and Steve Kremer. Automated ver­
ification of equivalence properties of cryptographic protocols. In 
Helmut Seidl, editor. Programming Languages and Systems, volume 
7211 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 108-127. Springer 
Berlin Heidelberg, 2012.
[CCM08] Michael R. Clarkson, Stephen Chong, and Andrew C. Myers. Civitas: 
Toward a secure voting system. In IEEE Symposium on Security and 
Privacy, pages 354-368, 2008.
[CEA07] Jeremy Clark, Aleks Essex, and Carlisle Adams. On the security 
of ballot receipts in E2E voting systems. In lAVoSS Workshop On 
Trustworthy Elections (W OTE), July 2007.
[CEC*^08] David Chaum, Aleksander Essex, Richard Carback, Jeremy Clark, 
Stefan Popoveniuc, Alan T. Sherman, and Poorvi L. Vora. Scant­
egrity: End-to-end voter-verifiable optical-scan voting. IEEE Secu­
rity & Privacy, 6(3):40-46, 2008.
[CCH+05] Sadie Creese, Michael Goldsmith, Richard Harrison, Bill Roscoe, 
Paul W hittaker, and Irfan Zakiuddin. Exploiting empirical engage­
ment in authentication protocol design. In Proceedings of the Sec­
ond International Conference on Security in Pervasive Computing, 
SPC’05, pages 119-133, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2005. Springer-Verlag.
[CCRZ03] Sadie Creese, Michael Goldsmith, Bill Roscoe, and Irfan Zakiuddin.
The attacker in ubiquitous computing environments: Formalising 
the threat model. In Formal Aspects of Security, 2003.
[Cha81] David Chaum. Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and
digital pseu-donyms. Communications of the ACM, 24:84-90, Febru­
ary 1981.
[Cha88] David Chaum. The dining cryptographers problem - unconditinal
sender and recipient untraceability. Journal of Cryptology, 1:65-75, 
1988.
[Cha04] David Chaum. Secret-ballot receipts: True voter-verifiable elections.
IEEE Security & Privacy, 2(l):38-47, 2004.
170 Bibliography
[CKW08] Jacek Cichon, Miroslaw Kutylowski, and Bogdan Weglorz. Short 
ballot assumption and Threeballot voting protocol. In Proceedings 
of the 3 4 th Conference on Current Trends in Theory and Practice of 
Computer Science, SOFSEM’08, pages 585—598, Berlin, Heidelberg, 
2008. Springer-Verlag.
[COPD06] Tom Chothia, Simona Orzan, Jun Pang, and Mohammad Torabi 
Dashti. A framework for automatically checking anonymity with 
fiCRL. In TGC, pages 301-318, 2006.
[CPP06]
[CRS05]
[CSll]
[Cull3]
[DH76]
[DKR06]
[DKR09]
[DKRIO]
Konstantinos Chatzikokolakis, Catuscia Palamidessi, and Prakash 
Panangaden. Anonymity protocols as noisy channels. In Information 
and Computation. Springer, 2006.
David Chaum, Peter Y. A. Ryan, and Steve A. Schneider. A practical 
voter-verifiable election scheme. In ESORICS, pages 118-139, 2005.
Véronique Cortier and Ben Smyth. Attacking and fixing helios; An 
analysis of ballot secrecy. In Computer Security Foundations Sym ­
posium (CSF), 2011 IEEE 2 4 th, pages 297-311, 2011.
Chris Culnane. Software design for VEC vVote system. Technical 
Report CS-13-01, University of Surrey, 2013.
W. Difiie and M.E. Heilman. New directions in cryptography. Infor­
mation Theory, IEEE Transactions on, 22(6):644-654, 1976.
Stéphanie Delaune, Steve Kremer, and Mark Ryan. Coercion- 
resistance and receipt-freeness in electronic voting. In CSFW, pages 
28-42, 2006.
Stéphanie Delaune, Steve Kremer, and Mark Ryan. Verifying 
privacy-type properties of electronic voting protocols. Journal of 
Computer Security, 17(4):435-487, December 2009.
Stéphanie Delaune, Steve Kremer, and Mark Ryan. Towards trust­
worthy elections. In David Chaum, Markus Jakobsson, Ronald L. 
Rivest, Peter A. Ryan, and Josh Benaloh, editors. Towards Trustwor­
thy Elections, chapter Verifying privacy-type properties of electronic 
voting protocols: a taster, pages 289-309. Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 
Heidelberg, 2010.
[dMPQ07] Olivier de Marneffe, Olivier Pereira, and Jean-Jacques Quisquater.
Simulation-based analysis of E2E voting systems. In Proceedings of 
the 1st International Conference on E-voting and Identity, VOTE- 
ID’07, pages 137-149, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2007. Springer-Verlag.
Bibliography 171
[DPP07] Yuxin Deng, Catuscia Palamidessi, and Jun Pang. Weak probabilis­
tic anonymity. Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science, 
180(l):55-76, June 2007.
[DRS08] Stéphanie Delaune, Mark Ryan, and Ben Smyth. Automatic ver­
ification of privacy properties in the applied pi calculus. In Yu- 
cel Karabulut, John Mitchell, Peter Herrmann, and ChristianDams- 
gaard Jensen, editors. Trust Management II, volume 263 of IFIP  - 
The International Federation for Information Processing, pages 263- 
278. Springer US, 2008.
[DSS03] David L. Dill, Bruce Schneier, and Barbara Simons. Voting and
technology: who gets to count your vote? Communications of the 
ACM, 46(8):29-31, August 2003.
[DY83] Danny Dolev and Andrew C. Yao. On the security of public key
protocols. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 29(2):198 -  
208, mar 1983.
[E1C84] Taher ElCamal. A public key cryptosystem and a signature scheme
based on discrete logarithms. In CRYPTO, pages 10-18, 1984.
[FA02] Cédric Fournet and M artin Abadi. Hiding names: Private authenti­
cation in the applied pi calculus. In ISSS, pages 317-338, 2002 .
[F0092] A. Fujioka, T. Okamoto, and K. Ohta. A practical secret voting
scheme for large scale elections. In AUSCRYPT, pages 244-251, 
1992.
[GGH+] Paul Gardiner, Michael Goldsmith, Jason Hulance, David Jack­
son, Bill Roscoe, Brian Scattergood, and Bryan Armstrong. FDR2 
user manual, h t tp  : / /www. f  s e l . com /docum entation/f d r2 /h tm l/ 
index .h tm l.
[GHPv05] Flavio D. Garcia, Ichiro Hasuo, Wolter Pieters, and Peter van 
Rossum. Provable anonymity. In Proceedings of the 2005 ACM  
Workshop on Formal Methods in Security Engineering, FMSE ’05, 
pages 63-72, New York, NY, USA, 2005. ACM.
[Gj0 lO] Kristian Gjpsteen. Analysis of an internet voting protocol. lA C R
Cryptology ePrint Archive, 2010:380, 2010.
[G0 0O8] Dan Goodin. E-voting outfit confesses vote-dropping software
bug, August 2008. h ttp ://w w w .th e re g is te r .c o .u k /2 0 0 8 /0 8 /2 6 / 
d ecade_o ld_evo ting_erro r/.
2Y2 Bibliography
[Gum05] Andrew Gumbel. Steal this vote : dirty elections and the rotten
history of democracy in America. Nation Books, 2005.
[Hea07] James Heather. Implementing STV securely in Prêt à Voter. In
CSF, pages 157-169, 2007.
[HealO] James Heather. Using rank functions to verify authentication proto­
cols. PhD thesis. Royal Holloway, University of London, 2010.
[HHK95] M. R. Henzinger, T. A. Henzinger, and P. W. Kopke. Computing
simulations on finite and infinite graphs. In Proceedings of the 36th 
Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, FOGS ’95, 
pages 453-, Washington, DC, USA, 1995. IEEE Computer Society.
[Hoa78] C. A. R. Hoare. Communicating sequential processes. Communica­
tions o f the ACM, 21:666—677, August 1978.
[HS04] Dominic Hughes and Vitaly Shmatikov. Information hiding,
anonymity and privacy: a modular approach. Journal of Computer 
Security, 12(l):3-36, 2004.
[HS12] James Heather and Steve Schneider. A formal framework for mod­
elling coercion resistance and receipt freeness. In FM, pages 217-231, 
2012.
[HSS09] Kevin Henry, Douglas R. Stinson, and Jiayuan Sui. The efltective- 
ness of receipt-based attacks on ThreeBallot. IEEE Transactions on 
Information Forensics and Security, 4(4):699-707, December 2009.
[Jak99] Markus Jakobsson. On quorum controlled asymmetric proxy re­
encryption. In Proceedings of the Second International IMorkshop 
on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptography, 1999.
[JCJ05] Ari Juels, Dario Catalano, and Markus Jakobsson. Coercion-
resistant electronic elections. In Proceedings of the 2005 ACM  Work­
shop on Privacy in the Electronic Society, WPES ’05, pages 61-70, 
New York, NY, USA, 2005. ACM.
[JJR02] Markus Jakobsson, Ari Juels, and Ronald L. Rivest. Making mix
nets robust for electronic voting by randomized partial checking. In 
USENIX Security Symposium, pages 339-353, 2002.
[JMP09] Hugo Jonker, Sjouke Mauw, and Jun Pang. A formal framework for
quantifying voter-controlled privacy. Journal of Algorithms, 64(2- 
3):89 -  105, 2009.
Bibliography 173
[Jon09] Hugo L. Jonker. Security Matters: Privacy in Voting and Fairness in
Digital Exchange. PhD thesis, Eindhoven University of Technology 
and University of Luxembourg, 2009.
[JP ll] Hugo Jonker and Jun Pang. Bulletin boards in voting systems; Mod­
elling and measuring privacy. In ARES, pages 294-300, 2011.
[KR05] Steve Kremer and Mark Ryan. Analysis of an electronic voting pro­
tocol in the applied pi calculus. In ESOP, pages 186-200, 2005.
[KSW05] Chris Karlof, Naveen Sastry, and David Wagner. Cryptographic
voting protocols: a systems perspective. In Proceedings of the I f th 
Conference on USENIX Security Symposium  - Volume I f, SSYM’05, 
pages 3-3, Berkeley, CA, USA, 2005. USENIX Association.
[KTVll] R. Kiisters, T. Truderung, and A. Vogt. Verifiability, privacy, and
coercion-resistance: New insights from a case study. In Security and 
Privacy (SP), 2011 IEEE Symposium on, pages 538 -553, May 2011.
[KZIO] Miroslaw Kutylowski and Filip Zagorski. Scratch, click & vote:
E2E voting over the internet. In David Chaum, Markus Jakobsson, 
Ronald Rivest, Peter Ryan, Josh Benaloh, Miroslaw Kutylowski, and 
Ben Adida, editors. Towards Trustworthy Elections, volume 6000 of 
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 343-356. Springer Berlin 
/  Heidelberg, 2010.
[Laz99] Ranko S. Lazic. A Semantic Study of Data Independence with Appli­
cations to Model Checking. D. phil. thesis, Oxford University Com­
puting Laboratory, 1999.
[LB03] Michael Leuschel and Michael Butler. Prob: A model checker for b.
In Keijiro Araki, Stefania Cnesi, and Dino Mandrioli, editors, FME 
2003: Formal Methods, volume 2805 of Lecture Notes in Computer 
Science, pages 855-874. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2003.
[LJPIO] Barbara Lucie Langer, Hugo Jonker, and Wolter Pieters. Anonymity
and verifiability in voting: Understanding (un)linkability. In ICICS, 
pages 296-310, 2010.
[Low95] Cavin Lowe. An attack on the Needham-Schroeder public-key au­
thentication protocol. Information Processing Letters, 56 (3): 131- 
133, 1995.
[Low96] Cavin Lowe. Breaking and fixing the Needham-Schroeder public-
key protocol using FDR. In Proceedings of the Second International
174 Bibliography
Workshop on Tools and Algorithms for Construction and Analysis 
of Systems, pages 147-166, London, UK, 1996. Springer-Verlag.
[Mea03] Catherine Meadows. Formal methods for cryptographic protocol
analysis: emerging issues and trends. IEEE Journal on Selected 
Areas in Communications, 21(l):44-54, 2003.
[Mer92] Rebecca T. Mercuri. Physical verifiability of computer systems. In
The Fifth International Computer Virus and Security Conference, 
March 1992.
[MH13] M urat Moran and James Heather. Automated analysis of voting
systems with Dolev-Yao intruder model. In Automated Verification 
of Critical Systems AVOCS, September 2013.
[MHS 12] M urat Moran, James Heather, and Steve Schneider. Verifying
anonymity in voting systems using CSP. Formal Aspects of Com­
puting, pages 1-36, 2012.
[MHS 13] M urat Moran, James Heather, and Steve A Schneider. Automated
anonymity verification of the ThreeBallot voting system. In IFM, 
pages 94-108, June 2013.
[Morl3] M urat Moran. CSP codes for CVS, ThreeBallot. Prêt à Voter and
vVote voting systems. May 2013. h t tp  : //m uratm oran . w ordp ress. 
co m /p u b lica tio n s/.
[MVd04] S. Mauw, J. Verschuren, and E. P. de Vink. A formalization of
anonymity and onion routing. In ESORICS, pages 109-124, 2004.
[MV096] Alfred J. Menezes, Scott A. Vanstone, and Paul C. Van Oorschot.
Handbook of Applied Cryptography. CRC Press, Inc., Boca Raton, 
FL, USA, 1st edition, 1996.
[NAN05] Christoffer Rosenkilde Nielsen, Esben Heltoft Andersen, and
Hanne Riis Nielson. Static validation of a voting protocol. Elec­
tronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science, 135(1):115-134, July
2005.
[NefOl] C. Andrew Neff. A verifiable secret shuffle and its application to
e-voting. In Proceedings of the 8th AC M  Conference on Computer 
and Communications Security, CCS ’01, pages 116-125, New York, 
NY, USA, 2001. ACM.
[NS78] Roger M. Needham and Michael D. Schroeder. Using encryption for
authentication in large networks of computers. Communications of 
the ACM, 21(12):993-999, December 1978.
Bibliography 175
[Pai99] Pascal Paillier. Public-key cryptosystems based on composite degree
residuosity classes. In EUROCRYPT, pages 223-238, 1999.
[Ped92] Torben P. Pedersen. Non-interactive and information-theoretic se­
cure verifiable secret sharing. In Proceedings of the 11th Annual 
International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology, 
CRYPTO ’91, pages 129-140, London, UK, 1992. Springer-Verlag.
[PIK94] Choonsik Park, Kazutomo Itoh, and Kaoru Kurosawa. Efficient
anonymous channel and all/nothing election scheme. In Tor Helle- 
seth, editor. Advances in Cryptology EU RO C RYPT’93, volume 765 
of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 248-259. Springer 
Berlin Heidelberg, 1994.
[PKOO] Andreas Pfitzmann and Marit Kohntopp. Anonymity, unobservabil­
ity, and pseudonymity - a proposal for terminology. In Workshop on 
Design Issues in Anonymity and Unobservability, pages 1-9, 2000.
[RBH"^09] Peter Y. A. Ryan, David Bismark, James Heather, Steve A. Schnei­
der, and Zhe Xia. P rêt à Voter: a voter-verifiable voting system. 
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 4(4):662-673, 2009.
[RC97] A.W. Roscoe and M.H. Coldsmith. The perfect ’’spy” for model-
checking cryptoprotocols. In D IM  ACS workshop on the design and 
formal verification o f cryptographic protocols, 1997.
[Riv06] Ronald L. Rivest. The ThreeBallot voting sys­
tem, 2006. h t t p : / / p e o p le .c s a i l . i i i i t . e d u / r iv e s t /
R ivest-T heT hreeB allo tV otingSystem .pdf.
[Ros97] A. W. Roscoe. The Theory and Practice of Concurrency. Prentice
Hall PTR, Upper Saddle River, NJ, USA, 1997.
[RoslO] A. W. Roscoe. Understanding Concurrent Systems. Springer-Verlag
New York, Inc., New York, NY, USA, 1st edition, 2010.
[RP05] Peter Y. A. Ryan and Thea Peacock. Prêt à Voter: a systems per­
spective. Technical report, Newcastle University, 2005.
[RPIO] Peter Y. A. Ryan and Thea Peacock. A threat analysis of P rêt à
Voter. In David Chaum, Markus Jakobsson, Ronald Rivest, Pe­
ter Ryan, Josh Benaloh, Miroslaw Kutylowski, and Ben Adida, edi­
tors, Towards Trustworthy Elections, volume 6000 of Lecture Notes 
in Computer Science, pages 200-215. Springer Berlin /  Heidelberg, 
2010.
176 Bibliography
[RRE+05] Andrew Reynolds, Ben Reilly, Andrew Ellis, Jose Antonio Cheibub, 
Karen Cox, Dong Lisheng, Jorgen Elklit, Michael Gallagher, Allen 
Hicken, Carlos Huneeus, Eugene Huskey, Stina Larserud, Vijay Pati- 
dar, Nigel S. Roberts, Richard Vengroff, and Jeffrey A. Weldon. Elec­
toral system design: The new international IDEA handbook, 2005.
[RS06]
[RS07]
[RSA78]
[RSG+00]
[RT09]
[RTIO]
[Rya04]
[Rya05]
[Rya06]
[Rya08]
[Sch96]
Peter Y. A. Ryan and Steve A. Schneider. P rêt à Voter with re­
encryption mixes. In ESORICS, pages 313-326, 2006.
Ronald L. Rivest and Warren D. Smith. Three voting protocols: 
ThreeBallot, VAV, and Twin. In Proceedings of USENIX/ACCU­
R A TE  Electronic Voting Technology (EVT). Press, 2007.
Ronald L. Rivest, A. Shamir, and L. Adleman. A method for ob­
taining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems. Communi­
cations of the ACM, 21(2):120-126, February 1978.
Peter Y. A. Ryan, Steve A. Schneider, Michael H. Goldsmith, Gavin 
Lowe, and A. W. Roscoe. The Modelling and Analysis of Security 
Protocols : the CSP Approach. Addison-Wesley Professional, first 
edition, 2000.
Peter Y. A. Ryan and Vanessa Teague. P retty  good democracy. In 
Security Protocols Workshop, pages 111-130, 2009.
Kim Ramchen and Vanessa Teague. Parallel shuffling and its appli­
cation to  Prêt à Voter. In E V T  /  WOTE, 2010.
Peter Y. A. Ryan. A variant of the Chaum voter-verifiable scheme. 
Technical Report CS-TR-864, University of Newcastle upon Tyne, 
2004.
Peter Y. A. Ryan. A variant of the Chaum voter-verifiable scheme. 
In Proc. 2005 Workshop on Issues in the Theory of Security, pages 
81-88,2005.
Peter Y. A. Ryan. Putting the human back in voting protocols. In 
Security Protocols Workshop, pages 20-25, 2006.
Peter Y. A. Ryan. Prêt à Voter with paillier encryption. Mathemat­
ical and Computer Modelling, 48(1):1646-1662, 2008.
Steve A Schneider. Security properties and CSP. In Security and 
Privacy, 1996. Proceedings., 1996 IEEE Symposium on, pages 174- 
187, 1996.
Bibliography 177
[Sch99] Steve A. Schneider. Concurrent and Real Time Systems: The CSP 
Approach. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New York, NY, USA, 1st edition, 
1999.
[Sch04] Bruce Schneier. The problem with electronic voting machines,
November 2004. http : //www. schneier. com/blog/archives/ 
2004/ll/the_problem_wit.html.
[SLD09] Jun Sun, Yang Liu, and JinSong Dong. Model checking csp revis­
ited: Introducing a process analysis toolkit. In Tiziana M argaria and 
Bernhard Steffen, editors. Leveraging Applications of Formal Meth­
ods, Verification and Validation, volume 17 of Communications in 
Computer and Information Science, pages 307-322. Springer Berlin 
Heidelberg, 2009.
[SMCOO] Paul Syverson, Catherine Meadows, and Iliano Cervesato. Dolev-
Yao is no better than Machiavelli. In First Workshop on Issues in 
the Theory of Security - W IT S ’OO, pages 87-92, 2000.
[Smyll] Ben Smyth. Formal verification o f cryptographic protocols with auto­
mated reasoning. PhD thesis. School of Computer Science, University 
of Birmingham, 2011.
[SRKKIO] Ben Smyth, Mark Ryan, Steve Kremer, and Mounira Kourjieh.
Towards automatic analysis of election verifiability properties. In 
ARSPA-W ITS, pages 146-163, 2010.
[SS96] Steve A. Schneider and Abraham Sidiropoulos. CSP and anonymity.
In ESORICS, pages 198-218, 1996.
[Str06a] Charlie Strauss. A critical review of the triple ballot vot­
ing system, part2: Crack- ing the triple ballot encryp­
tion, 2006. http://www.cs.princeton.edu/~appel/voting/ 
Strauss-ThreeBallotCritique2vl.5.pdf.
[Str06b] Charlie Strauss. The trouble with triples: A criti­
cal review of the triple ballot (3ballot) scheme p a rti ,
2006. http://www.cs.princeton.edu/~appel/voting/
Strauss-TroubleWithTriples.pdf.
[TPR07] Thomas Tjpstheim, Thea Peacock, and Peter Y. A. Ryan. A case
study in system-based analysis: The ThreeBallot voting system and 
Prêt à Voter. In Vo Comp, 2007.
[XCH+10] Zhe Xia, Chris Culnane, James Heather, Hugo Jonker, Peter Y. A.
Ryan, Steve A. Schneider, and Sriramkrishnan Srinivasan. Versatile
178 Bibliography
Prêt à Voter: Handling multiple election methods with a unified 
interface. In INDOCRYPT, pages 98-114, 2010.
N ota tion
Explanation of some notation, left this in as it might be useful.
A set of agents
C set of candidates
T set of facts
X set of indices
C set of candidate lists
M set of messages
JV set of nonces
s set of serials
V set of voters
XK, set of initial knowledge
P/C set of all public keys
,s/c set of all secret keys
pk public key variable
sk secret key variable
k symmetric key variable
(pk, sk) public key pair variable
pka public key variable belonging to
ska secret key variable belonging to
f j i fact variables
S q .( / l .. ./n > sequence of facts
Epk(/) public key encryption
public key decryption
symmetric encryption
D&(/) symmetric decryption
S,A(/) digital signature
H (/) cryptographic hash
a agent variable
V voter variable
c candidate variable
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180 Notation
s
l
m
n
i
Indi  
Raw(s, Epfc(/)) 
DigB(Ssfc(s),Epfc(/)) 
B(Z, s, Indi)  
RHS(s,  Indi )  
R(S, fe (RHS(s , lndi ) ) )  
V ( l n d i ,  Epfc(Z))
serial number variable 
candidate list variable 
message variable 
nonce variable 
index variable 
vVote index 
vVote raw ballot 
vVote digital ballot 
vVote ballot form 
vVote RHS of a ballot form 
vVote receipt 
vVote vote
A cronym s
A K ISS  Active Knowledge in Security Protocols.
AV alternative vote.
C S P  Communicating Sequential Processes.
C V S conventional voting system.
D R E  Direct Recording by Electronics.
E 2E  end-to-end.
E B M  electronic ballot marker.
F D R  Failures-Divergence Refinement.
F F T P  first-past-the-post.
IN D -C C A 2  indistinguishability under adaptive chosen ciphertext attack. 
IN D -C P A  indistinguishability under chosen plaintext attack.
IR V  instant-runoff voting.
LTL linear temporal logic.
LTS labelled transition systems.
N S P K  Needham-Schroeder Public-Key.
P A T  Process Analysis Toolset.
P C D  Pretty  Good Democracy.
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182 Acronyms
P O D  print-on-demand.
R P C  randomised partial checking.
SB A  short ballot assumption.
S T V  single transferable vote.
T T P  trusted third party.
V E C  Victorian Electoral Commission.
V V P A T  voter-verified paper audit trail.
W B B  web bulletin board.
